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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The last century has seen little change in the conduct of litigation
before the United States Supreme Court. The Court's familiar proce-
dures-the October Term, the opening-answering-reply brief format
for the parties, oral argument before a nine-member Court-remain
essentially as before. The few changes that have occurred, such as
shortening the time for oral argument, have not been dramatic.
In one respect, however, there has been a major transformation in
Supreme Court practice: the extent to which non-parties participate
in the Court's decision-making process through the submission of
amicus curiae, or friend-of-the-court, briefs. Throughout the first cen-
tury of the Court's existence, amicus briefs were rare.' Even during
the initial decades of this century, such briefs were filed in only about
10% of the Court's cases. This pattern has now completely reversed
itself. In recent years, one or more amicus briefs have been filed in
85% of the Court's argued cases.3 Thus, at the close of the twentieth
century, cases without amicus briefs have become nearly as rare as
cases with amicus briefs were at the beginning of the century.
I Although dated, the best history of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court
remains Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE
LJ. 694 (1963). The first recorded appearance of an amicus curiae in the Supreme
Court occurred in 1821, see Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), which per-
haps not coincidentally was the first year the Court accepted written briefs for filing.
See DAVID M. O'BmN, SToRM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLncs
146 (1986).
2 See Steven Puro, The Role of Amicus Curiae in the United States Supreme Court:
1920-1966, at 56 tbl.III-l (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of
New York at Buffalo) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
See infra Figure 23 (presenting specific data evidencing the increased filing of
amicus briefs).
THE NFLUENCE OFAMICUS BRiEFS
Attitudes within the legal community about the utility and impact
of amicus briefs vary widely. Perhaps the most common reaction
among lawyers and judges is moderately supportive. Amicus briefs, it
is said, can provide valuable assistance to the Court in its delibera-
tions.* For example, they can present an argument or cite authorities
not found in the briefs of the parties, and these materials can occa-
sionally play a critical role in the Court's rationale for a decision. Al-
ternatively, these briefs can provide important technical or back-
ground information which the parties have not supplied.6 Those
sharing this perspective can point to the frequent citation of amicus
briefs in the Justices' opinions in support of the supposition that the
Court often finds such briefs helpful.
7
Other members of the legal community, however, offer a much
more negative assessment of amicus briefs. For example, Chief'Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has written that the amicus
briefs filed in his court provide little or no assistance to judges be-
cause they largely duplicate the positions and arguments advanced by
the parties.8 Those who share this assessment regard such filings as
4 See, e.g., Edmund Ruffin Beckwith & Rudolf Sobemheim, Amints Curiae-Minister
ofJustice, 17 FoRDHwAL. REv. 38 (1948); Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need
anAmicu?, 1J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 279, 281-83 (1999).
5 The Court will on occasion base its decision on a point or argument raised only
in an amicus brief. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion of O'Connor, J.) (ruling against petitioner on question of retroactivity even
though the issue "has been raised only in an amicus brief"); Oregon ex. reL State Land
Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 368 n.3, 382 (1977) (overruling an
earlier case even though this action was urged only by amici); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 646 n.3 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and adopting
exclusionary rule in cases of Fourth Amendment violations by state officials, even
though that course of action had been urged only by amicus ACLU). As a general
rule, however, the Court will not address issues raised only by an amicus. See, e.g., Del-
Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 154 & n.2 (1983) (citing
United Parcel Sent., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981), and noting the Court's
hesitation to address an issue raised only by an amicus).
6 Cf Justice Breyer Calsfor Experts to Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17,
1998, at A17 (quotingJustice Breyer as stating that "[amicus] briefs play an important
role in educatingjudges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping to make us
not experts but educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve the quality of our
decisions").
7 See infra text following note 40 (analyzing the frequency of references to amicus
briefs in the Court's opinions).
8 In an order explaining why he was denying leave to file a brief amicus curiae,
Judge Posner wrote the following:
After 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of which have
not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be good to scrutinize
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largely a nuisance-imposing unwarranted burdens on judges and
their staffs with few, if any, mitigating benefits. According to those
who harbor this negative assessment, the judicial system would be im-
proved if amicus filings were prohibited or at least sharply curtailed.9
Justice Scalia recently offered a third perspective on the wide-
spread filing of amicus briefs. The occasion was Jaffee v. Redmond 0
where the Supreme Court recognized a "psychotherapist's privilege"
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In a dissenting
opinion joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia of-
fered the following observation:
In its consideration of this case, the Court was the beneficiary of no
fewer than 14 amicus briefs supporting respondents, most of which came
from such organizations as the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Psychoanalytic Association, the American Association of State
Social Work Boards, the Employee Assistance Professionals Association,
Inc., the American Counseling Association, and the National Association
of Social Workers. Not a single amicus brief was filed in support of peti-
tioner. That is no surprise. There is no self-interested organization out
there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal courts. The expecta-
tion is, however, that this Court will have that interest prominently-in-
deed, primarily-in mind. Today we have failed that expectation, and
that responsibility."
Justice Scalia's reference to "self-interested organizations" and his
lack of surprise in finding no amicus arguing against creation of an
evidentiary privilege suggest that amicus briefs reflect a form of inter-
est group lobbying directed at the Court. His remarks further suggest,
these motions in a more careful, indeed a fish-eyed, fashion.
The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of the litigants
and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants' briefs, in effect merely ex-
tending the length of the litigants' brief. Such amicus briefs should not be al-
lowed.
Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner,J., in chambers).
9 Among Supreme Court Justices, Robert Jackson at least occasionally expressed
such a view of amicus briefs. In Craigv. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947),Jackson made the
following remark about the amicus brief filed by the American Newspaper Publishers
Association:
[I]t does not cite a single authority that was not available to counsel for the
publisher involved, and does not tell us a single new fact except this one:
"[The Association's] membership embraces more than 700 newspaper pub-
lishers whose publications represent in excess of eighty per cent of the total
daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers published in this country."
Id. at 397.
10 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
n Id. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in keeping with the interest group theory of politics, 12 that well-
organized interest groups will be more likely to file amicus briefs than
will diffuse and poorly organized interests. Most significantly, Justice
Scalia intimates that the over-representation of well-organized interest
groups through amicus filings may have an influence on the outcomes
reached by the Court. He at least suggests that this is what happened
in Jaffee, in which the highly disproportionate amicus support for the
respondent may have sent a clear signal to the Court that a decision
recognizing a psychotherapist's privilege would more likely receive ac-
claim from organized groups than one rejecting such a privilege.
The critical but unstated variable that divides these different per-
spectives is the model of judicial decision making adopted by each
commentator. Each of the three positions corresponds to a different
model of judging, which in turn suggests a different pathway of influ-
ence that amicus briefs may have on the outcomes reached by courts.
3
The first or moderately supportive view of amicus briefs implicitly
12 See, e.g., NEAL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECTALTERNAnvES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, EcoNoMIcs, AND PUBIC PoICY 53-97, 123-50 (1994) (explaining the interest
group theory of politics and arguing for its extension to judicial processes); Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoryJustify More IntrusiveJudicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31,
35-48 (1991) (arguing thatjudicial processes are subject to the same interest group
dynamics as other political processes).
is We do not mean to suggest that Judge Posner, who has expressed skepticism
about the value of amicus briefs, see supra note 8 and accompanying text, or Justice
Scalia, who has suggested that amicus briefs may reflect a form of interest group lobby-
ing, see supra text accompanying note 11, is necessarily committed to the explanatory
models ofjudging we associate with their remarks.
In writings about judicial behavior, Judge Posner has suggested that appellate
judges are primarily motivated by the pleasure they derive from participating in the
"spectator's game" of deciding cases. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 126-
35 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMINGLAW]; Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges
and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUp. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 23-
30 (1994) [hereinafter Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maximize?]. This theory does
not precisely conform to any of the three models of judging we will discuss, but in
practice it would appear to fall closer to the legal model than to either the attitudinal
model or the interest group model. Ifjudging is like observing a game of tennis or
chess, then presumably an important part of the process is understanding and follow-
ing the rules of the game.
Justice Scalia, to our knowledge, has not offered a positive theory ofjudging. But
his normative writing clearly presupposes that judges are profoundly constrained by
legal rules. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAw 3, 44-47 (1997) (arguing that an evolutionary interpretation of the Con-
stitution is destructive of its purpose); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) (arguing against unlimited judicial discretion).
Thus, he too would presumably endorse the legal model as an explanation for judg-
ing-at least when judging is done correctly.
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adopts the conventional legal model ofjudicial decision making. Un-
der this model, judges are regarded as seeking to resolve cases in ac-
cordance with the requirements of law, as understood by professional
actors in the legal community. Amicus briefs are assumed to have an
impact on this process insofar as they contain new information-legal
arguments and background factual material-that would be relevant
to persons seeking the correct result in light of established legal
norms.
The second or sharply negative view is often associated with what
political scientists call the "attitudinal model" of judicial behavior.1
4
This model posits that judges have fixed ideological preferences, and
that case outcomes are a product of the summing of the preferences
of the participating judges, with legal norms serving only to rationalize
outcomes after the fact. Under this view, amicus briefs should have
little or no impact on the outcomes reached by a court, because each
judge's vote in a case is assumed to be the product of his or her prees-
tablished ideological preferences with respect to the issue presented.
Ajudge can obtain all the information needed to determine his or her
vote, the attitudinal model would suggest, by reading the "Question
Presented" and the statement of facts contained in the parties' briefs.
To the extent that amicus briefs provide additional legal arguments
and factual background, under this model they offer information of
no relevance to judges.
The third view, which we have extrapolated from Justice Scalia's
comments in Jaffee, implicitly adopts an interest group theory of the
judicial process. In contrast to the attitudinal model, the assumption
here is that judges do not have strong ideological preferences about
most issues. Rather, they are empty vessels who seek to decide cases so
as to reach those results supported by the most influential groups in
society that have an interest in the question at hand. Amicus briefs on
this view should be important to the judicial process because of the
signals that they convey about how interested groups want particular
cases decided. If, as in Jaffee, the groups filing amicus briefs all want a
case to come out a certain way, this tells the judges how to rule if they
want to secure the approval of organized groups.
The question of how amicus briefs influence judicial outcomes is
one as to which, in principle, empirical information can be gathered.
14 See JEMEY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrrrUDINAL MODEL 65-73 (1993) (describing the rationale and historical antecedents
of the attitudinal model).
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Unfortunately, when courts devise policies regarding the filing of ami-
cus briefs, and when lawyers advise clients about filing such briefs,
they almost always proceed on the basis of anecdotal information or
recent episodes that may be unrepresentative of the larger universe of
amicus curiae participation. What is worse, this highly fragmentary
information may be processed through a perceptual lens based on a
particular implicit model of judging, which model, again, is untested
and may or may not be a reliable guide to underlying realities.
In this Article, we present empirical evidence designed to enhance
our understanding about the impact of amicus curiae briefs on the
Supreme Court and therefore also about the validity of different
models of judging. To this end, we have assembled a large database
consisting of fifty years of Supreme Court merits decisions-every ar-
gued case from the 1946 Term through the 1995 Term. For each de-
cision, we recorded, among other things, the outcome of the case, the
number of amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, the number sup-
porting the respondent, and whether certain key institutional litigants
filed amicus briefs in the case. 5 We then analyzed these data using
standard statistical techniques to try to differentiate between different
hypotheses about the influence of amicus briefs on judicial behavior.
Briefly, our principal findings are as follows. First, our study shows
conclusively that the incidence of amicus curiae participation in the
Supreme Court has increased dramatically over the last fifty years.
While the number of cases that the Court has disposed of on the mer-
its has not appreciably increased during this time (indeed it has fallen
in recent years), the number of amicus filings has increased by more
than 800%.
In terms of the influence of amicus briefs on outcomes, our study
uncovers a number of interesting patterns. We find that amicus briefs
supporting respondents enjoy higher success rates than do amicus
briefs supporting petitioners; that small disparities of one or two briefs
for one side with no briefs on the other side may translate into higher
success rates but larger disparities do not; that amicus briefs cited by
the Court appear to be no more likely to be associated with the win-
ning side than briefs not cited by the Court; and that amicus briefs
filed by more experienced lawyers may be more successful than briefs
filed by less experienced lawyers. Among institutional litigants that
appear frequently before the Court, we confirm the finding of other
is For a detailed explanation of our methodology in assembling the database, see
infra Appendix B.
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researchers that the Solicitor General, who represents the United
States before the Supreme Court, enjoys great success as an amicus
filer. We also track the amicus records of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), the American Federation of Labor-Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), and the States, and find that they
enjoy some success as amicus filers, although less than the Solicitor
General.
We cautiously interpret these results as providing more support
for the legal model than for either the attitudinal or interest group
models. Contrary to what the attitudinal model would predict, amicus
briefs do appear to affect success rates in a variety of contexts. And
contrary to what the interest group model would predict, we find no
evidence to support the proposition that large disparities of amicus
support for one side relative to the other result in a greater likelihood
of success for the supported party. In fact, it appears that amicus
briefs filed by institutional litigants and by experienced lawyers-filers
that have a better idea of what kind of information is useful to the
Court-are generally more successful than are briefs filed by irregular
litigants and less experienced lawyers. This is consistent with the legal
model's prediction that amicus briefs have an influence to the extent
they import valuable new information. Moreover, the greater success
associated with amicus briefs supporting respondents can be ex-
plained by the supposition that respondents are more likely than peti-
tioners to be represented by inexperienced lawyers in the Supreme
Court and hence are more likely to benefit from supporting amici,
which can supply the Court with additional legal arguments and facts
overlooked by the respondents' lawyers.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of
amicus curiae activity in the Supreme Court over the last fifty years,
tracking the increase in amicus filings and in the Court's citation and
quotation of such briefs. Part II traces the emergence of the Court's
open door policy toward amicus filings starting in the late 1950s, and
the impact of this policy on the frequency of amicus filings. Part III
reviews the conflicting results of previous studies that have sought to
measure the influence of amicus briefs on the Supreme Court. Part
IV posits three models ofjudicial behavior that underlie commentary
about amicus curiae briefs and sets forth the hypotheses about amicus
influence associated with each model. Part V summarizes the major
findings of our empirical survey. Part VI closes with some reflections
on the factors that may account for the surge in amicus curiae activity
in the Supreme Court in the last fifty years.
0 THE FLUENCE OFAMICUS BR&EFS
I. THE RISING TIDE OF AMICUS CuRIAE BRIEFS
Amici curiae today play an integral role in Supreme Court litiga-
tion. In this Part, we offer a statistical overview of how the frequency
of amicus participation has changed in the last fifty years to the point
where amicus briefs have become an everyday occurrence in Supreme
Court practice. We also provide a comprehensive survey of the inci-
dence of citation and quotation of amicus briefs by the Justices. Pre-
vious studies have provided partial descriptions or intimations of these
phenomena. Our study confirms these accounts and fills in the de-
tails.
A. The Level ofAmicus Curiae Activity, 1946-1995
The phenomenon of increasing amicus participation in the Su-
preme Court was not evident to all while it was taking shape. Writing
in the 1960s, Nathan Hakman was able to argue that amicus curiae in-
fluence on the Supreme Court was exaggerated-an example of "Po-
litical Science Folklore," as he put it.'6 Hakman found that participa-
tion of interest groups as amici curiae had modestly increased after
World War 11,17 but he insisted that organized interest groups "appear
to play a relatively minor role in Supreme Court decision making." 8 A
more comprehensive study completed in 1971 found clear evidence of
increasing amicus curiae participation between 1920 and 1966,
though still in far fewer than half of the cases overall.' 9 By 1982, it was
apparent that a major shift was underway. Karen O'Connor and Lee
Epstein reported that for the period from 1970 to 1980, amicus par-
ticipation had risen to three times the level of the World War II era.20
Most recently, Andrew Koshner has documented a continuing and
steady increase in the overall percentage of cases with at least one
16 Nathan Hakman, Lobbying the Supreme Court-An Appraisal of "Political Science Folk-
lore, "35 FORDHAm L. REv. 15, 15 (1966).
17 See Nathan Hakman, The Supreme Courts Political Environment: The Processing of
Noncommercial Litigation, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 199, 209-10 (Joel B.
Grossman &Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969).
18 Haknan, supra note 16, at 50.
19 SeePuro, supra note 2, at 54-56 (examining all Supreme Court cases decided on
the merits between 1920 and 1966).
20 See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme
Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakmans "Folklore," 16 LAW & Soc. REV. 311, 317
(1981-82) (finding that while amicus briefs were filed in only 18.2% of noncommercial
cases before the Supreme Court between 1941 and 1952, they were filed in 53.4% of
such cases between 1970 and 1980).
2000]
752 TNAVERS1TY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:743
amicus brief from 1950 to 1994.21
Our study, which provides a complete assessment of amicus activ-
ity for nearly the entire post-War period, shows conclusively that a ma-
jor reorientation in practice has taken place. Amicus participation has
risen dramatically over the last fifty years. 22 The point can be con-
veyed, as in Figure 1, by a simple examination of the number of ami-
cus briefs filed in each of the five decades of our study. The Court re-
ceived some 4907 amicus briefs in the last decade (1986-1995), as
opposed to 531 briefs in the first decade (1946-1955)-an increase of
more than 800%.23
[ Brie
Figure 1: Number of Amicus Briefs
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000 -
4,000
2,000
1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-19951 All
fsFiled 531 743 2042 4182 4907 12,40!
Decade
21 See ANDREWJAY KOSHNER, SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF INTEREST GROUP LITIGATION
7-11 (1998) (showing an increase from under 15% of cases in 1950 to over 92% in
1994); see also LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DEcISIONs & DEVELOPMENTS 647-48 (2d ed. 1996) (reporting percent and number of
Supreme Court cases with at least one amicus brief, 1953-1993).
The Supreme Court divides its proceedings into Terms-for example, an Octo-
ber Term ordinarily starts the first Monday of each October, and all cases argued in
the fall and the following winter and spring are decided in that October Term. For
ease of exposition, throughout this Article we will simply refer to a year (e.g., 1956)
when we are in fact referring to the October Term that commenced that year and ran
into the next year (e.g., October Term 1956, which ran from 1956 to 1957). Our study
thus begins in 1946 and ends in 1996 (at the end of October Term 1995).
23 Because of the nature of the Court's decisional system (and, in particular, its oc-
casional use of consolidated cases that may have varying numbers of amicus briefs),
there may be some slight variance between the numbers in our database and the num-
ber of amicus briefs actually filed in the Court. For a full explication of this point, see
5
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The increase in amicus briefs is equally impressive when expressed
in terms of the percentage of total argued cases. Although the num-
ber of cases set by the Court for oral argument increased during the
first four decades, in the most recent decade it has fallen back to a
level closer to that of the 1946-1955 period.2' The percentage of ar-
gued cases with one or more amicus briefs, however, has marched
ever higher throughout our study period. As shown in Figure 2,
whereas one or more amicus curiae briefs were filed in 23% of argued
cases in the decade from 1946 to 1955, this figure rose steadily and
steeply to 85% of argued cases in the most recent decade, 1986 to
1995.2
Figure 2: Percentage of Cases with an Amicus Brief
100%
80%
60%
40%-A
20%
1946-1955 1956-1965 9675 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
% 23.45% 33.28% 54%% 73A.4% 85.10% 55.19%
Decade
Data Ud n m2 19461955 19561965 1966-1975 19761985 19861995 All
Nuniribef sesithArics Biefs 250 391 714 1052 982 3389
Total NuI er of Cases1 1066 1175 1313 14,3 1154 6141
infraAppendix B at note 13.
24 The number of argued cases increased in each of the first four decades (by
10.23%, 11.74%, and 9.14% in each successive decade) and then fell by 19.47% in the
fifth decade (even as the number of amicus briefs continued to rise) and wound up
only 8.26% higher than in the first decade.
The frequency of amicus participation by the four institutional litigants tracked
in our study generally mirrors the frequency of participation overall. The Solicitor
General, the AGLU, the AFIaO, and the States have participated in increasingly
higher percentages of cases over the five decades in question. Specifically, in the five
decades of our study (taken in chronological order), the Solicitor General filed amicus
briefs in 6.38%, 9.28%, 13.40%, 21.49%, and 28.60% of all cases (for an aggregate total
throughout the five decades of 16.14% of all cases). The ACLU filed amicus briefs, by
decade, in 3.47%, 4.60%, 7.84%, 12.35%, and 16.03% of all cases (for an aggregate
total of 9.05%). The AFL-CIO participated as amicus in 2.81%, 2.21%, 4.42%, 5.72%,
and 6.24% of all cases (for an aggregate total of 4.36%). Finally, the States filed ami-
cus briefs in 4.13%, 5.11%, 12.64%, 19.47%, and 29.64% of all cases (for a total of
14.51%).
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Another measure of the intensity of amicus participation is the
number of amicus briefs per argued case. The mean (average) num-
ber of briefs per case has also shot up in the last fifty years. Expressed
in terms of total cases, the mean has increased from about 0.50 per
case to 4.23 per case over the course of the five decades. Perhaps
more instructively, when expressed in terms of the cases in which one
or more amicus briefs were filed, the mean number of amicus briefs
per case has also multiplied, going from 2.12 in the first post-War dec-
ade to 5.00 in the most recent period.26
Arguably, the mean number of briefs per case provides a mislead-
ing picture of the intensity of amicus participation, given that (as we
discuss below) a small number of cases attract unusually high numbers
of amicus briefs. However, looking at the cases where there is some
amicus activity, the median number of briefs jumps from one to three
over the period of our study.2 Thus, not only are more cases attract-
ing amicus filings, but it is clear that the intensity of participation-
whether measured in terms of the mean or median numbers of briefs
per case-is also rising.
The phenomenon of certain cases attracting extraordinarily large
numbers of amicus briefs warrants special comment. The phenome-
non is not entirely new; earlier landmark decisions such as Brown v.
Board of Education, Baker v. Carr, and Furman v. Georgia also drew above-
average numbers of amicus filings. 28 As with other aspects of Supreme
Court amicus curiae practice, however, the most recent decades have
seen a qualitative change in the number of cases attracting extraordi-
narily large numbers of amicus filings. All of the cases that have at-
tracted twenty or more briefs have come since the twenty-fifth year of
26 The mean, median, and modal number of amicus briefs per case during each
decade and the mean, median, and modal number of briefs in each case with at least
one amicus brief (denominated "w/l+") in each decade are as follows:
Mean Mean w/l+ Median Median w/l+ Mode Mode w/l+
1946-1955 0.50 2.12 0 1 0 1
1956-1965 0.63 1.90 0 1 0 1
1966-1975 1.56 2.86 1 2 0 1
1976-1985 2.92 3.98 2 3 0 1
1986-1995 4.23 5.00 3 3 1,2 (tie) 1,2 (tie)
All 2.02 3.66 1 2 0 1
2 See supra note 26.
28 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (listing six amicus briefs);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (seven amicus briefs); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam) (eight amicus briefs).
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our fifty-year study (i.e., since 1970). Indeed, no argued case elicited
more than thirty amicus briefs until the last twenty years of our study.2
Most but not all of the thirty-four cases that have triggered twenty
or more amicus briefs during the fifty-year period of our study involve
controversial social and political issues such as abortion, affirmative
action, free speech, church-state relations, and takings of property.
3 0
The all-time record-setter in terms of amicus participation is Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,s' an abortion case which drew seventy-eight
briefs-forty-six supporting the petitioner (the Attorney General of
Missouri, who asked the Supreme Court to overrule its decision in Roe
v. Wade) and thirty-two supporting the respondents (who asked that
Roe be reaffirmed).32 Other notable cases with large numbers of briefs
include Regents of the University of Cal~fornia v. Bakke," the 1978 affirma-
tive action case, whose fifty-four briefs stood as a record until Webster,
and Crzzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,3 where the right-
to-die issue attracted thirty-nine briefs. Although falling outside the
period of our study, the Court's 1997 assisted-suicide decisions con-
tinued this trend, each eliciting more than forty amnicus briefs. 5
The very large numbers of amicus briefs filed in a small number of
controversial cases have probably done more than anything else to
raise public consciousness about amicus briefs. For example, a num-
ber of commentators have associated the outpouring of amicus filings
in abortion cases with the public protests and letter-writing campaigns
The number of cases spawning 10 or more, 20 or more, and 30 or more briefs
per decade is as follows:
>10 20 z30
1946-1955 3 0 0
1956-1965 2 0 0
1966-1975 29 3 0
1976-1985 79 10 2
1986-1995 119 21 4
All 232 34 6
30 The 34 cases with 20 or more amicus briefs during the 50-year period of our
study and the issues raised in each case are set forth in Appendix A, infra.
s 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
32 See Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly-Fre: Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 74JUDICATURE 261, 261 (1991).
35 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 704 n.* (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793, 794 n.* (1997); see also Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg & Quill Amicus
Curiae Briefs: Verbatim Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 ISSUEs L. & MED. 3, 3
(1997) (reporting that the two cases occasioned a total of 60 briefs, 19 in favor of as-
sisted suicide and 41 opposing it).
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that have been directed at the Court and others over this issue. 6 As
our study reveals, however, the phenomenon is by no means limited
to such high-profile cases. Large numbers of amicus briefs have also
been filed in cases involving copyright protection, punitive damages,
and the apportionment of state taxes.37 In addition, our study clearly
establishes that the overall percentage of argued cases with amicus
participation has increased dramatically, as has the median number of
amicus briefs in cases with some amicus participation."s Thus, al-
though amicus briefs make their most dramatic appearance in highly
visible controversies, amicus participation is now well-established in all
areas of Supreme Court litigation.
36 See e.g., Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335, 349 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (link-
ing amicus briefs with political protests and concluding that "pro-life and pro-choice
forces treated the Court as if it were Congress considering a piece of legislation, not a
judicial body deliberating points of law"); Stuart Taylor Jr., High Court Hears 2 Abortion
Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1985, atA22 (using the large number of amicus briefs to il-
lustrate the "elemental religious and political fervor generated by the abortion issue
around the country"); Abortion Lobbying, NEWSDAY, Apr. 21, 1989, at 14 (describing
ACLU-led coalition's delivering 200,000 letters to Attorney General Thornburgh in
effort to persuade him to withdraw an amicus brief in an abortion case).
3 See infra Appendix A. The largest number of amicus briefs in a non-headline-
grabbing case was 32, filed in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S.
159 (1983), which involved the question of the constitutionality under the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses of aspects of California's corporate income tax.
38 Treating each decade as a separate sample of cases, we ran one-sample t-tests of
the mean number of amicus briefs filed per case in each decade. The "tightness" of
the mean measured by a 95% Confidence Interval (with a test value of zero cases filed)
was relatively consistent across the data; for each decade, the mean lies close to the
center of the 95% Confidence Interval range of values. We infer from this result that
the increase in the mean number of briefs per case is primarily a result of the trend
toward increased filing activity across all cases: fewer and fewer cases have no amicus
briefs. However, the impact of cases with large numbers of amicus briefs in recent
decades is noticeable, as evidenced by the increase in the standard deviation of the
mean in recent decades. This suggests that not only is the mean number of briefs filed
per case rising, but the number of cases with especially large numbers of amicus briefs
is increasing in frequency as well, increasing the standard deviation around the mean
number of briefs per case.
Mean Standard Deviation 95% Confidence Interval of the Mean
1946-1955 0.50 1.43 0.41-0.58
1956-1965 0.63 1.29 0.56-0.71
1966-1975 1.56 2.62 1.41-1.70
1976-1985 2.92 3.94 2.71-3.12
1986-1995 4.23 5.07 3.96-4.54
All 2.02 3.54 1.93-2.11
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B. Citation and Quotation of Amicus Briefs, 1946-1995
Clearly, amici curiae are playing an increasingly active role in sup-
plying input to the Court's decision-making process. What can be said
about the impact of these briefs on the Court's output? The only pub-
licly visible manifestation of the impact of amici is the frequency with
which their briefs are cited or quoted in the opinions of the Justices.
A mere passing familiarity with the Court's decisions reveals that ami-
cus briefs are often referred to by the Justices39 Less impressionisti-
cally, one study examined all Supreme Court cases with amicus par-
ticipation from 1969 to 1981 and found that 18% included one or
more references to an amicus brief."
To provide a more authoritative picture of the Court's references
to amicus briefs, we undertook a computer-aided review of all the
cases in our database to determine the frequency of citation and quo-
tation of amicus briefs from 1946 to 1995. Specifically, we examined
every reference by the Court to an amicus in the case before the
Court, whether the reference was in a majority, plurality, concurring,
or dissenting opinion."
There is no question but that the total number of references to
amici is substantial, and that the frequency of such references has
been increasing over time. We found a total of 936 decisions in which
there were one or more references to an amicus in the case. This rep-
resents just under 28% of all decisions in which one or more amicus
briefs were filed. Moreover, as Figure 3 reflects, the likelihood of a
Supreme Court decision's referring to an amicus in the case increases
over the five decades of our study, beginning with close to 18% of the
cases with amicus filers decided between 1946 and 1955 and ending
with just under 37% of the cases with amicus filers between 1986 and
1995.2
s9 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
40 See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Wokload" A Case Study of
Rules GoverningAmicus CuriaeParticipation, 8JUST. SYS.J. 35,42 (1983).
41 For a description of our methodology in undertaking the citation study and of
how we defined "citation," see infra Appendix B.2.
42 One scholar has offered what appears to be a much higher estimate of the fre-
quency of citation of amicus briefs, reporting that "the proportion of written opinions
citing at least one brief" was .417 for Warren CourtJustices, .656 for Burger CourtJus-
tices, and .676 for Rehnquist Court Justices. See Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation
During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9J.L. & PoL 639, 650 (1993). It appears that these es-
timates were derived by counting the total number of citations of amicus briefs by each
Justice and dividing by the number of opinions written by each Justice. See id. at 651
thl.2. As Epstein explains, see id. at 651 n.62, this does not account for the fact thatJus-
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Data Lkod'4*gRwe3 11946-1955 1956195 1966-19751197619851196-19951 All
Number of Cases Referrin an Ai 44 81 158 290 363 936
Total Nmber of Cases %ith an AnicwI 250 391 714 1052 982 389
We also catalogued the extent to which the Court over the past
fifty years has actually quoted the arguments of amici. The incidence
of quotations could yield a truer approximation of the extent to which
the Court has actually relied on amicus arguments, particularly when
assessed on a relative basis over time.43 We found a total of 316 deci-
sions in which one or more amicus arguments were quoted by the
Court. As revealed in Figure 4, the incidence of quoted arguments in
cases with amicus filers also increases over the five decades. Particu-
larly noteworthy is the fact that the rate of such cases with quoted
amici jumps in the most recent decade to over 15%, which is more
than double the rate of the first three decades and almost double the
rate of the fourth.
tices may cite more than one amicus brief in a given opinion-as in fact they often do.
We are confident that our numbers present an accurate picture of the frequency of
citation of amicus briefs in the Court's decisions.
43 As noted below, see infra text accompanying note 44, the Court's practice of oc-
casionally referring to amici generically, especially in recent years, makes it difficult to
be precise about the frequency of citations of amicus briefs relative to the number of
amicus briefs.
THE NFL UENTCE OFAMICUS BRIEFS
Figure 4: Percentage of Cases Quoting an Amicus in All Cases
Where There Is an Amicus
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
=194r-1955 I1956.1i965 1 966-1975 1976.1985 1 1986-1995 AJ!
1%fm 2.80% 16.14% 16.86% 18.08% 115.38% 19.32% 1
Decade
jData UnderlyingFigure 4 1946-1955 11956-1965 19661975 11976-1985 11986-1995 All
Cases Quoting Amicus 7 24 49 85 151 316
Total Cases with Amicus 250 391 714 1052 982 3389
Arguably a more revealing measure of whether the Court is refer-
ring to amicus briefs more frequently is not the rate of citations or
quotations of amicus briefs per case, but rather the rate of citations or
quotations per amicus brieffied. If the total number of citations and
quotations is rising (as it is), but the number of amicus briefs is also
rising (as it is), then the actual chance of any given briefs being cited
or quoted may be decreasing. Unfortunately, because the Court often
refers to amici as a group (as in the increasingly popular opinion-
writer's phrase, "petitioner and its amici argue .. ."),44 we cannot cal-
culate precisely the number of citations per brief filed.4 Nevertheless,
we can calculate other ratios that should roughly mirror the changes
in the rate of references per brief.
First, because there is no ambiguity about when the Court actually
quotes from a specific amicus, we can calculate the ratio of quoted
amici to the total number of amicus briefs filed. When the data are
See infra Appendix B at note 29 and accompanying text (noting that by the 1980s
numerous opinions used this and similar formulations).
Because of the nature of the Courts writing style, our citation study tracked
whether or not an opinion cited 0, 1, or more than 1 amicus brief, and did not meas-
ure the precise number of briefs cited if more than 1 brief was cited. See generally infra
Appendix B.2. Thus, we cannot calculate the incidence of citations per amicus brief
filed (i.e., the odds of any single amicus brief's being referred to by the Court).
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arranged by decade, we find this ratio fluctuates around an average of
about 3%, with the first decade showing a lower frequency of quoted
amici than the middle decades, the most recent decade showing a
slightly higher frequency of quoted amici than previous decades, and
some variation in between. Although no decisive trend emerges, this
pattern certainly does not support the proposition that the rate of ref-
46erences is going down as the number of amicus filings goes up.
Second, because there is also relatively little ambiguity about when
the Court refers to an amicus brief of a specific institutional litigant,
we can compute the trend line with respect to the rate of references
per amicus brief for three of the institutional litigants tracked in our
study-the Solicitor General, the ACLU, and the AFL-CIO.4 The king
of the citation-frequency hill is the Solicitor General, and this is in-
creasingly true. The Court referred to the Solicitor General as amicus
in 402 cases during the fifty years of our study, which works out to just
over 40% of the cases where the Solicitor General filed a brief.48 Sig-
nificantly, the frequency of the Court's citation of the Solicitor Gen-
eral as amicus rises each decade, roughly doubling between the first
decade of our study and the most recent decade.49 This strongly sug-
gests that the Court has come to rely more heavily on the Solicitor
General's amicus filings in the last fifty years, at least in the writing of
opinions.
In contrast, when we look to the two other institutional litigants,
we find no such pattern of increased incidence of citation. Here, the
number of briefs is sufficiently small that one should exercise caution
in drawing any firm conclusions.0 Nevertheless, we find that the
46 The odds of a particular amicus brief's being quoted by the Court were, by dec-
ade, 1.32% in 1946-1955 (7 of 531 amicus briefs were quoted), 3.50% in 1956-1965 (26
of 743), 2.69% in 1966-1975 (55 of 2042), 2.37% in 1976-1985 (99 of 4182), and 3.89%
in 1986-1995 (191 of 4907), and, across the 50-year period of our study, 3.05% (378 of
12,405).
47 Comparative numbers for the States are not as meaningful, since multiple States
often file amicus briefs in individual cases.
48 The Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in 991 cases between 1946 and 1995.
49 The details are as follows: in 1946-1955, the Solicitor General was cited in
26.47% of the cases in which he filed an amicus brief (18 of 68 cases); in 1956-1965,
30.28% (33 of 109); in 1966-1975, 36.93% (65 of 176); in 1976-1985, 42.53% (131 of
308); and in 1986-1995, 46.97% (155 of 330).
50 We do not provide standard tests of statistical significance for the number of
quoted briefs per case and other subsets of our database. As explained in more detail
in Appendix C, this is because our subset populations represent all cases that fit a spe-
cific category of analysis, derived from the total population of cases. Since the data-
base contains all cases where an amicus brief was filed, there is no need to draw upon
sampling methodologies in this study. Thus, all of the numbers reported in this Part
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ACLU was referred to as amicus only twenty-four times overall or in
4.32% of the 556 cases in which it filed an amicus brief. This rate var-
ied somewhat over the five decades but never exceeded 8.11% .5' The
AFL-CIO fared slightly better, being cited twenty-eight times, or in
10.45% of the 268 cases where it appeared as amicus. After a sharp
increase during the Warren Court decade of 1956-1965,2 this rate also
has remained more or less steady over the last thirty years.s5
In sum, there is no evidence that the rise in the frequency of cita-
tions and quotations of amicus briefs per case masks a decrease in the
frequency per brief filed. To the contrary, there is reason to believe
that the rate of citations and quotations per brief is more or less keep-
ing pace with the increase in filings. The one notable exception to
the pattern is the Solicitor General, whose office has seen its amicus
briefs cited with significantly increased frequency during the period of
our study, suggesting (not for the last time, as we shall see) that the
Solicitor General's office is in a class by itself in terms of its influence
as an amicus filer.
II. THE OPEN DOOR POUcYTOWARD AMIcUS BRIEFS
In seeking to explain the changing role of the amicus curiae in
the last fifty years, it is important to consider briefly the Court's role as
gatekeeper in permitting amicus participation. In this Part, we review
the Court's rules and practices regarding amicus curiae participation
and ask whether changes in those rules and practices may have played
a role in the surge of amicus filings we have seen in recent decades.
The Court's formal rules regarding amicus participation have in
broad outline remained essentially unchanged since they were first
promulgated in 1939.5 Those rules today provide that governmental
and in Part V are statistically significant in the technical sense that they represent the
total population of cases of interest. Still, it is appropriate to exercise caution in draw-
ing conclusions from subsets of cases where the population size is quite small. See infra
Appendix C (discussing the statistical analysis used in the study).
51 The specific numbers by decade for the ACLU are 8.11% for 1946-1955 (3 of 37
ACLU briefs were referred to), 5.56% for 1956-1965 (3 of 54), 5.83% for 1966-1975 (6
of 103), 1.69% for 1976-1985 (3 of 177), and 4.86% for 1986-1995 (9 of 185).
52 Note, however, that the number of cases with citations of the AFL-CIO's amici
briefs was only five in that decade. See infra note 53.
Specifically, the numbers for the AFL-CIO by decade are 6.67% for 1946-1955 (2
of 30 briefs were referred to), 19.23% for 1956-1965 (5 of 26), 10.34% for 1966-1975 (6
of 58), 9.76% for 1976-1985 (8 of 82), and 9.72% for 1986-1995 (7 of 72).
The original rule consisted of one paragraph within the rule governing the filing
of briefs. See SUP. CT. P,. 27.9, 306 U.S. 671, 708-09 (1939). In 1949, the Court added
four more paragraphs, spelling out, inter alia, the procedure for motions for leave to
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representatives-such as the Solicitor General or a state attorney gen-
eral-may file an amicus curiae brief in any case." Nongovernmental
entities may file an amicus curiae brief in any case if they obtain the
consent of all parties.56 If a party refuses to consent to an amicus fil-
ing, then a would-be amicus curiae may file a motion with the Court
seeking leave to file a brief.57 The full Court will then either grant the
motion, permitting the would-be amicus to file over the party's objec-
tion, or deny the motion.
The biggest change in the last fifty years has occurred not in the
Court's formal rules, but in the manner in which they are imple-
mented. The Court's current practice in argued cases is to grant
nearly all motions for leave to file as amicus curiae when consent is
denied by a party.e Because the Court in recent years has routinely
granted such motions, parties that are represented by experienced
lawyers will in most cases consent to such filings, if only to avoid bur-
dening the Court with the need to rule on the motion. The effect of
the Court's liberality in ruling on motions for leave to file, therefore,
is to permit essentially unlimited filings of amicus briefs in argued
cases.
file amicus briefs. See Amendment of Rules, 338 U.S. 959, 959-60 (1949). When the
Court promulgated new rules in 1967, amicus briefs received their own rule for the
first time, but the content of the rule was unchanged. See Sup. Cr. R. 42, 388 U.S. 931,
973-75 (1967). With another new set of rules in 1990, the rule was renumbered and a
new subsection was added at the beginning, admonishing that amicus briefs failing to
bring new relevant matter to the attention of the Court are "not favored." SUP. Cr. R.
37.1, 493 U.S. 1099, 1145-47 (1989); see infra text accompanying note 113 (quoting this
provision). In 1997, the rule was amended again to require disclosure of party in-
volvement in the drafting or funding of amicus briefs. See Sup. Cr. R. 37.6; see infra
text accompanying note 73 (discussing possible rationales behind the new rules). (The
Supreme Court Rules currently in force are available at 519 U.S. 1159 (1997).)
5 See SUP. Cr. R. 37.4.
56 SeeSuP. Cr. R. 37.3(a).
57 See SuP. CT. R. 37.3(b).
58 See Epstein, supra note 42, at 650 (reporting that the Rehnquist Court denied
only one out of 115 motions for leave to file in 1990). The rules state that a motion for
leave to file as amicus curiae "is not favored" at the certiorari stage during which the
Court decides whether it will consider the case on the merits. SUP. Cr. R. 37.2(b).
Nonetheless, our understanding is that even here such motions are routinely granted.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, 517 U.S. 1229 (1996) (granting motion for leave
to file amicus brief and denying petition for certiorari); Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 517
U.S. 1217 (1996) (granting motion for leave to file amicus brief and granting petition
for certiorari); Mock v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 517 U.S. 1216 (1996)
(granting motions for leave to file amicus briefs and denying petition for certiorari).
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The Court has not always followed this "open door" policy 9 In
the late 1940s and early 1950s, large numbers of amicus briefs were
submitted in several controversial cases involving government investi-
gation of Communist Party activities, including the prosecution of the
"Hollywood Ten" for failing to testify before the House Un-American
Activities Committee ° and the espionage convictions of Ethyl and
61Julius Rosenberg. Some Justices were reportedly put off by the
"propagandistic" tone of these filings, and the Court sought to curtail
the filing of amicus curiae briefs. 2 In terms of formal action, the
Court amended its rules to emphasize that the consent of all parties
was required for a nongovernmental entity to file an amicus brief, and
spelled out in detail the procedure for filing a motion with the Court
for leave to file if consent was denied.6 More importantly, the Court
adopted the unwritten policy of denying virtually all motions for leave
to file as amicus curiae when consent was denied.*6 The Solicitor
General viewed this policy as a signal from the Court that it wanted
the government to refuse to consent to amicus filings in cases in
which the United States was a party, and the Solicitor General
obliged.6 The net effect of these coordinated efforts was that the
number of amicus filings in argued cases declined around 1949 and
remained at a relatively depressed level throughout the 1950s.
Several years after this clamp-down on amicus filings, some of the
59 See generally O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 40, at 36-39 (recounting the history
of the Court's rules regarding amicus curiae submissions).
60 See Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
934 (1950); Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U.
PA. L. REV. 1172, 1173 (1953) (discussing Lawson case); Krislov, supra note 1, at 710
(same).
61 See Harper & Etherington, supra note 60, at 1173 n.4 (discussing the amicus ac-
tivit7 in the Rosenbergcase); Krislov, supra note 1, at 710 (same).
See Krislov, supra note 1, at 711 (recountingJustice Black's critical comments re-
garding attempts through amicus briefs, telegrams, and letters to pressure the Court to
reach particular conclusions); see also Puro, supra note 2, at 39-40 (describing the
Court's frustration with briefs offered at the certiorari stage because they were lacking
in "legal merit" and "[un]related to the points of law in the case"); Harper &Ethering-
ton, supra note 60, at 1173; Comment, The Amicus Curiae, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 474
(1960).
SeeAmendment of Rules, 338 U.S. 959 (1949). Note that these amendments did
not change prior practice, but simply made that practice explicit.
64 SeeHarper & Etherington, supra note 60, at 1173-76; Krislov, supra note 1, at 713-
14; O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 40, at 37-38; Puro, supra note 2, at 41.
See Krislov, supra note 1, at 714 (describing the Solicitor General's change from
automatically granting consent to amici to automatically withholding it).
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Justices began to have a change of heart. In published opinions, Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Black each indicated unhappiness with the So-
licitor General's restrictive policy of denying consent in virtually all66
cases. In 1957, the Solicitor General responded by issuing a "policy
statement" softening the government's attitude toward consent to
amicus participation.67 By 1959, it was clear that when consent to file
was refused, the Court was granting far more motions for leave to file
than it was denying.6 As shown below in Figure 5, the number of
amicus briefs soon started to increase. After the early 1960s, the atti-
tude of the Court toward amicus filings in argued cases gradually be-
came one of laissez-faire. Two studies of the Court's rulings on mo-
tions for leave to file published in the mid-1980s found that the Court
rarely granted fewer than 85% of these motions between 1959 and
1981, and in the later years it was granting an even higher percent-
age.6 There is no indication that this practice has changed. Today, it
can truly be said, the Supreme Court's policy "is to allow essentially
unlimited amicus participation."7
The Court's open door policy toward amicus briefs undoubtedly
provides a part of the explanation for the rising tide of such briefs in
the last half-century. Whatever the benefits of filing an amicus brief
See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924, 924 (1952) (memorandum of Frank-
furter, J.); id. (statement of Black, J.); United States v. Louknit Mfg. Co., 342 U.S. 915,
915 (1952) (statement of Frankfurter, J.); Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Su-
preme Court, 346 U.S. 945, 947 (1954) (statement of Black, J.). Although both Justices
chastised the Solicitor General, they did so for different reasons. Frankfurter did not
question the Court's policy of vigorously screening amicus briefs but objected to the
Solicitor General's practice of automatically refusing consent to amicus filings, on the
ground that this thrust the entire burden of screening onto the Court. Black, in con-
trast, objected to the Court's underlying policy of discouraging amicus briefs, not to
the manner in which this policy was implemented. This underlying disagreement
about the merits of the restrictive policy may be the reason why the Solicitor General
did not immediately change his policy.
67 See Krislov, supra note 1, at 715 (describing the Solicitor General's new, i.e., post-
1957, intermediate standard governing when it would grant and when it would with-
hold its consent from would-be amici).
See id. at 716 n.119 tbl. (showing that 1959 marked a clear change from the pre-
vious pattern of denying motions).
69 SeeRobert C. Bradley & Paul Gardner, Underdogs, Upperdogs and the Use oftheAmi-
cus Brief. Trends and Explanations, 10JusTcE Sys. J. 78, 90-91 (1985) (presenting data
showing the high percentage of amicus requests granted by the Court from 1959 to
1980); O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 40, at 40-41 (presenting similar data for 1969
to 1981); see also Epstein, supra note 42, at 650 (presenting data for 1990).
70 Gregory A. Caldeira &John R. Wright, Amid Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who
Participates, When, and How Much, 52J. POL. 782, 784 (1990).
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may be-whether they consist of influencing the Court's decisions, be-
ing cited by the Court, or just assuring the members of an organiza-
tion that its leaders are on the watch-those benefits are more readily
obtained in a regime where every brief is automatically accepted. Un-
der a regime with a significant risk of rejection, in contrast, the bene-
fits would have to be discounted by the probability of rejection and
the costs of litigating to obtain permission to file. The open door pol-
icy inaugurated after around 1960 thus had the effect of increasing
the benefits of seeking to file amicus briefs relative to the costs-
which one would expect to lead to an increase in filing activity.
The open door policy, however, cannot supply the whole explana-
tion for the rising tide of amicus activity. This is because the Court's
policies remained essentially unchanged over the next thirty-five years.
If the open door policy initiated in the early 1960s were the only fac-
tor at work, one would expect to see an increase in filing in the 1960s
followed by a levelling off thereafter. Yet, as shown in Figure 5, when
we plot the expected number of amicus briefs after 1970 based on the
rate of filings from 1960 through 1969, we see a much lower projected
number of briefs than were actually filed during the latter half of our
study. Some of the later increase may be due to perceptual lag among
practicing lawyers, as the Court's open door policy gradually became
more firmly entrenched and hence more visible to lawyers. Yet it
seems obvious that some additional factor or factors must also be in-
fluencing groups to intensify their efforts in filing amicus briefs.'
7 We return to the question of what factors might explain the increase in amicus
activity in Part VI.
The decline in the number of amicus briefs filed during the last six years, as shown
in Figure 5, is entirely due to a decline in the number of argued cases during these
years, rather than to a falloff in the rate of filings per case. The following are the
numbers of argued cases and the mean number of amicus briefs per argued case dur-
ing the last decade (1986-1995) of our study:
1986 153 cases (3.30 mean) 1991 108 cases (5.02 mean)
1987 145 cases (3.59 mean) 1992 109-cases (4.28 mean)
1988 145 cases (4.32 mean) 1993 90 cases (4.84 mean)
1989 131 cases (4.39 mean) 1994 83 cases (5.07 mean)
1990 114 cases (3.50 mean) 1995 76 cases (5.46 mean)
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Figure 5: Number of Am icus Briefs, 1946-1995
-Actual Number of Amicus Briefs, 1946-1995
-U-Projected Number Based on 1960s Filing Rate
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More recently, there has been a modification in the Court's rules
regarding amicus curiae participation that may betoken a further
change in the Court's attitude toward amicus briefs. The Court in
1997 adopted what is probably the most important amendment to its
formal rules regarding amicus participation since they were first
promulgated in 1939. The new Rule 37.6 requires the disclosure of
certain relationships between the parties to the case and any person
or entity that files an amicus brief. Specifically, the amended rule now
requires that each amicus brief disclose in the first footnote on the
first page of text "whether counsel for a party authored the brief in
whole or in part," as well as the identity of "every person or entity,
other than the amicus curiae, its members or its counsel, who made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the
brief."2
The Court provided no rationale for these new disclosure re-
quirements. The changes could mean simply that the Justices want to
know if an amicus brief is written or financed by one of the parties so
that they can more appropriately evaluate the contents of the brief for
possible bias.n Alternatively, the changes could reflect a perception
72 Sup. Cr. R. 37.6.
73 Cf. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 157-58 (1993) (advocating ex-
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by the Justices that some parties are funding or ghost-writing amicus
briefs to get around the page limits that apply to the parties' briefs on
the merits. Or, the amendments could reflect a growing concern on
the part of the Justices that amicus filings are being manipulated in
order to create an impression of widespread political support for a
particular position. Thus, although the recent rule change indicates
that there is some unease within the Court about the phenomenon of
proliferating amicus briefs, the Court's response is consistent with a
variety of different assessments of the influence that amicus briefs
have on the Court.
The long term implications of the Court's new disclosure rules are
unclear. Whatever concerns underlie the requirement of a disclosure
of interest or participation on the part of the parties with respect to
the filing of amicus briefs, the Court has not yet changed its basic
open door policy towards amicus filings.
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE INFLUENCE OFAMICUS BRmS ON
SUPREME COURT OUTCOMES
By far the most important question about amicus briefs is not
whether they are easy to file, or whether, if filed, they are likely to be
cited or quoted. Rather, it is whether such briefs have any influence
on the decisions reached by the Court. If amicus briefs have a de-
monstrable impact on the supported party's chances of prevailing in
the Court, or on the Court's rationale for its judgment, then this
would readily explain the high rate of amicus filings we have seen in
recent decades. On the other hand, if amicus briefs have no impact
on the Court's decision-making process, then the tidal wave of amicus
briefs becomes harder to explain.74 There have been a number of
panded disclosure requirements as a way of deterring the submission of biased social
science data to the Court).
74 Amicus briefs can have an impact on the Court's decision-making process either
by influencing the outcomes reached by the Court or by influencing the rationales
used by the Court in justifying those outcomes. We have no doubt that amicus briefs
have had an impact on the rationales employed by the Court. To take but one exam-
ple, the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requiring that po-
lice give suspects defined warnings before the suspects may be subjected to custodial
interrogation, does not adopt the decisional rule urged by the ACLU in its amicus
brief in that case. (The ACLU urged that all custodial interrogation without counsel
designed to elicit a confession be deemed unconstitutional.) But the majority opinion
of ChiefJustice Warren draws extensively from the argument and authorities set forth
in the ACLU's brief. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55, 457-58 n.26, with Brief for
the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, at 13-20, 43-67, Miranda (No. 759).
Given the quantitative nature of the data we draw upon in this Article, however, we
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studies by legal scholars and political scientists over the last thirty years
that shed light on the phenomenon of the amicus curiae brief.75 Most
of these studies describe the role of amicus briefs in particular cases or
in the resolution of particular issues. For example, they examine the
strategic considerations underlying the filing of amicus briefs in the76
Court's decisions invalidating racial covenants, expanding the consti-
tutional rights of women,7 addressing the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action,7 and in numerous other areas." These studies are valu-
able, and suggest that groups seeking social change through litigation
assume that amicus support can in some circumstances influence the
Court's adoption of a particular position on a critical issue or can at
least frame the debate.
Though illuminating, only rarely do these case studies address the
question of whether amicus briefs have an impact on the Court, even
in specific areas.0 Furthermore, even in these areas, the exact role of
have not been able to investigate in any systematic fashion the impact of amicus briefs
on the rationales adopted by the Court, except insofar as we have recorded the fre-
quency with which amicus briefs are cited or quoted by the Court. Seesupra Part I.B.
In addition to the case studies discussed immediately below, scholars have ex-
plored the history of the amicus brief and its evolution over time, see, e.g., Krislov, supra
note 1, at 694-704 (describing a basic shift from neutrality to partisanship), and have
examined the factors that influence the decision to file an amicus brief and the Court's
decision whether to permit such filings. See, e.g., Bradley & Gardner, supra note 69, at
81-84 (exploring the motivations of amicus filers).
76 See CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, TlE NAACP,
AND THE RESTRICiVE COVENANT CASES 163-76, 193-99 (1959) (describing the strate-
gies that guided amici in composing their briefs).
77 See KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF THE COURTS 100-23
(1980) (describing the activities of various women's groups that often file amicus
briefs); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, Women's Rights Litigation in the 1980s: More of
the Same?, 74 JUDICATURE 314 (1991) (documenting the role of amicus filings by
women's groups and the ACLU in seeking to convince the Rehnquist Court to main-
tain a relatively liberal policy in sex discrimination cases).
78 See TIMOTHYJ. O'NEILL, BAKKE& Tm PO=rncS OF EQUAliY: FRIENDS AND FOES
IN TE CLASSROOM OF LrIGATION 165-67 (1985) (assessing the relative influence on
the Court of the briefs filed in the Bakke case).
See, e.g., STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXrTY 219-35
(1995) (discussing the role of amicus briefs in civil rights cases);John Howard, Retalia-
tion, Reinstatement, and Friends of the Court: Amicus Participation in Brock v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 31 HOw. LJ. 241 (1988) (analyzing the role of amici in a leading due proc-
ess case).
so For examples of studies that do address the influence of amicus briefs in specific
areas, see SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT 102-03 (1990) (finding that legal
services providers fared less well in the Supreme Court when supported by amici); Ste-
phen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: Th Revenge of the Amid, 61 ANTITRUST
Lj. 269 (1993) (providing detailed analysis of the impact of amicus briefs on the
Court's antitrust decisions in a recent Term); Andrew P. Morriss, Private Amid Curiae
and the Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Law Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY
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the amici is often open to interpretation. Clearly, more extensive em-
pirical data about the relationship between amicus curiae filings and
Supreme Court outcomes are needed."' Unfortunately, only a handful
of studies have attempted to use quantitative data to assess the rela-
tionship between the filing of amicus curiae briefs and the outcomes
reached by the Court.e Moreover, the studies that do exist reach
strikingly inconsistent conclusions about whether such briefs have an
effect on the Court.
The first empirical survey of the influence of amicus briefs on Su-
preme Court decision making was undertaken in a doctoral disserta-
tion by Steven Puro completed in 19 7 1. 3 Puro's study contains much
valuable information. His data set consisted of all amicus briefs filed
in reported decisions of the Supreme Court from the 1920 Term to
the 1966 Term. In order to provide some basis for comparing the role
of amicus briefs over time and across different filing entities, Puro
computed what he called the "success rate" of various amicus filers.
This was a kind of amicus curiae batting average-the number of cases
in which an entity files an amicus brief supporting the prevailing party
divided by the total number of amicus filings by that entity.8
Overall, Puro found that amicus filers had a success rate of
.550-that is, they filed briefs supporting the winning side 55% of the
BILL RTS.J. 823 (1999) (analyzing positions of amici in three recent Title VII cases and
assessing their influence on the Court); Leo Pfeffer, Amid in Church-State Litigation, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 83 (discussing the role that amicus briefs
played in two church-state decisions).
81 There are good empirical studies of the relationship between amicus briefs at
the certiorari stage and the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari. See, e.g.,
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 135-39 (1991) (finding that the presence of amicus briefs supporting
petitioner at the certiorari stage makes the granting of certiorari more likely); Gregory
A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the US. Supreme
Court, 82 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1109, 1119 (1988) (concluding that "justices pay close at-
tendon to the demands of outside parties when making certiorari decisions").
82 One reason for the dearth of such studies may be that the Supreme Court Data-
base, which is the foundation on which most empirical studies of Supreme Court deci-
sion making rest, does not include information on the number of amicus briefs filed
for petitioner and respondent. See INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POUTICAL AND SOC.
RESEARCH, UNrrED SrATES SUPREME COURTJUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953-1997 TERMS (9th
ed. 1999). For this reason, we developed our own independent database of Supreme
Court decisions, rather than drawing upon the Supreme Court Database. See infra Ap-
pendix B (describing our database).
Puro, supra note 2. Hakman's article, supra note 16, preceded Puro's study. But
Hakman provided no information about the influence of amicus briefs on outcomes.
SeePuro, supra note 2, at 21 (describing the study's methodology).
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time.8& Moreover, he found that the success rate of amicus filers in-
creased over time: the success rate was only 44.4% in the period 1920-
1936; it increased to 54.9% in 1937-1952; and it rose to 60.3% in 1953-
1966.86 Puro also provided an extensive breakdown of success rates
according to type of legal issue, the status of the entity filing the brief,
and whether the position being advocated was, in his judgment, "lib-
eral" or "conservative.
"87
Standing alone, Puro's findings regarding success rates might
suggest that amicus filings have some modest but positive influence on
outcomes, and that this influence was increasing during the period of
his study. However, Puro did not claim to have uncovered any causal
connection between amicus filings and Supreme Court outcomes. He
noted that the Court tended to favor liberal positions during the pe-
riod of his investigation, and that "underdog" groups were at that time
more likely to file amicus briefs than were business groups or other
conservative organizations.5 Thus, to the extent he suggested any ex-
planation for his findings, it was that the Court was ideologically in-
clined to reach liberal outcomes, and that groups advocating liberal
results were more likely to file amicus briefs, and hence more likely to
be on the winning side.
Puro was well advised to exercise caution in drawing any strong
causal conclusions from his success rates, if only because his aggregate
data did not control for the impact of institutional litigants. Specifi-
cally, Puro's overall success rate of 55% was based on a sample of ami-
cus filings which included such institutional litigants as the Solicitor
General (who filed in over 17% of the amicus cases during the pe-
riod), the ACLU (12.3% of the cases), and the AFL-CIO (5.7% of the
cases). These institutional litigants enjoyed unusually high success
rates during the period of his study.8 9 Moreover, the high success
rates of such players in turn might be at least partly a function of their
legal strategies. For example, they might seek to build up their credi-
bility with the Court by filing frequently on the side they would pre-
85 See id at 96.
8 See id at 106 tbl.IV-3 (describing success rates across time periods).
87 See ii at 97 tbl.IV-1 (type of case); id. at 102 tbl.IV-2 (type of amicus); id. at 111
tbl.IV-4 (ideological position).
88 See id. at 254-55.
89 Puro found that the Solicitor General had a success rate of 77% in the cases in
which he filed an amicus brief, that the ACLU prevailed in 65% of its cases, and that
the AFL-CIO (or its predecessor organizations, the AFL and the CIO) prevailed in 66%
of its cases. See id. at 101, 103, 104.
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dict to be more likely to win.9 Or as Puro himself suggested, interest
groups might file amicus briefs out of a desire to "look good" with
their members,91 which might also cause them to file in cases in which
they are most likely to win. To the extent interest groups pursue such
a strategy, they will presumably lift their success rates, and hence to a
degree the overall success rate for all amicus filers. But this would not
signify any causal connection between amicus filings and outcomes.
More recently, Donald Songer and Reginald Sheehan attempted
to measure the efficacy of amicus briefs by using a different investiga-
tive strategy.92 They sought to identify "matched pairs" of cases in
which, in one case, only one party was supported by one or more ami-
cus curiae briefs filed by an interest group and, in the other case, nei-
ther party had amicus support. The matched pairs had to be decided
in the same Term, had to involve parties of the same status (viz., pri-
vate individual, business, union, state or local government, or the fed-
eral government), and had to involve the "same issue" (i.e., both cases
had to fall into one of thirteen general subject matter categories) 93
Using data from ten Terms over a twenty-year period (1967 to 1987),
Songer and Sheehan identified 132 such matched pairs of cases.
Analyzing their case pairs, Songer and Sheehan found no evi-
dence of amicus group influence. The success rate of parties sup-
ported by interest group amicus briefs was virtually identical to that of
parties without such support. Restricting the comparison to cases in
which one side had at least two or three amicus supporters, they again
found "no support for the thesis that interest groups have a substantial
impact on Court outcomes through their use of amicus curiae
briefs."94 They also found no variation in success rates among differ-
ent categories of litigants, and no evidence of change in the pattern of
influence over the twenty-year period under examination.95
90 Cf Thomas W. Merrill, High-LeveL 'Tenured" Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1998, at 95-99 (suggesting that the Solicitor General's office sometimes
acts against its short-term interest in order to enhance its institutional reputation for
good faith and honesty).
91 Puro, supra note 2, at 247.
92 See Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the Courts:
AmicusParticipation in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993).
93 See id. at 341-45 (explaining the research strategy).
94 Id. at 345-46.
95 The Songer and Sheehan study has potentially serious limitations. Although
they referred to their research design as "precision matching," their criteria for deem-
ing that pairs of cases involve the "same issue" were very crude. 1d. at 342. For exam-
ple, all cases involving "labor management disputes" were regarded as presenting the
"same issue," as were all cases involving "judicial power." Id. at 343 n.8. Moreover,
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In contrast, recent studies applying multivariate regression analy-
sis to limited subsets of Supreme Court decisions have detected signs
of a positive impact of amicus briefs on outcomes. Kevin McGuire has
published two such studies, one seeking to identify the factors that af-
fect the outcome of obscenity cases in the Supreme Court,96 the other
focusing on the relationship between the use of experienced lawyers
and the probability of success in the Supreme Court97 Both studies
found that the probability of success was significantly related to the
level of amicus curiae support for a party. But the more directly rele-
vant of these studies-the one seeking to determine the factors influ-
encing the outcome of obscenity cases-is vulnerable to the same
criticism noted above in connection with Puro's study: it does not
control for the influence of institutional litigants such as the Solicitor
General."'
Finally, a number of studies have sought to determine the degree
of influence that particular institutional litigants, most prominently
the Solicitor General, have achieved through their amicus filings.9
Songer and Sheehan looked only at amicus briefs filed by interest groups. Thus, even
if their study tells us something about the influence of interest groups on the Supreme
Court, it does not necessarily tell us whether other amicus briefs (e.g., those filed by
the Solicitor General or the States) are similarly lacking in influence.
Another recent study by Songer, conducted with Ashlyn Kuersten, examined the
influence of amicus curiae briefs on state supreme courts. See Donald R. Songer &
Ashlyn Kuersten, The Success of Amid in State Supreme Courts, 48 POL RES. Q. 31 (1995).
Analyzing data pertaining to amicus filing in the Georgia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina Supreme Courts from 1983 to 1990, the study examined the relationship be-
tween amicus curiae filings and outcomes, using three measures: success rates, an-
other study of matched pairs of cases, and multivariate regression analysis. In sharp
contrast to Songer and Sheehan's matched-pair study of United States Supreme Court
outcomes, all three measures showed that "support or opposition from amici is signifi-
cantly related to litigants' chances of success in state supreme courts." Id. at 39. Son-
ger and Kuersten did not speculate as to why amicus curiae participation would have
no impact on the United States Supreme Court, but would be associated with an in-
crease of up to 30% in the success of litigants in state courts.
See Kevin T. McGuire, Obscenity, Libertarian Values, and Decision Making in the Su-
preme Court, 18 AM. POL. Q. 47,48 (1990).
See Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced
Lauwers in Litigation Success, 57J. POL 187, 194 (1995).
e See McGuire, supra note 96, at 57 (noting the special influence of the Solicitor
General but failing to account for this in the definition of the variable assigned to ami-
cus influence).
In addition to the studies of Solicitor General amicus success noted immediately
below, see also Steven Puro, The United States as Amicus Curiae, in COURTS, LAW, AND
JUDICIAL PROCESSES 220 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981) (examining the amicus behavior
of the United States as part of its litigation strategy) and Karen O'Connor, The Amicas
Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256
(1983) (discussing significant impact of Solicitor General's office on public policy
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Jeffrey Segal has conducted a number of studies of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's amicus curiae activities.'0 Looking at all cases decided between
the 1952 and 1982 Terms, Segal found that the Solicitor General's
amicus filings supported the winning side approximately 75% of the
time overall.'0' This high rate of success applied across all categories
of issues, all changes in the Court's membership, and regardless of
whether the Solicitor General was urging a liberal or a conservative
result.102 Segal's other studies show that amicus support by the Solici-
tor General is highly influential in determining the outcome of sex
discrimination cases, after a number of other variables are controlled
for, °3 and that the Solicitor General's success is not related to the
number of Justices appointed by Presidents of the same party as the
Solicitor General.1' 4 Rebecca Mae Salokar, reviewing all amicus cases
decided by a full Court between 1959 and 1986, obtained similar re-
sults: the Solicitor General supported the winning side in 72% of the
through its involvement in litigation).
The Solicitor General typically represents the executive branch and most federal
agencies in the Supreme Court. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 518(a)'s mandate to the Solicitor
General to "conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court... in which
the United States is interested"). See generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence:
Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994);
Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the Inde-
pendent Agencies: A Re-evaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549 (1993). There are some excep-
tions. For example, the former Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), the first
major federal regulatory agency, was entitled to defend its orders before the Court if
the Solicitor General elected not to do so. Because of such exceptions, there are some
cases in which the Court has received more than one brief from federal entities
charged with administering the law. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc.,
422 U.S. 659, 660 (1975) (stating in syllabus that an amicus brief for the United States
was filed by the Solicitor General, who urged the opposite result from an amicus brief
filed by Securities Exchange Commission); Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 426
(1947) (noting, in case where Solicitor General represented respondent, that Court
had invited the ICC to file an amicus brief). An extreme example is Levinson v. Spector
Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649 (1947), where over the course of two arguments (the case
was reargued) the Court received three such amicus briefs: one from the ICC, another
for the United States from the Solicitor General, and a third from the Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor. See Levinson, 330
U.S. at 651 (listing those who filed amicus briefs).
100 See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (describing Segal's studies).
101 SeeJeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren
and Burger Courts: A Research Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 136 (1988).
102 See id at 138-39 (issues); id. at 141-42 (membership); id. at 141 (ideological posi-
tions).
103 SeeJeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl D. Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination:
The Role of the Solicitor Genera4 41 W. POL Q. 553 (1988).
104 See Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor Generaf" The Effect of
PreidentialAppointments, 43 WESTrE POL Q. 137 (1990).
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cases in which he filed an amicus brief, with no significant variations
from one administration to the next. 05
Studies of other institutional litigants have found less reason to
believe that these litigants have a major impact on the Court. A paper
by Thomas Morris suggested that state attorneys general are less suc-
cessful than the Solicitor General in influencing the Supreme Court
through amicus filings.0 5 A study undertaken by Gregg Ivers and
Karen O'Connor found that the ACLU and Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement achieved some success as amici curiae, but only
when the Court was ideologically predisposed to reach the outcomes
they favored."'
In sum, the existing empirical literature on the relationship be-
tween amicus briefs and Supreme Court outcomes provides confusing
and contradictory results. Some studies, including those of Puro and
the issue-specific multivariate regression analyses, suggest that amicus
support is associated with enhanced chances of success. Other stud-
ies, such as Songer and Sheehan's matched pair study and the studies
of institutional litigants other than the Solicitor General, show no re-
lationship between amicus support and outcomes. The only finding
that has been consistently replicated is that the Solicitor General en-
joys a unique degree of success as an amicus filer.
IV. THREE MODELS OFJUDGING AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMICUS BRIEFS
One of the shortcomings of previous quantitative studies of ami-
cus briefs is that they often fail to articulate a clear hypothesis about
how information contained in amicus filings influences the decision
making of the Supreme Court.' These studies nearly always presup-
pose some theory of judicial behavior. But often that theory is not
made explicit,'°9 and only rarely is any linkage established between the
105 See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICTrOR GENERAL: THE POLIICS OF LAW
145-50 (1992).
106 See Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys General as
Amicus Curiae, 70JUDIcATURE 298, 305 (1987).
107 See Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Fiends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae Participa-
tion and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982,9 LAW & POL'Y 161 (1987).
108 See, e.g., id (noting the relationship between amicus briefs and court decisions,
but making no claims of causality); McGuire, supra note 96 (same); Songer & Sheehan,
supra note 92 (same).
109 For example, McGuire, supra note 97, at 188, appears to adopt the attitudinal
model.
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theory and a working hypothesis about how information influences
the Court. Perhaps further progress can be made in understanding
the impact of amicus briefs by delineating more precisely how differ-
ent models of judicial behavior generate different hypotheses about
how amicus briefs influence (or fail to influence) the Court."' These
hypotheses, in turn, suggest the different types of empirical results we
should expect to find in examining large numbers of Supreme Court
cases. Whether or not these results obtain may shed new light on
which model ofjudging is most accurate. In this Part, we discuss three
models ofjudicial behavior and specify the implications of each model
in terms of the pathway of influence of amicus briefs. This in turn
suggests, in a general way, the type of empirical results that would
tend to corroborate or disprove the model.
A. The Legal Model
The first model, and the one with which lawyers will be most fa-
miliar, we call the legal model.' As its name suggests, the legal model
11 There is a small but growing body of literature that is self-consciously aware of
the existence of rival models ofjudging and of the importance of these models to em-
pirical evaluation of the courts. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OFJuDICIAL
BEHAVIOR passim (1997) (reviewing different models ofjudging found in political sci-
ence literature); Ronald A. Cass, Judging. Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-
making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941 (1995) (examining two models ofjudging in order to syn-
thesize a new model); Christopher R. Drahozal,JudicialIncentives and the Appeals Process,
51 SMU L. REV. 469, 471 (1998) (constructing a model ofjudicial incentives and stat-
ing that such an approach "complements and refines" previous approaches); Thomas
W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 973-87
(1997) (discussing various ways of differentiating courts from other institutions in a
comparative institutional choice perspective); Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maxi-
mize?, supra note 13, at 7-31 (discussing various "maximands" that judges might have
under a utility-maximization model); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1385-92
(1998) (discussing behavioral, attitudinal, and legal models of judging); Frederick
Schauer, Judicial Incentives and the Design of Legal Institutions, Paper Delivered at
American Political Science Association Meeting (August 31, 1997) (manuscript on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (contrasting theories of'judging based
on self-interest with theories based on the pursuit of policy preferences);.
,I This is the phrase employed by political scientists who specialize in quantitative
studies of courts. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14, at 32 ("[T]he legal
model ... postulates that the decisions of the Court are based on the facts of the case
in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the fram-
ers, precedent, and a balancing of societal interests."); Frank B. Cross, Political Science
and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinay Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 251, 255-64 (1997) (discussing the origins and history of the traditional legal
model). For a defense of the legal model in the context of a study of amicus briefs, see
Hakman, supra note 16, at 47-50.
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posits that Justices resolve cases in accordance with their understand-
ing of the requirements of the authoritative sources of law relevant to
the question presented. These include the text of the applicable con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, the structure and history of these
provisions, precedents of the Court, and arguments about the policy
consequences of different outcomes.1
The legal model is without doubt the "official" conception of how
information, including that provided by amicus briefs, influences
judges. Since 1990, the Court's rules governing the filing of amicus
briefs have begun with this admonition:
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court rele-
vant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of
considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve
this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored."
3
In other words, the Court's rules suggest that amicus briefs can in-
fluence the Court ("may be of considerable help to the Court") inso-
far as those briefs have value, both in the sense that they speak to the
merits of the legal issue before the Court (supply "relevant matter")
and provide new information ("matter not already brought to its at-
tention by the parties").
The legal model is also the conception of the judicial role implicit
in the procedures that the Court follows in deciding argued cases.
Those procedures are designed to facilitate a careful sifting of argu-
ments and authorities. They include the dialogic pattern reflected in
the filing of opening briefs, followed by responsive briefs, followed by
112 What we call the legal model is often presented in legal literature in a highly
idealized form, as in the works advocating a "civic republican" model ofjudging. See,
e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988) (suggesting that repub-
lican theory can foster stronger judicial protection of individual rights than can com-
peting theories); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that the emphasis of civic republicanism
on citizen participation in government is the best justification for modern administra-
tive law); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1579-85
(1988) (suggesting the application of republican concepts to the courts). As such, the
model is vulnerable to the charge that it offers an unrealistic conception of the judicial
process. But it is not necessary to assume that judges are heroic civic republicans in
order to embrace the legal model. Chief Judge Posner has offered a model in which
judges are depicted as consumers who derive pleasure from the "game" of deciding
cases. See Posner, Wat Do Judges andJustices Maximize, supra note 13, at 28-30. If one
of the rules of this game is that judges should strive to decide cases correctly-i.e., in
accordance with their understanding of the (highly complex) norms of the legal pro-
fession-then Posner's rational consumer model of judging should also yield behav-
ioral redictions roughly similar to those of the legal model.
li Sup. Cr. R. 37.1.
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reply briefs; the close questioning of counsel at oral argument; the ex-
change of views and preliminary votes at the conference of the Jus-
tices; and the circulation of draft opinions among the Justices for
comment and revision before a final decision is reached! This sift-
ing process can be seen as a collective weighing by the Justices of the
strength of different legal perspectives with respect to the controversy
at hand.
Notwithstanding the legal model's preferred status as reflected in
the Court's rules and procedures, political scientists have long been
intensely skeptical about whether the legal model has any explanatory
power in predicting the outcomes reached by the Court. They note
that the legal factors the Court considers are complex and have no
fixed ordinal ranking. Thus, they contend, the legal model is open to
manipulation and simply serves as a post hoc rationalization for results
reached on political grounds.1 5
A proponent of the legal model might respond that it is unrealis-
tic to demand that the law produce highly predictable outcomes, at
least at the highest level of appellate litigation. The fact that the cases
reaching the Supreme Court are those that produce disagreement
among lawyers does not mean that law is irrelevant to the resolution
of these disputes. The lawyers appearing before the Court debate
these issues in terms of legal doctrine,116 and they frequently reach a
consensus about which outcomes are most appropriate. Indeed, the
fact that the Court rules unanimously in nearly 40% of its argued
cases17 suggests either that there is a strong core of agreement among
the Justices about the law's requirements in a significant percentage of
114 For an overview of the Court's procedures, see ROBERT L. STERN ET AL,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 533-609 (7th ed. 1993), and WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE
SUPREME COURT: HoWITWAs, HoWITIS 271-303 (1987).
11 See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14, at 62-65 (asserting that the legal model
is meaningless, since "various aspects of the legal model can support either side of any
given dispute that comes before the Court"); cf. Cross, supra note 111, at 264 (noting
numerous dismissive remarks by political scientists in referring to the legal model).
16 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine,
30 CONN. L. REv. 961, 1016 (1998) (contending that the substantial amount of time
that courts and academics devote to doctrine belies the argument that doctrine is "in-
coherent, manipulable, and manipulated").
17 See EPSTEIN ETAL, supra note 21, at 193-94 tbl.3-1 (listing the raw numbers and
percentages of unanimous decisions for the terms from 1900 to 1994); see also J.
Mitchell Pickerill, The Unanimously Ignored Issue of Unanimity and the Attitudinal
Model 15 (Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, April 18-20, 1996) (manuscript on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review) (identifying unanimous decisions as a "potential problem" for ad-
vocates of the attitudinal model).
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cases, or at least that their disagreements are not sharp enough to
provoke a dissent."8
Given the assumption of the legal model that Justices are anxious
to resolve the cases before them correctly, in light of the complex
norms of the legal profession, they should be eager to explore differ-
ent legal perspectives on the issue, including different legal theories
concerning how the issue should be resolved. These norms include,
for many Justices, the social consequences of adopting different legal
rules. Thus, these Justices should be receptive to "Brandeis Brief-type
information that sheds light on the wider social implications of the
decision.
The legal model therefore generates a clear prediction about what
results we should expect from an empirical study of amicus briefs.
Amicus briefs should affect the likelihood of a party's success in the
Supreme Court, but only insofar as they are of high quality, i.e., they
provide new, legally relevant information to the Court beyond that
supplied by the parties. The sheer quantity of amicus submissions, on
11 Additional support for the constraining power of legal doctrine is provided by
studies that look beyond the set of highly controversial Supreme Court decisions that
garner the most public attention. For example, one study that looked to all of the
Court's decisions on the merits, including both argued cases and per curiam opinions
(which typically rest upon the application of precedent), found a high degree of inter-
nal agreement among the Justices. See Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not
the Whole Story: The Impact ofJustices' Values on Supreme Court Decision Making 40 AM. J.
POL Sc. 1049 (1996). Studies of lower federal court decision making designed to
measure the influence of legal doctrine on outcomes have reached mixed results.
Generally speaking, however, it appears that legal doctrine often acts as a significant
constraint on the decisions reached by lower courts, although less so when those deci-
sions are inherently discretionary or when review by higher level courts is unlikely. See,
e.g., C.K. RoWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS ANDJUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 34, 40, 48-50 (1996) (finding relatively little difference between Democratic
and Republican district judges over all cases, but larger differences in cases involving
controversial issues such as race relations, religion, and privacy); Orley Ashenfelter et
al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding that "individual judge characteristics" have little
power in explaining outcomes in federal district court decisions in civil rights cases);
John R. Quinn, "Attitudinal" Decision Making in the Federal Courts: A Study of Constitu-
tional Self-Representation Claims, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 701 (1996) (finding little support
for attitudinal model as opposed to legal model at district court level); Richard L. Re-
vesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1743,
1763-64 (1997) (finding that outcomes in the D.C. Circuit in environmental cases are
highly correlated with political party of appointing President, but cautioning that the
strongest effects are shown in discretionary cases that are effectively immune from fur-
ther review); Sisk et al., supra note 110, at 1498-99 (finding in study of district court
decisions assessing the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that de-
sire to limit caseload and opportunity for promotion have some influence on out-
comes, but so do legal factors, especially precedent).
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the other hand, should have little impact. Indeed, low-quality briefs
that are merely repetitious should have no impact, or perhaps even a
negative impact insofar as they "burden the Court," to use the Court's
own phrase. Measuring "high quality" in a study that relies on count-
ing large numbers of briefs in large numbers of cases is inherently
problematic. Nevertheless, as reported in Part V we have attempted in
our empirical study to devise various proxies for high-quality briefs in
an effort to test this prediction.19
B. The Attitudinal Model
The second model of judicial behavior is the attitudinal model,
which is today the dominant model used by political scientists study-
ing the Supreme Court."0 The attitudinal model posits that the Jus-
tices decide cases in accordance with their political beliefs. 2' These
beliefs are assumed to be fixed by the time a Justice is appointed to
the Court; the Justices do not change their ideological predispositions
by interacting with their colleagues or by reflecting on the cases they
hear or other information they acquire during their years on the
Court.'2
Under the attitudinal model, individualJustices are viewed as each
having a package of political "attitudes" that can be ranked along or-
dinal scales. These are usually scaled from "liberal" to "conservative,"
but are sometimes expressed more specifically, such as pro- to anti-
death penalty or pro- to anti-labor union123 The model assumes that
as cases presenting facts that implicate these attitudes arise, the out-
comes are determined in accordance with the preferences of the ma-
jority of the votingJustices. Thus, if the issue involves a conflict be-
119 See infra Part V.C.
120 See generally Cross, supra note 111, at 252 n.4 ("The attitudinal model has
achieved predominance in political science scholarship."); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul
Brace, Justices' Responses to Case Facts: An Interactive Mode; 24 AM. POL Q. 237, 237-38
(1996) ("Without question, the attitudinal model has dominated the study of judicial
choice and stands unchallenged as the best representation of voting on the merits in
the nation's highest court."); Schauer, supra note 110, at 4-5 (noting that political sci-
entists today overwhelmingly adopt some version of the attitudinal model).
121 See SAUL BRENNER & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992, at 59-71 (1995); SEGAL & SPAETH, su-
pra note 14, at 65.
12 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14, at 64-72.
12 See i&L at 242-55 (positioningJustices on a scale of "liberal" to "conservative" on
a variety of issues); id. at 222-25 (scaling Justices as pro- to anti-death penalty); id- at
236 (characterizingJustice Frankfurter as "anti-union").
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tween management and labor, and a majority of judges fall on the
pro-labor end of the pro- to anti-labor scale, the party representing la-
bor wins.
Lawyers and law professors usually react to the attitudinal model
with hostility, regarding it as at best a caricature of the legal process. 4
The proponents of the model acknowledge that it is highly reduction-
istic, but counter that any model ofjudicial behavior, if it is to be use-
ful, must be "simpl [e] and parsimoniou[s]."'2 They maintain that the
attitudinal model, for all of its oversimplification, does a better job of
predicting the outcomes of Supreme Court cases than any other
126
model. It is this claim to predictive superiority, rather than any sub-
tlety or verisimilitude, that has caused the attitudinal model to be-
come the dominant approach to study of the Court among political
124 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235,
235 (1999) ("Judging is a complex, case-specific, and subtle task... ; reducing the
process to the level of checking a ballot box... discredits the responsibility with which
federal judges have been entrusted... .");J. Randolph Block, Book Review, 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 617, 624 (reviewing HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY
MAKING: EVALUATION AND PREDICTION (1979), and concluding that the attitudinal
model is nothing more than a simple "toy that gives intellectual pleasure and nothing
else"). The principal response of the legal academy to the attitudinal model, however,
has been silence. Legal academics who study courts are surprisingly ignorant of the
empirical literature on courts being generated by social scientists. See Cross, supra note
111, at 252-53 ("To date, legal scholarship has been remarkably oblivious to this large
and mounting body of political science scholarship on courts."). The operational as-
sumption of the attitudinal theory-that all judging is political-is of course similar to
the operational assumptions of the Critical Legal Studies movement. See id. at 257-60
(noting that the "fundamental principle of CLS" is that the law is indeterminate and
manipulated by "capitalist elites"). But CIS scholars are typically not very interested in
quantitative empirical research, and have not discussed the findings of attitudinal
scholarship. See id. at 257-58 (noting that some CIS scholars feel that empirical sup-
port is unneeded given that "CLS bases its theory of social change" on widely held as-
sumptions in our political culture).
"- SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14, at 32.
126 For notable studies finding the attitudinal model a better predictor of outcomes
than the legal model, see, e.g., BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 121, at 109 (finding that
"attitudinal variables" substantively explain the voting patterns of the Justices); Jeffrey
A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
83 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 557, 561-63 (1989) (arguing that the attitudinal model is a suc-
cessful predictor while noting some of its shortcomings); and Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme
Court Justices as Human Decision Makers: An Individual-Level Analysis of the Search and Sei-
zure Cases, 48J. POL. 938, 941-43 (1986) (using the attitudinal model to explore voting
patterns in search and seizure cases). Cf Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Na-
ture of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 331-32 (1992) (finding
that both the attitudinal model and the legal model have predictive power in death
penalty cases, and proposing a synthesis).
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scientists.12
7
The important point for present purposes is the implications of
the attitudinal model for how Justices react to information beyond
that supplied by the parties to a case. Under the. attitudinal model,
judges need very little information to decide cases. Ordinarily, the list
of "Questions Presented" in the petitioner's brief and the bare out-
lines of the underlying controversy should do. The assumption that
Justices decide cases based on only a few key bits of information in
turn suggests that it will be an extremely rare case in which amicus
briefs will supply critical information that invokes a different prefer-
ence and changes the outcome.'2 In short, the attitudinal model
generates what statisticians would call the null hypothesis: amicus
briefs will have no discernible impact on outcomes.129
Recently, some political scientists have begun to question the as-
sumption of the attitudinal model that the Justices do not modify
their positions in light of information about how other institutional
actors are likely to respond to their decisions. Instead, they have
12 Although the attitudinal model is usually encountered in its undiluted form in
the writing of political scientists, it is not unfamiliar to lawyers. For example, it is pri-
marily this model that underlies the exercise of "counting heads" used by lawyers in
advising clients about possible outcomes of cases under appeal. See, e.g., Richard J.
Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court!s Takings Cases, 38
WM. & MARYL. REV. 1099, 1102-03 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of counting
votes to take account of the "rule of five"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting Heads on
RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 7, 7-25 (1997) (engaging in nose-counting ofJustices
to predict that the Supreme Court would uphold the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act). Moreover, at least one sittingJustice-Chiefjustice Rehnquist-has intimated in
some of his writings that he accepts something akin to the attitudinal model of the ju-
dicial process. See Thomas W. Merrill, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the
Intergetation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 621, 632-38 (1994) (and sources cited therein).
Segal and Spaeth are explicit on this point "[I]nterest groups have little tangi-
ble to offer the justices, apart from some information-occasionally not otherwise
available-that may marginally ease their reaching a decision.... [MAe have virtually
no evidence to date that interest groups have an independent impact on Supreme
Court decisions on the merits." SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14, at 241.
12 It is possible to imagine individualized exceptions to this generalization. For
example, suppose a Justice favors organized religion, and is presented with a case in
which a fringe religious group is contesting a decision by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to revoke its tax-exempt status. Cf Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680
(1989) (considering whether payments to the Church of Scientology for spiritual train-
ing sessions are tax deductible). On the face of the matter, it may be unclear whether
the IRS's position is favorable or unfavorable to organized religion. One or two ami-
cus briefs from mainstream religious bodies should help clarify this ambiguity, and
would therefore guide the Justice ideologically predisposed to favor organized religion
as to how to vote. But these situations presumably would be rare, certainly given the
level of generality at which the decisive judicial values and attitudes are typically de-
scribed by the proponents of the attitudinal model.
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sought to explain judicial behavior in accordance with a "strategic ac-
tor" model.30 This is essentially the attitudinal model with the added
assumption that the Justices are rational actors who modify their vot-
ing behavior in order to maximize the chances of their ideological
preferences actually being adopted as policy. Thus, the Justices do
not vote in accordance with their "knee jerk" reaction to the facts of a
case, but instead consider how other institutional actors are likely to
respond to their decisions. In particular, the Justices will consider
whether a given interpretation of a statute is likely to be overruled by
Congress, or whether the recognition of a particular constitutional
right is likely to be nullified by lackluster executive enforcement' 3'
Although it is difficult to derive testable hypotheses about the in-
fluence of amicus briefs from the strategic actor version of the attitu-
dinal model, at least two predictions would seem to flow from this per-
spective. First, since the interests of the executive branch and of
Congress are nearly always represented in the Supreme Court by the
Solicitor General, one would expect a strategic Justice to pay very
close attention to the amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General.
This might translate into higher success rates for the Solicitor Gen-
eral's amicus briefs relative to those of other filers. Similarly, though
less dramatically, one would expect a strategic Justice to pay more
than ordinary attention to the arnicus briefs filed by the States since
the States are often called upon to implementjudicial decisions. This
might translate into a somewhat higher success rate for the States as
amicus fliers relative to others.
C. The Interest Group Model
The third model ofjudging posits that Justices will seek to resolve
ISO See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 110, at 89-124 (concluding thatJustices routinely vote
strategically, rather than always following their own optimal policy preferences, in or-
der to advance broader policy goals); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) ("[J]ustices are strategic actors who realize that their ability
to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors,
the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they
act."); Revesz, supra note 118, at 1766-67 & n.101 (collecting other studies applying a
strategic actor model).
11For example, the Supreme Court's wavering path in interpreting federal civil
rights legislation between the 1960s and the 1990s has been explained in terms of a
strategic actor model that incorporates the Court's changing policy preferences, its
perceptions as to how likely it is that Congress will vote to overrule its decisions, and its
perceptions as to whether the President will veto an attempted overruling by Congress.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Game, 79 CAL L. REV. 613, 642-46 (1991).
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cases in accordance with the desires of the organized groups that have
an interest in the controversy. We call this the interest group model.
Political scientists have long perceived an analogy between interest
groups lobbying legislatures and interest groups seeking to influence
judicial decisions through the filing of amicus briefs. 2 More recently,
some legal scholars influenced by public choice theory have begun to
model the judiciary in accordance with the rational-maximizer as-
sumptions of the interest group theory of politics."" Indeed, the in-
terest group model may be the dominant conception that amicus fil-
ers have today regarding their own efforts.'3 4
What has not been perceived is that the interest group model of
the judicial process, although it shares with the attitudinal model the
basic hypothesis that judicial behavior is political, in fact adopts a very
different assumption as to why judges behave politically. In contrast
to the attitudinal model, which views judges as having fixed political
beliefs and as seeking to advance those beliefs through judicial deci-
sions, the interest group model depicts judges as having no fixed be-
liefs, but rather as seeking to satisfy the political demands of the best-
organized groups appearing before them. The distinction between
the attitudinal model and the interest group model of judging thus
exactly parallels the distinction in political science between the "ideo-
logical" and the "interest group" model of legislative behavior.'35 In
both literatures, the former model depicts government actors as utiliz-
ing their office in order to advance their view of the public good,
while the latter model depicts government actors as utilizing their of-
132 See DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 479 (1951); VOSE, supra
note 76, at ix; Lucius J. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic iew of theJudicial
Function, 29J. POL 41, 41 (1967); Harper & Etherington, supra note 60, at 1172. See
generally Epstein, supra note 36, at 336-45 (tracing the history of the interest group con-
ception of the judicial process).
3 See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 12, at 18-28, 123-50; Elhauge, supra note 12; Saul
Levmnore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 278-79 (1999);
Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY' 220 (1997).
134 See Morriss, supra note 80, at 829 ("[A]mici's view of their own efforts is akin to
that of groups lobbying before Congress.").
1s3 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCnON 12-37 (1991) (reviewing studies purporting to show that legis-
lators are primarily motivated by ideology and other studies purporting to show that
they are primarily motivated by desire for reelection);Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan,
Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279, 298
(1984) (finding that economic models that view political actors as "narrowly egocentric
maximizers" without taking account of legislators' ideologies poorly predict legislative
outcomes).
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fice in order to maximize their own private good.
The immediate question raised by the interest group model is why
Supreme Court Justices, who have lifetime tenure and guaranteed
compensation, should care about the political demands of organized
groups. Two possible reasons have been offered.
The first suggests that Justices have the same self-regarding ten-
dencies that economists impute to other individuals to explain both
market and non-market behavior.3 6 Thus,just as firms are assumed to
maximize profits, and politicians are assumed (by analogy) to maxi-
mize their chances of reelection, so judges can be assumed (by further
analogy) to maximize some private good they value. It is possible to
imagine various private goods that lower court judges might seek to
maximize, such as the chances of promotion to a higher judicial or
executive office or the prospect of lucrative post-employment income
as a private mediator.137 But at least at the Supreme Court level, the
reputation of the judge (as measured by laudatory articles, honorific
awards, invitations to make appearances at elite law schools and to
conduct seminars at exclusive resorts, and the like) seems like the
most plausible maximand. This concern with enhancing their repu-
tation, the self-interest argument suggests, drives the Justices to adopt
the preferred positions of the most influential interest groups, be-
cause these groups have the capacity to affect the Justice's reputation
with key audiences.
An alternative explanation would focus not on each Justice's con-
136 SeeJERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOvERNANCE 3 (1997) (discussing
the rational-choice assumption "that people behave as if they were purely rational cal-
culators of their own gains and losses from alternative courses of action").
137 See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 13, at 109-17 (discussing various ob-
jectives judges might seek to maximize, including promotion, leisure, popularity, repu-
tation, and the pleasure of playing the "judicial game"); Cross, supra note 111, at 294-
97 (offering a broad array of the self-interests judges may seek to maximize, ranging
from respect, to the ability to impose their personal views on society, to leisure time).
138 As Lawrence Baum, supra note 110, at 47, observes, "there is no doubt that Su-
preme Courtjustices care about their standing with audiences outside the Court." He
explains:
They frequently speak to legal groups and sometimes speak to other interest
groups. They often work to obtain positive reactions from such groups; Ben-
jamin Cardozo, for instance, "cultivated the good opinion of academics."
Many justices pay attention to their depiction in the mass media, some grant
interviews to journalists, and some respond to criticism in the press. Harry
Blackmun read his mall from the public, and William Brennan cared about
his portrayal in biographies. Several justices have maintained personal rela-
tionships with presidents, even at the risk of creating conflicts of interest.
Id. at 47-48 (citations omitted).
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cern about personal reputation, but rather on the Justices' collective
concern about the prestige and power of the Court as an institution.
Scholars who study the relationship between public opinion and the
Court have long hypothesized that the Justices recognize that "the
Court is a political institution whose authority depends on public def-
erence and respect. ' 9 Consequently, at least some Justices will mod-
ify their decisions "in response to what they individually perceive as
long-term and fundamental changes in public opinion."40 Justice
Roberts's famous "switch in time" to preserve New Deal programs
from invalidation14' and Justice Kennedy's apparent reversal of posi-
tion on whether to overrule Roe v. Wade0 are familiar examples.
Whatever the assumed source of the Justices' sensitivity to organ-
ized public opinion, the implications of the interest group theory for
amicus activity are reasonably clear. In order to maximize their own
public reputations or the reputation of the Court, the Justices need
information about public opinion. How do they get such informa-
tion? On some issues that reach the Court, such as whether abortions
should be constitutionally protected or compulsory busing used to
achieve integration in public schools, public opinion polling data is
available.'4 However, with respect to most issues the Court must de-
cide-such as whether to recognize a psychotherapist's privilege (the
issue in Jaffee v. Redmond)-there is no public opinion, or at least no
polling data about public opinion. This does not mean, however, that
specific interest groups do not have strong views about such issues.
Those groups most affected by a decision are likely to have very pro-
nounced views about how these issues should be resolved as a policy
matter. Thus, in the vast run of cases that the Court decides, "public
opinion" translates into "interest group opinion."
139 William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Mode and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58J. PoL. 169, 173 (1996).
For other studies of the impact of public opinion on the Court, see THOMAS R.
MARSHAIL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989), and David Barnum, The
Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47
J. PoL 652 (1985).
140 Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 139, at 174.
141 See Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat; 107 HARV. L. REv. 620,
631-34 (1994).
142 Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Kennedy,
J.,joins plurality opinion declining to reaffirm Roe v. Wade) with Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,joins opinion reaffirming central holding of
Roe v. Wade).
143 SeeEPS N ET AL., supra note 21, at 679-95 (reporting longitudinal polling data
on these questions).
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The interest group model therefore generates a third hypothesis
about the role of amicus briefs in transmitting information to the
Court. Insofar as the Justices are assumed to try to resolve cases in ac-
cordance with the weight of public opinion, they should look to ami-
cus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both sides of the issue.
Moreover, the information that amicus briefs convey about organized
opinion is such that it can largely be assimilated simply by looking at
the cover of the brief. The Justices can scan the covers of the briefs to
see which organizations care strongly about the issue on either side.
The fact that the organization saw fit to file the brief is the important
datum, not the legal arguments or the background information set
forth between the covers of the brief.'44
The understanding that amicus briefs transmit the views of inter-
est groups appears to be the animating idea of Justice Scalia's dissent-
ing opinion in Jaffee. In Jaffee, Justice Scalia noted that fourteen
groups, most of them representing different types of psychotherapists,
filed amicus briefs in support of creating a "psychotherapist's privi-
lege" in federal court.. Such a privilege, by shielding psychothera-
pists from having to testify about information disclosed to them by pa-
tients while undergoing therapy, would enhance the value of
therapeutic services and would elevate the prestige of therapists by as-
sociating their services with those provided by more traditional profes-
sionals such as lawyers. The filing of the fourteen briefs could be
viewed as sending a clear message to the Court that the weight of or-
ganized public opinion strongly supported the recognition of such a
psychotherapist's privilege. Thus, if the Justices are assumed to be
concerned primarily with public opinion, amicus briefs offer a road
map about how to rule.
The interest group model generates a clear prediction about what
results we should expect from an empirical analysis of amicus briefs.
We should expect to find that disparities in amicus support for one
side over another would translate into a greater probability of success
for the side with the greater support. Such disparities would signal to
the Court that organized interest groups, and through them public
'44 Amicus briefs may also be a source of direct information about the policy pref-
erences of other institutional actors. Epstein and Knight did a small random study of
briefs filed in the 1990 Term and found that "the majority of briefs filed in constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional cases attempt to define the preferences of other political
actors." EpsTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 130, at 146.
145 SeeJaffee v, Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
supra text accompanying note 11.
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opinion, are aligned with one side of the controversy rather than an-
other. The greater the disparity of amicus support for one side, the
more likely the Court will rule for that side.16 The quality of the legal
analysis contained in amicus briefs, however, would make little differ-
ence to the outcome.
V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE
OFAMICUS BRIEFS
In an effort to test these rival conceptions about the influence of
amicus briefs, we undertook to conduct an empirical study. Unfortu-
nately, the standard database used in studying the Supreme Court
does not contain the bulk of the information necessary for such a
study. For example, it does not include the number of amicus briefs
filed in support of the different parties.14 Thus, it was necessary to de-
velop our own database. (A complete description of the methodology
that we followed and of a number of the variables that we tracked in
assembling the database is set forth in Appendix B of this Article.)
Our database consists of all Supreme Court decisions from the
beginning of October Term 1946 to the end of October Term 1995 in
146 It might be argued that the best measure of interest group support is the num-
ber of organizations that participate in the filing of amicus briefs, as opposed to the
number of amicus briefs they file. Thus, for example, if 40 business organizations
joined forces to file 10 amicus briefs in a case involving punitive damages, then the
best index of interest group views might be the fact that 40 organizations participated
in the effort, not that 10 briefs were filed. We reject this approach for two reasons, one
methodological, the other theoretical. The methodological reason is that it would be
impossible to tabulate the number of participating organizations based on the infor-
mation supplied by the Reporter of Decisions in the United States Reports, because the
Reporter typically lists only the first-named organization that appears on a brief, fol-
lowed by the notation "et al." Thus, in order to gather the names of all participating
organizations, it would be necessary to examine the original amicus briefs individually,
an extraordinarily time-consuming task. The theoretical reason is that the strength of
interest group support may best be measured by the total amount of resources that
these groups are willing to expend in "lobbying" the Court. If the costs of filing an
amicus brief fall within a relatively narrow range, then the number of amicus briefs
may serve as a reasonably good proxy for the total amount of resources that groups are
willing to spend. Certainly it is a better proxy than the number of groups that appear
on the covers of the briefs (the larger the number of groups participating on each
brief, the lower the expense for each of the participating groups). Large numbers of
groups joining forces to file a small number of briefs thus might signal less intense
concern with a case than would a larger number of briefs filed by a smaller number of
grougs. See also infra note 198.
See supra note 82 (discussing INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POlITICAL AND SOC.
RESEARCH, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURTJUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953-1997 TERMs (9th
ed. 1999)).
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which the Court heard oral arguments and rendered a decision on
the merits or by dismissing declined to do so. For each of 6141 cases,
we classified the outcome as falling into one of three categories: p-win
(short for petitioner win), meaning that the judgment below was set
aside; p-loss (short for petitioner loss), meaning basically that the
judgment below was sustained or at a minimum not set aside; and
mixed result, meaning that the judgment was partially sustained and
partially set aside.14 1 Using the tabulation of amicus briefs at the be-
ginning of each decision in the official United States Reports by the Re-
porter of Decisions, we also recorded for each case the number of
amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, the number of amicus briefs
supporting the respondent, and the number of amicus briefs not clas-
sified as supporting either party (we term this last category "other"
briefs) 149
In addition, we tracked the amicus curiae briefs of four institu-
tional litigants-the Solicitor General, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the AFL-CIO, and the States. Each of these four institutional
actors frequently appears as amicus before the Supreme Court and
has done so throughout the fifty years of our study."5 Moreover, each
of these institutional litigants has been identified in the previous lit-
erature as being especially successful in influencing the Court through
amicus curiae submissions. 5' We wanted to test these assertions and
also to be able to control for the impact of these litigants in assessing
the effectiveness of other amicus filers.
We used our large database of decisions to try to answer three
148 Supreme Court decisions do not come neatly packaged as victories or defeats
for the parties. The Court uses an array of terms for its judgments, including "re-
versed," 'vacated," 'affirmed," "reversed in part and vacated in part," and so forth. We
set forth in an appendix a description of the methodology we followed in categorizing
outcomes. See infra Appendix B at notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
149 See infra Appendix B at notes 12-20 and accompanying text (describing the Re-
porter's classification system).
150 This distinguishes these groups from other institutional litigants that could also
have been interesting to track. For example, the American Medical Association,
though appearing as amicus as early as 1926, see Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581,
587 (1926), did not become a regular filer until well after even the halfway point of
our study, see, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339 n.* (1981); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 308 n.* (1976); id. at 323 n.4 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Such relatively recent emergence also characterizes the American Psycho-
logical Association. See, e.g., Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 587 n.*, 606 (1979); Maxwell
v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 263 (1970).
151 See, e.g., Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 107, at 169 (discussing the success rate of
the ACLU); Puro, supra note 2, at 101-04 (discussing the success rates of each of these
filers).
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questions, corresponding to our three models ofjudging and their as-
sociated hypotheses. The first, which was suggested by the attitudinal
model, is whether amicus briefs in general have any measurable im-
pact on the outcomes reached by the Supreme Court The second,
which was stimulated by justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Jaffee v.
Redmond 52 and the interest group model, is whether disparities in
amicus support for one side or another have an impact on the out-
comes reached by the Supreme Court The third, which is responsive
to the legal model, is whether high-quality amicus briefs have an im-
pact on outcomes reached by the Court
A. The Overall Success Rates ofAmicus Filers
The earliest studies of amicus briefs by political scientists sought to
determine the influence of such briefs by computing the overall suc-
cess rates of amicus filers-how often amicus filers prevail relative to
some underlying benchmark of outcomes.' 5 It makes sense to repeat
this exercise using our large and updated database. More to the
point, the overall success rate sheds light on the attitudinal model.
Under the attitudinal model, a high success rate for any particular
amicus group could be explained on the ground that a majority of the
Justices shares the same political attitudes as the group. But if hun-
dreds of different amicus filers reflecting every possible viewpoint are
collectively associated with parties that achieve greater success relative
to parties that lack amicus support, this would tend to cast doubt on
the attitudinal model. Accordingly, we computed the success rates for
amicus filers both over the entire span of our study and by decade.
In assessing the impact of amicus filers in general, the point of
departure is to determine the benchmark rate of success for petition-
ers and respondents without regard to amicus support. We computed
the benchmark rate by determining the mean p-win and p-loss rate for
petitioners and respondents in cases in which no amicus briefs were
filed. Rounding to whole numbers, we found that in such cases peti-
tioners are successful 60% of the time, respondents are successful 37%
of the time, and mixed results are obtained 3% of the time.'" Figure
152 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996); seesupra text accompanying notes 10-11, 145.
353 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 83-91 (discussing Puro's calculation of a
base rate of amicus success); Songer & Sheehan, supra note 92, at 345 (comparing suc-
cess rates of parties supported by amici with success rates of parties not supported by
amici).
5 More precisely, for cases in which no amicus briefs were filed, petitioners
achieved success 59.77% of the time, respondents achieved success 36.85% of the time,
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6 summarizes the benchmark rates of success overall and by decade.
Figure 6: P-Win and P-Loss Rates for All Cases
Without Amicus Briefs
100%
80%
60% -
40% --- ---
20%
0%- 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
54.90% 61.61% 63.44% 61.42% 58.14% 59.77%
42.52% 34.57% 32.55% 34.8% 40.70% 86.85%
Decades
Data UndedyingFRu 6 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
P-lds 448 483 380 234 100 1645
P-&sses 347 271 195 131 70 1014
Mived reults 21 30 24 16 2 93
Our benchmark rates of success are themselves an important em-
pirical payoff of the study. Previous studies have found that the Su-
preme Court is more likely to rule in favor of petitioners than respon-
dents.1 15  Analysts have suggested that this reflects the fact that one
factor that presumably motivates the Court to grant review is the per-
ception of at least four Justices that the case below was wrongly de-
156
cided s. Our large database not only confirms that petitioners fare
better than respondents, but allows us more precisely to quantify the
disparate success of petitioners.
Given that the benchmark rates of success vary slightly by decade,
we have used decade-specific success rates in reporting data. As a
rule, however, we do not in our presentation of results use different
benchmark rates of success for petitioners and respondents. Instead,
we focus solely on whether filers supporting petitioners have increased
the p-win rate above the p-win benchmark and on whether filers sup-
and mixed results were achieved 3.38% of the time.
155 See, e.g., Segal, supra note 101, at 140 (noting that the typical success rate for re-
spondents is 33%).
156 See, e.g., Virginia C. Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the
Warren and Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 PoLmI 141, 150 (1982).
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porting respondents have reduced the p-win rate below the p-win
benchmark. This introduces a small amount of inaccuracy, since the
p-win benchmark is not exactly the obverse of the p-loss benchmark,
given that the percentage of mixed results (which is 3% overall) varies
slightly from decade to decade. But the alternative of using separate
benchmarks for filers supporting petitioners and filers supporting re-
spondents would have made the exposition of results more compli-
cated and potentially confusing. We concluded that a small amount
of inaccuracy was a price worth paying for a more simplified and
comprehensible presentation.
Figure 7: Percentage Change in P-Win Rates for Amici
Supporting Petitioner Relative to Benchmark Rates of Success
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
-6% 194 1195 11966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 A.9
-4.38% 8.97 3.68% -0.12% -1.70% %
Decades
Dda UA~rbiWs 7 19161955 1956195 19661975 1976195 19861995 AN
Utrb''oficdancers A rcuaRBde g W ' 146 283 549 %8 1118 M)94
!r ofer l cs nicus des i n / s 118 105 223 531 M 1716
Mmi=erPcidoncesAdisnids P A Pi 25 13 46 99 124 307
otl 4 of donees Arrc Bd6 289 401 818 188 1981 5117
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the extent to which amicus filers sup-
porting petitioners and amicus filers supporting respondents have
achieved results that diverge from the benchmark p-win rates over the
fifty years of our study.
117
157 Specifically, Figure 7 compares the p-win rates of amicus briefs supporting peti-
tioners (i.e., the number of amicus briefs supporting petitioners whose petitioners win
divided by the total number of amicus briefs supporting petitioners) to the benchmark
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As can be seen from the last column in Figure 7, the success rate
of amicus filers supporting petitioners over the entire fifty-year span
differs very little from the benchmark rates of success. Amicus filers
supporting petitioners obtained a p-win rate less than 1% higher than
the benchmark rate of success. When we break the results down by
decade, we see some intriguing variations. Filers supporting petition-
ers exceeded the benchmark in the second (Warren Court) decade of
1956-1965 by nearly 9%, and beat the benchmark success rate in the
third (Warren Court/Burger Court) decade of 1966-1975 by slightly
less than 4%. In the last two decades, however, filers supporting peti-
tioners were much more numerous and achieved success at rates that
hover just under the benchmark rates of success, bringing the overall
result closely in line with the benchmark rate. It is possible, therefore,
that amicus filers supporting petitioners had some effect on outcomes
from 1956 to 1975, but then lost this advantage as the numbers of
amicus briefs surged in the last two decades.
When we turn to filers supporting respondents, we see a different
picture. Filers supporting respondents have experienced a consistent
degree of success relative to the benchmark rates of success through-
out the period of our study. Overall, as reflected in Figure 8, amicus
filers supporting respondents obtained a p-win rate of less than 53%,
which, for a filer supporting respondents, is substantially better than
the benchmark rate of 60%. When we break down the results by dec-
ade, we see that filers supporting respondents have consistently out-
performed the benchmarks. Moreover, filers supporting respondents,
unlike filers supporting petitioners, have continued to do better than
the benchmark rates in the last two decades. As we shall see, our data
show in a variety of contexts that amicus briefs supporting respon-
dents have greater success than amicus briefs supporting petitioners.
p-win rates reflected in Figure 6. Figure 8 compares the p-win rates of amicus briefs
supporting respondents (i.e., the total number of amicus briefs supporting respon-
dents where petitioners win divided by the total number of amicus briefs supporting
respondents) to the benchmark p-win rates.
THE INFLUENCE OFAMICUS BRIEFS
Figure 8: Percentage Change in P-Win Rates for Amici
Supporting Respondent Relative to Benchmark Rates of
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B. Disparities in Amicus Support
One of the primary reasons we developed our large database of
decisions is that we wanted to gather as many cases like Jaffee v.
Redmond as possible in order to test the interest group theory. That is,
we wanted to uncover a subset of cases involving extreme disparities of
amicus support of a magnitude similar to Jaffee, where the petitioner
had no amicus support and the respondent was supported by fourteen
briefs. Somewhat to our surprise, we discovered that no such subset of
cases exists. Jaffee is in a league by itself. Based on the Reporter's clas-
sification of amicus briefs, no other case in our database of 6141 deci-
sions had a disparity of at least fourteen briefs on one side and zero
on the other ss
158 Jaffee itself is classified by the Reporter as having 12 amicus briefs supporting
respondent, and two briefs are not shown as supporting either party (they are in the
"other" column). See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 3 & n.* (1996). Individual ex-
amination of these two briefs reveals, as Justice Scalia reported, that they in fact also
support respondent.
The largest disparity in a case with no briefs in the "other" column occurred in
" aa..ft. . ,
-14 I-14-
=,. -- ss m l
m
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We were therefore forced to examine the effect of much smaller
disparities in amicus support in order to consider the interest group
model. "Disparities" in this context could be measured in different
ways. They could be measured in terms of the absolute difference be-
tween the number of amicus briefs supporting one side and the num-
ber of amicus briefs supporting the other side. Alternatively, they
could be defined in terms of the ratio of the number of briefs sup-
porting one side relative to the number of briefs supporting the other
side. Finally, they could be measured in terms of multiples of briefs
supporting one side with no briefs supporting the other side. Each
measurement presents its own problems, especially in terms of han-
dling the briefs in the "other" column. We settled on the last measure
because it struck us (as it apparently did Justice Scalia inJaffee) as the
type of disparity most likely to suggest to the Court that organized
groups are aligned in favor of one side of a case rather than the other.
In other words, we studied cases in which there were one, two, or
three or more briefs supporting petitioner, none supporting respon-
dent, and none in the "other" column (x-0-O cases), and then studied
cases in which there were one, two, or three or more briefs supporting
respondent, none supporting petitioner, and none in the "other" col-
umn (0-x-O cases).159
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). (For a discussion of the "other" col-
umn and the briefs that fall into that column, see infra Appendix B notes 15-20 and
accompanying text.) In Winstar, no briefs were filed in support of the petitioner, the
United States, and 12 briefs were filed in support of the respondents, two Savings &
Loan Associations. As in Jaffee, the side supported by the amici prevailed. The next
largest disparities in cases with no amicus briefs in the "other" column occurred in two
cases in which 10 briefs were filed for the petitioner and none for the respondent, with
one case resulting in a p-win and the other in a mixed result. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 563-64 n.* (1974); Lindsey v.Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 57-58 (1972).
Moreover, only five cases in the entire database had enough briefs in the "other"
column to show even potentially the type and degree of disparity found inJaffee-i.e.,
at least 14 briefs in fact supporting petitioner or respondent and none in fact either
supporting the other party or constituting true "other" briefs. When we examined the
briefs in these five cases, it turned out that none was marked by aJaffee-type disparity.
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (listing 17 "other" briefs, none as urg-
ing reversal or affirmance); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546
(1993) (listing eight amicus briefs as urging reversal and eight "other" briefs); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (listing one brief as urging affirmance and
30 "other" briefs); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (listing 15 "other" briefs, none as
urging reversal or affirmance); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971) (listing 20 "other" amicus briefs, none as urging either reversal or affir-
mance).
In both instances we lumped together all cases with three or more briefs on one
side in order to generate a large enough number of cases to make the statistical analy-
sis potentially meaningful. For the reason explained in Appendix C, these numbers
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Figure 9: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate for
All x-0-0 Disparity Cases
15%
10% /
5%
0%41
-5%
*% change 6.65% 10.53% -1.10%
Number of Amicus Briefs Supporting: Petitioner-Respondent-Other
Data Underlying Figure 9 1-0-0 2-0-0 >2-0-0
NumberofCases 545 165 121
Our first step was to compare the rates of success over all the cases
in our database that fit this definition of disparity against the bench-
mark rate of success (p-win = 60%). Figure 9 depicts the increase in p-
win rates that we found with different degrees of disparity favoring the
petitioner. The interest group model predicts that higher levels of
disparity for petitioner should increase the success rate of petitioners
above 60%. What we see tends to support this hypothesis, at least for
disparities of one and two amicus briefs. When one amicus brief is
filed in support of petitioner and none for respondent, the p-win rate
rises by nearly 7%. When two amicus briefs are filed in support of pe-
titioner and none for respondent, the p-win rate rises by more than
10%. When we reach a disparity of three or more briefs, however, the
results no longer correspond to the prediction of the interest group
hypothesis. Indeed, the success rate of petitioners drops slightly below
the benchmark rate of success, a puzzling result.
are all technically statistically significant, because we are not sampling. See also supra
note 50. Subsets with small numbers (e.g., N<30) nonetheless present a related prob-
lem of substantive significance. While we have avoided the pitfalls of sampling with a
small n, there is the possibility of "skewness" in our data, in that a few cases or parties
may be acting as outliers and pulling the data in unusual ways that would not occur
with more cases.
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Figure 10 shows the parallel findings with respect to disparities of
amicus support for the respondent. Here, the hypothesis we are test-
ing predicts that increasing levels of disparity should push the p-win
rates below the benchmark level of 60%. The pattern we uncover re-
sembles that seen with respect to disparities of support for petitioners.
The success rate follows the predicted pattern with respect to dispari-
ties of one brief and two briefs, with respondents supported by one
amicus brief reducing the p-win rate by slightly over 4% and those
supported by two amicus briefs reducing the p-win rate by somewhat
more than 10%. When we reach the third column, for disparities of
three or more, the differential shrinks back toward the benchmark, as
it did with three or more briefs on the petitioner side, although this
time the change in the success rate is still in the predicted direction (a
greater than 3% reduction in p-win rate).
Figure 10: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate
for All 0-x-0 Disparity Cases
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-5% - -
-10%
-15%- 0-1-0 0-2-0 0->2-0
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Number of Amicus Briefs Supporting: Petitioner-Respondent-Other
Data Underl ing Figure 10 0-1-0 0-2-0 0->2-0
Number of Cases 400 146 112
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These results, which reflect all cases in the database falling within
the x-O-O and O-x-O pattern, appear to provide some support for the
hypothesis that disparities of amicus support affect success rates, at
least for small disparities of one or two briefs on one side and none on
the other. As our survey of the prior literature suggests, however, it is
important to control for the influence of institutional litigants, espe-
cially the Solicitor General. Given our large pool of cases, it was pos-
sible to do this simply by re-running the analysis looking at only those
cases in which the Solicitor General did not file an amicus brief.
When we analyzed the cases in which the Solicitor General was not an
amicus filer, we discovered that the success rates with different de-
grees of disparity were close to the benchmark success rate in almost
all instances. Only with a disparity of three or more on the peti-
tioner's side and of two on the respondent's side did we find substan-
tial effects.'o This suggests that the influence on success rates shown
in the aggregate data may largely be a product of the influence of the
Solicitor General as an amicus filer when included as a component
part of the aggregate data.
On further consideration, however, we realized that removing the
Solicitor General as an amicus filer did not fully neutralize the Solici-
tor General's influence. Prior studies suggest that the Solicitor Gen-
eral enjoys extraordinary success not only as an amicus filer, but also
as a party. Accordingly, we re-ran the disparity analysis looking only
at cases in which the Solicitor General did not participate in any ca-
pacity, either as an amicus or as a party. Figures 11 and 12 report the
results. We found, somewhat to our surprise, that when the Solicitor
General is completely eliminated from the picture, disparities of ami-
160 In cases where the Solicitor General was filtered out as amicus (but not as a pos-
sible party), disparities favoring petitioner at levels 14-0 (N396) and 2-0-0 (N7=-113)
produced, respectively, 0.58% and 3.94% increases in p-win rates from the benchmark
of 59.77%. Disparities favoring petitioner at levels of >2-00 (N=79), however, decreased
the p-win rate by 7.88%. Disparities favoring respondent at levels of 0-1-0 (N7=-359) de-
creased p-win outcomes by just 1.28%, while those at 0-2-0 level (N7=-128) decreased the
p-win rate by 8.21%. At the 0->2-0 level (N=-100), p-win outcomes were not significantly
changed from the benchmark rate, increasing byjust 0.23%.
161 See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 21, at 632 tbls.7-13 (listing success rates of
the United States as a party before the Supreme Court); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining
Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Cour4 51 POL. RES. Q. 505, 507, 522 (1998) (discuss-
ing various theories explaining the success of the Solicitor General before the Su-
preme Court); Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of
Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court 86 Am. POL Sci. REV. 464, 466 (1992) (noting that
Solicitor General enjoys "very large net advantages against all other parties" before the
Supreme Court).
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cus support appear once again to be associated with greater success;
indeed, small disparities have a greater impact on this subset of the
database than they do with respect to disparities over all the cases in
the database (Figures 9 and 10). As shown in Figure 11, with the first
brief supporting petitioners, the success rate of petitioners rises by
almost 7%; with the second brief, it rises a remarkable 19%. The suc-
cess rate with three or more briefs again falls back toward the bench-
mark rate, but still remains over 8%. The number of cases each col-
umn represents is not large, but in no case does it fall below forty.
Figure 11: Percentage Change in P-Win Rates for
x-0-0 Disparity Cases in Which the SG
Does Not Represent a Party or an Amicus
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On the respondent's side, as reflected in Figure 12, the impact of
disparities once the Solicitor General is altogether removed from the
picture is even more dramatic. With the first amicus brief supporting
respondents, the p-win rate falls by more than 14%; with the second
brief, it falls a striking 24%. Little effect is shown at three briefs and
higher, but the number of those cases here is relatively small. It may
be, therefore, that disparities of amicus support have an impact on
outcomes, at least for small disparities of one or two briefs to none,
but that this effect is masked by the considerable success of the Solici-
tor General as a Supreme Court litigant and thus dearly appears only
in cases where the Solicitor General is not involved.
Figure 12: Percentage Change in P-WinRates for
0-x-0 Disparity Cases in Which the Solictor General
Does Not Represent a Party or an Amicus
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I % Change -14.61% -23.93% 0.23%
Number of Amicus Briefs Supporting- Petitioner-Respondent-Other
oData Underlin Fiure 12 0-1-0 0-2-0 0->2-0
NumberofCases 155 53 40
The findings up to this point are based on observing the change
in win rates for petitioner by comparing means across different cate-
gories of amicus involvement. In order to confirm our findings and to
consider the substantive significance and impact of specific case-level
variables on p-win rates across the entire population of cases, we ran a
multivariate regression model based on the dependent variable "out-
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come of case is p-win" versus "all other outcomes."162 We included as
independent dummy variables "Solicitor General as party" (either pe-
titioner or respondent), "Solicitor General as amicus" (either for peti-
tioner or for respondent), and the six different disparity possibilities
tracked in Figures 11 and 12.
Our findings are quite consistent with Figures 11 and 12: in terms
of impact on p-win rates, disparities of 1-0-0 and 2-0-0 are statistically
significant, as are disparities of 0-1-0 and 0-2-0. The third column in
both Figures, however, showing disparities at levels of three or more
briefs filed for either side, is not statistically significant (at the p < .05
level) within the model.16
Of particular interest to us is the robustness of the different case
variables in altering the odds of a p-win outcome, controlling for other
variables. To facilitate this assessment, we included odds ratios for a p-
win outcome. These ratios show that if the Solicitor General is pres-
ent as petitioner, all other factors being equal, the odds of a p-win are
effectively doubled. If the Solicitor General is present as respondent,
all other factors being equal, the odds of a p-win are effectively re-
duced by roughly half. We found less robust effects for the disparity
figures: 1-0-0 and 2-0-0 cases with the Solicitor General filtered out as
amicus increase the odds of a p-win by roughly 27% and 50%, respec-
tively; 0-1-0 cases and 0-2-0 cases decrease the odds of a p-win outcome
by roughly 20% and 45%.'"
We should note an important caveat here. When we expanded
our regression model to include dummy variables for each of the insti-
tutional litigants, and then excluded the amicus briefs filed by these in-
stitutional litigants from the disparity dummy variables, the disparity
variables were no longer statistically significant. 16 This could mean
that with the institutional filers excluded, the numbers of cases re-
flected in the. disparity variables were decreased to the point where
the variance among them was too great to generate significant results.
Alternatively, it could mean that what appears to be an impact from
disparity of support is actually an impact from support by an institu-
tional litigant.
162A description of our logit regression model and more detailed results are set
forth in Appendix C, infra.
16 See infra Appendix C, tbl.I.
164 See id.
16 See id. at tbl.II.
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In sum, by focusing on different subsets of our database in our
analysis, we uncovered some evidence that disparities of amicus sup-
port may have an impact on the outcomes reached by the Supreme
Court. The effect of disparities of one or two amicus briefs on success
rates for petitioner is not strong enough to overcome the heightened
probability of success enjoyed by the Solicitor General as amicus and
as a party. Consequently, the effect can only be seen by comparing
means across subsets of data that exclude the Solicitor General.
Moreover, this effect appears only when there are either one or two
briefs in support of one party and no briefs in support of the other.
For some reason, the effect largely disappears when there are three or
more briefs in support of one party and no briefs in support of the
other. Finally, even the small effect of disparities of one or two briefs
loses statistical significance when we analyze these disparities as inde-
pendent variables in a regression model that includes all four institu-
tional litigants.
C. The Impact of Amicus Brief Quality
By far the most difficult model to test quantitatively is the legal
model, which predicts that the Court is influenced by briefs that pres-
ent especially valued information but not by briefs that are merely re-
petitive of the parties' briefs. Because reading and assessing the qual-
ity of more than 12,000 individual amicus briefs was a task far beyond
our endurance, we had to come up with a proxy for briefs that contain
information valued highly by the Court. We adopted three ap-
proaches. First, we inquired whether cases with an amicus brief from
one of our institutional litigants had different success rates from those
supported by "ordinary" amicus briefs. Second, we examined the suc-
cess rates of amici whose briefs the Court or an individual Justice ex-
plicitly relied upon through citation. Third, we considered whether
briefs filed by more experienced Supreme Court litigators enjoy
greater success than briefs filed by less experienced litigators.
1. Success Rates of Institutional Litigants
We examined the success rates of the Solicitor General, the
ACLU, the AFLCIO, and the States over each of the five decades. We
reasoned that the first three of these entities are good proxies for
high-quality amicus briefs, i.e., those containing valued information.
Not only has each of these entities filed numerous amicus briefs in all
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five decades, but each employs or retains counsel with substantial Su-
preme Court litigation experience. The Solicitor General's office has
been widely praised by the Justices and others for the consistent qual-
ity of its briefs.166 Similarly, the national offices of both the ACLU and
the AFL-CIO are widely regarded by knowledgeable Supreme Court
observers as consistently producing briefs of superior quality.' 7 Only
the States as institutional litigants represent a problematic proxy for
quality. The offices of state attorneys general vary widely in terms of
the skill of the lawyers they employ and the degree of experience they
bring to the task of filing Supreme Court briefs.&6 On balance, there-
fore, the overall quality of the States' filings should be closer to "aver-
age" rather than high quality.
166 See, e.g., SALoKAR, supra note 105, at 33-34 (praising the Solicitor General's of-
fice for the high quality of its lawyers and the "accuracy and reliability of its briefs");
LINcoLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JuSTICE 19 (1987) (discussing the tradition of high-
quali submissions from the Solicitor General's office).
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 42, at 689 (noting that the ACLU "is a well-known
repeat player with substantial resources and great expertise in reproductive freedom
litigation"); Morriss, supra note 80, at 879-86 (commenting that the AFL-CIO made
"significant legal arguments" in its amicus briefs in two recent Tite VII cases before
the Supreme Court). It should be emphasized, with regard to the ACLU and AFL-
CO, that we restricted ourselves to amicus briefs filed by the national organizations
thus named and therefore did not include filings by local affiliates or chapters or by
constituent unions. These are entities separate from the AFL-CIO and the ACLU and
have different (and almost always less experienced) counsel. For examples of amicus
briefs excluded on this principle from being counted as an "ACLU" or "AFL-CIO"
brief, see Cohen v. Caliornia, 403 U.S. 15, 15 (1971) (brief filed by ACLU of Northern
California); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sauyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952) (brief filed
by United Steelworkers of America, CIO); and International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 695 (1951) (brief filed by United Brotherhood of Car-
penters &Joiners, AFL). For cases litigated prior to the 1955 merger of the AFL and
CO, we tracked whether either entity filed an amicus brief.
16 SeePERRY, supra note 81, at 127 (citing interviews with Justices and former clerks
for the proposition that attorneys for state governments are generally ineffective); see
also Lee Epstein & Karen O'Connor, States and the U.S. Supreme Court: An Examination of
Litigation Outcomes, 69 SOC. ScI. Q. 660, 665-66 (1988) (exploring variables such as
progressiveness of individual state policies and state governmental litigation appara-
tuses to explain the differences in state litigation success).
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Among the three institutional litigants with experienced Supreme
Court lawyers, the largest deviation from the benchmark success rates
occurred in cases where the Solicitor General appeared as amicus. As
shown in Figure 13, the p-win rate in cases in which the Solicitor Gen-
eral appears as an amicus for the petitioner increases substantially be-
yond the mean rates in each decade. Indeed, the average differential
between p-win rates in cases where the Solicitor General appears as
amicus and the benchmark rate is just under 17%, and in no decade is
the Solicitor General's presence as amicus supporting petitioner
marked by less than a 12% increase in the p-win rate.
Figure 13: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate for Cases
Where Solicitor General Appears as Amicus Supporting
40% Petitioner
30%
20%
10%O
0%L70% 1946-1955 195-16 166-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
% change, 15.31% 29.64% 12.65% 15.83% 12.69% 16.52%
Decades
Data UnderlingF gure13 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
Number of Cases 47 80 92 167 192 578
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As shown in Figure 14, there is a corresponding decrease in p-win
rates in cases in which the Solicitor General appears as an amicus
supporting the respondent. The first two decades of our study may be
disregarded for these purposes because of the low numbers of cases
(although their percentages are nonetheless not outliers). In each
subsequent decade, however, the p-win rate decreases by at least 21%
where the Solicitor General took the respondent's side as amicus. In-
deed, the average decrease in the p-win rate -was almost 26% over all
cases. This is the single most pronounced deviation from benchmark
success rates we uncovered in our study.
Figure 14: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate for Cases
Where Solicitor General Appears as Amicus Supporting
I Decades
Data Underlying R re14 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
Number of Cases 11 17 38 110 120 296
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The changes from benchmark p-win rates are substantially less
pronounced when we look at cases in which the ACLU or AFL-CIO
appeared as an amicus. Indeed, the changes in some instances are
not in the direction of the side supported by the institutional litigant.
As shown by Figure 15, the ACLU has achieved fluctuating, but usually
favorable, rates of success relative to the benchmark when it files
briefs supporting the petitioner. In two of the decades, the p-win rate
when the ACLU filed is higher than the benchmark rate by more than
10%. For the 1966-1975 decade, however, the p-win rate when the pe-
titioner was supported by the ACLU as amicus is actually lower than
the benchmark by nearly 8%. For the entire fifty-year period, the
AGLU achieved a positive differential of just under 6% in cases sup-
porting petitioner.
Figure 15: Percentage Change in P-Wn Rate for Cases Where
ACLU Appears as Amicus Supporting Petitioner
40%
30%
20%-
10%-
0%
-10%10 194&-1955 1 -1965 1966-1975 1 1976-1985 19 -15 Al
Eichge 5.70% 12.81% -7.88% 13-58% 3.50% 5.83%
Decades
Data Underfini ure15 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
NumberofCases 33 1 43 45 56 73 250
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Contrary to the usual pattern in which petitioner success rates de-
cline with amicus support for respondent, the results where the ACLU
appears as an amicus for the respondent are much less impressive. As
reflected in Figure 16, in the three decades where there are reason-
able numbers of cases, the ACLU achieved at best only modest differ-
ential rates of success, and, in one decade (1986-1995), it underper-
formed the benchmark rate of success for respondents.
Figure 16: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate for Cases
Where ACLU Appears as Amicus Supporting Respondent
10%
0%
-10%-
-20%
-30%
-40% 14-95 15-95 16175 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
-40% 19-95
c -21.57% -33.04% -2.08% -7.05% 6.75% -1
Decades
Data UnderlyingFigure16 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
Number of Cases 3 7 44 103 94 251
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The cases in which the AFL-CIO participated as an amicus provide
yet a third pattern. As set forth in Figure 17, the AFL-CIO's support of
petitioner produces inconsistent results. After achieving less success
than the benchmark rate in the first decade, the AFL-CIO achieves an
increase in p-win rates relative to the benchmark in the second and
third decades, but then falls back into negative territory in the last two
decades. Overall, the AFL-CIO shows a modest positive differential of
less than 3%. The underlying pool of cases is small in each instance
(only 1976-1985 has more than thirty cases).
Figure 17: Percentage Change in P-Wn Rate for Cases
Where AFL-CIO Appears as Amicus Supporting Petitioner
20%
10%m
0%
-10%
-20%
1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
N% change -0.74% 14.58% 9.29% -0.81% -8.14% 2.73%
Decades
JData Underlying Fre 17 11946-195511956-196511966-197511976-1985 1986-19951 AU
lNumber of Cases 1 24 1 21 1 22 1 33 20 1201
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When the AFL-CIO appears as an amicus supporting the respon-
dent, however, we see our usual pattern of higher success rates again.
As Figure 18 suggests, differential success is obtained in the last two
decades. No clear pattern can be discerned in the first three decades,
where the numbers of briefs are small. Overall, the AFL-CIO exhibits
a substantial differential some 14% better than the benchmark rate.
Nm4r195C195s196511966 1976-19 8 19 A I1 6 , 3  27  41 1 "4 11211IData Underlying Figure 18lNumber of Cases
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Finally, to provide a source of comparison, it is instructive to con-
sider the success of the States as amicus filers. When the States file
amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, and no State appears as a dif-
ferent kind of amicus, they show modest success overall, securing a p-
win rate about 5% higher than the benchmark rate. When we break
the results down by decade, Figure 19 reveals that during the last
three decades, when the States were filing significant numbers of
briefs supporting petitioners, they achieved small and declining suc-
cess.
Figure 19: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate for Cases
Where a State Appears as Amicus Supporting Petitioner
and No State Appears as a Different Kind of Amicus
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30% -
-40% 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 All
*% change -36.72% 14.86% 9.89% 5.81% 3.58% 4.91%
Decades
Data Underlying gyre 19 1946-195 1956-196 1966-197 1976-198 1986-199 All
Number of Cases 11 1 17 1 45 1 119 128 320
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The States have been moderately more active, and successful, on
the respondent's side. As shown in Figure 20, measured over all five
decades the respondents supported by States have bettered the
benchmark rate by nearly 9%. This robust number is driven by the
large numbers of cases in the last two decades.
Fgure 20- Perentage Qian in P-Wn Rate for Casesi e a
Stte Appeam asAnicus &TponR dent and No State Appears
as aDifferent ind cfAnicus
20%
-10%0IN
-209%
1946-1955 1956-1965 191975 1976-15 1981995 All
E cwlgde -20.% -77% -5.63% -107% .14% 94%
Decades
Data Underling Figure 20 1946-19551956-196 1966-197 1976-198 1986-199 All
Number of Cases 26 31 1 64 1 91 1 146 1 358
In order to gain a clearer sense of the relative power of the differ-
ent institutional litigants, we ran a multivariate regression incorporat-
ing variables for all four institutional litigants as well as variables simi-
lar to those used in our disparity studies. We also included new
variables for amicus briefs cited by the Court and those filed by expe-
rienced lawyers. 69 The results of this regression, set forth in more de-
tail in Appendix C, largely confirm what our figures based on com-
pared means suggest. The Solicitor General's amicus briefs have a
statistically significant impact on outcomes (all other variables held
constant) for both the petitioner's and respondent's side. The
ACLU's briefs have a statistically significant impact on the petitioner's
side but not on the respondent's side. Conversely, the AFL-CIO's
briefs have a statistically significant impact on the respondent's side
but not the petitioner's. The States have a statistically significant im-
169 See infra Part V.C.2-.3 (discussing these variables).
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pact only on the respondent's side as well. 70
Our next step was to determine to what extent the statistically sig-
nificant variables in the model actually altered the likelihood of a p-
win outcome across all cases. To assess this, we looked at the odds ra-
tios produced by each variable in the model and determined how it
would influence the odds of a p-win outcome. The effect of the Solici-
tor General as amicus outweighed all other institutional litigants in
this regard; the Solicitor General increased the odds of a p-win out-
come by roughly double when filing as amicus on behalf of the peti-
tioner, and decreased the odds by nearly 50% when filing on behalf of
the respondent. The ACLU had a powerful impact when filing on
behalf of petitioner, increasing the odds of a p-win by about 70%, but
did not display a predictable or stable pattern of increasing or de-
creasing the odds when filing on behalf of respondent. The AFL-CIO
decreased the odds of a p-win by about 40% when filing on behalf of
respondent. The States displayed a similar effect filing as amici in
support of respondents, decreasing the odds by about 35%.171
2. Success Rates of Cited Briefs
We also decided to use as a proxy for quality the amicus briefs that
members of the Court cited in their opinions. We reasoned that a
cited brief is one that provided at least some valued information to the
Court beyond that supplied by the briefs of the parties. Thus, briefs
that are cited may be regarded as "high quality" in the relevant sense
of supplying valued and nonrepetitive information. Of course, one
must exercise caution here. It is possible that cited amicus briefs play
no role in the decision-making process, and are mined by the Justices
(or their clerks) only at the opinion-writing stage. Nevertheless, it is
plausible to think that cited briefs are more valuable briefs, and if the
legal model is correct, we should find that more valuable briefs will,
over large numbers of cases, prove to be more successful.
The characteristics of our database made it possible to identify
cited briefs that supported the decision of the Court only in those
cases that contained only one cited amicus brief.ln Of the 758 major-
170 See infra Appendix C, tbl.ll (setting forth the results of the regression used in
conjunction with Figures 13-22).
171 See id. (containing relevant variables).
17 This is because our database tracks whether or not the Court referred to zero,
one, or more than one amicus brief, and further tracks whether the Court ruled in fa-
vor of any of the amici to which it referred. (The former aspect of the database was
necessary because, in numerous cases where the Court refers to more than one amicus,
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ity or plurality opinions citing amicus briefs, 548 cited only one ami-
cus brief. Of these 548 opinions, we excluded 121 of them because it
was not clear whether the Court ruled in favor of the party that filed
the amicus brief the Court cited.ln Of the remaining 427 cases, in 240
the cited brief was filed on the petitioner's side, and in 187 the cited
brief was filed on the respondent's side. With this information, and
knowing whether the Court ruled for the petitioner or the respon-
dent, we were able to determine success rates for cited briefs support-
ing petitioners and for cited briefs supporting respondents. 174
Our results, as set forth in Figure 21 below, provide no support for
the proposition that cited briefs enjoy greater success than noncited
amicus briefs. The cases including a cited brief supporting petitioner
have a p-win rate less than 2% above the benchmark. The cases in-
cluding a cited brief supporting respondent have a p-win rate about
7% below the benchmark. These success rates are very close to those
of the "average" amicus filer over our entire set of cases, which show
an increase in the p-win rate of less than 1% for briefs supporting peti-
tioner and a decrease in the p-win rate of about 7% for briefs support-
ing respondent.1 75 Thus, the success rates of the cited amicus filers
appear to parallel the success rates of amicus filers overall. In any
event, our regression model indicates that these results are not statis-
176tically significant predictors of petitioner success.
the Court's writing style makes it impossible to determine precisely how many amici,
with how many separate briefs, the Court is referring to. For example, the Court might
write, "Petitioner and several of its amici argue....") The combination of these two
columns in our database, together with the column tracking whether or not the out-
come in each case was a p-win, p-loss, or mixed result, meant that we could track whether
the Court ruled in favor of an amicus to which it referred, and whether that amicus
supported petitioner or respondent, only where it referred to only one amicus brief.
The number of cases where it was not clear whether the Court ruled for the one
amicus brief that it cited-22.08%, or just more than one-fifth of these cases-is high
because the Court either cited an "other" amicus brief (we did not track in the citation
study itself whether the brief cited was for the petitioner, was for the respondent, or
was an "other" brief) or reached a mixed result See infra Appendix B at notes 15-27 and
accompanying text (defining "other" briefs and "mixed result" cases).
174 Since every case in this particular subset resulted in either a p-win or a p-loss, it
was necessary to recompute the benchmark rates as if the mixed result cases did not ex-
ist. As recomputed, the p-win rate is 61.87%.
17 See supra Figures 7 & 8.
176 See infra Appendix C, tbl.II.
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Figure 21: Percentage Qiange inP-Wn Rate for Certain Cases
Where the Court, ates One Anicus Brief
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3. Success Rates of Briefs Filed By
More Experienced Lawyers
In a final effort to measure the effect of high-quality amicus briefs,
we undertook to differentiate among amicus briefs based on the de-
gree of Supreme Court experience of the lawyers who wrote the
briefs. Kevin McGuire, a political scientist, has authored several stud-
ies examining whether more experienced lawyers enjoy greater suc-
cess in the Supreme Court than less experienced lawyers. 77 McGuire
reasons that experienced lawyers are more likely to frame issues and
arguments in a way that is persuasive to the Court, and are likely to
have greater credibility with the Court. Hence, he predicts, their
submissions should have a greater impact on the decisional process,
which should be reflected in greater success before the Court.' 78
177 See KEvIN T. McGuiRE, TH1E SUPREME COURT BAR 171-99 (1993) [hereinafter
McGuImE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR] (analyzing the effect of the involvement of expe-
rienced Supreme Court counsel on the Court's case selection and judgments);
McGuire, supra note 161, at 509-11 (weighing the importance of experience in effec-
tive Supreme Court advocacy). See generally McGuird, supra note 97 (arguing generally
that parties with more litigation experience in the Supreme Court are more likely to
succeed).
178 See McGuire, supra note 161, at 510 (referring to empirical data to support the
contention that litigators who reduce the Justices' information costs are likely to be
favored).
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McGuire's studies generally measure advocate experience by
counting the number of times a lawyer is recorded as having entered
an appearance at either oral argument or on the briefs of the parties
in cases in the Supreme Court. He then determines which side's ad-
vocate is more experienced. Using this method, McGuire shows that
more experienced lawyers are more successful at getting certiorari pe-
titions granted,79 and are more likely to prevail on the merits8' Most
recently, he has argued that the success rate of the Solicitor General is
almost entirely attributable to the greater experience of the lawyers in
the Solicitor General's office relative to their opponents in most
181
cases.
We sought to replicate McGuire's method in the context of assess-
ing the influence of amicus briefs. Because it would be conceptually
difficult to rank the experience of the lawyers in cases involving mul-
tiple amicus briefs, we limited our consideration to those cases in
which one amicus brief was filed in support of petitioner and one in
support of respondent (1-1-0 cases). In addition, we excluded cases
with amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General and cases with amicus
briefs filed by a State. Within the remaining set of cases, we used
computer research methods to determine how many times each
member of the Supreme Court bar who appeared on each amicus
brief had previously appeared on behalf of a party or amicus before
the Supreme Court. Following McGuire's method, the lawyer with the
highest number of appearances in each case was deemed the more
experienced. We then computed the change in p-win rates where the
petitioner's amicus was more experienced than the respondent's, and
where the respondent's amicus was more experienced than peti-
tioner's. As a benchmark, we used the p-win rate in all 1-1-0 cases ex-
cluding the Solicitor General and the States as amici.
The results are summarized in Figure 22. As can be seen, amicus
briefs filed by more experienced lawyers supporting petitioners expe-
rienced a p-win rate about 8% higher than the benchmark rate, and
amicus briefs filed by more experienced lawyers supporting respon-
dents experienced a p-win rate nearly 10% lower than the benchmark
rate. However, the numbers of cases in both of these categories are
fairly small (56 cases and 64 cases, respectively), and these results were
1 See McGUmrE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR, supra note 177, at 184.
ISO See McGuire, supra note 97, at 194.
181 SeeMcGuire, supra note 161, at 513-14.
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not statistically significant in our regression model.1 Thus, although
our results are suggestive and are generally consistent with McGuire's
findings about the impact of experienced lawyers, they must be used
with caution.
Figure 22: Percentage Change in P-Win Rate for Certain
1-1-0 Cases Where One Amicus's Counsel Is
More Experienced
5%LI-
0%
-5%"
-10%
Cases Where Petitioner's Amicus Is More Cases Where Respondents Amicus Is More
Experienced Than Respondent'$ (56 cases) Experienced Than Petitioner's (64 cases)
*% change 8.35% -9.73%
D. Interpretation of Results
Overall, our results arguably provide some support for each of the
models ofjudging set forth in Part IV. A proponent of the attitudinal
model can point to the lack of impact from amicus filers in general (at
least on the petitioner's side), the failure to find that the ACLU and
the AFL-CIO enjoy consistent success even though they file high-
quality briefs, and the failure to find that cited amicus briefs are any
more likely to support prevailing parties than those that are not cited.
The pronounced influence of the Solicitor General and the milder
influence of the States might be explained away by the attitudinalist as
ad hoc exceptions to the model.""
A proponent of the strategic actor variation on the attitudinal
182 See infra Appendix C, tbl.I (setting forth in more detail the results of the re-
gression used in conjunction with Figure 22).
183 Segal and Spaeth in fact have acknowledged that the Solicitor General has an
independent influence on outcomes beyond what would be predicted under the atti-
tudinal model, and treat the Solicitor General as an ad hoc exception. See SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 14, at 237-38.
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model would stress the consistent findings suggesting the high success
rate of the Solicitor General. Since the executive branch is critical to
the implementation of the Court's policy preferences, it is not surpris-
ing to find that the Court apparently pays careful attention to the po-
sitions of the Solicitor General. Likewise, the States are important po-
litical actors and play a role in implementing the Court's decisions, so
it is consistent with the strategic actor model that they too should
achieve a measure of success as amici.
The interest group theory also finds something to point to in sup-
port of its contentions that the Justices decide cases so as to maximize
their own reputations or the public standing of the Court as an insti-
tution. Disparities of support by amicus filers appear to matter, in that
parties supported by one or two amicus briefs when there is no brief
filed on the opposing side experience greater rates of success, at least
once we control for the influence of the Solicitor General. The inter-
est group theorist might even offer an explanation of the success of
the Solicitor General, to the effect that the executive branch pays
close attention to the views of the public, and hence its legal represen-
tative before the Court is likely to take positions that are popular with
the general public. The Court, the interest group theorist might ar-
gue, is aware of the executive's desire to track public opinion, and so
the Court follows the lead of the Solicitor General in order to assure
that it does not run afoul of public opinion.
Notwithstanding these arguments in support of other theories, on
the whole we interpret our results as providing the most support for
the legal model. We reach this conclusion for four reasons.
First, throughout all our results we find a fairly consistent pattern
in which amicus briefs supporting respondents show more success
relative to the benchmarks than do amicus briefs supporting petition-
ers. This is true of the data concerning amicus filers in general; 4 the
data on the impact of disparities when the Solicitor General is ex-
cluded;' 85 the data on the success rates of the Solicitor General,'8 the
AFL-CIO,1 87 and the States;e the data on the success of cited briefs;18
and the data on experienced lawyers.19°
18 See supra Figures 7 & 8.
l8 See supra Figures 11 & 12.
186 See supra Figures 13 & 14.
187 See supra Figures 17 & 18.
18 See supra Figures 19 & 20.
18 See supra Figure 21.
19 See supra Figure 22.
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Why might amicus filers supporting respondents achieve more
success than filers supporting petitioners? The explanation may be
that petitioners typically must be represented by able counsel in order
to convince the Court to grant review. The Court grants certiorari in
only about 4% of all cases in which it is sought.19' Thus, there is a
strong presumption against review, and a petitioner's counsel must
carry a heavy burden in persuading the Court to hear her case in
preference to thousands of others. The lawyer who can carry this
burden must typically be highly skilled.'9 In contrast, respondents
obviously do not have to be represented by able counsel in order to
have the Court grant review; indeed, the Court is more likely to grant
review if the respondent is not represented by able counsel who can
distinguish circuit conflicts and offer prudential reasons why review
should be denied.
19 3
If it is true that petitioners are, on average, represented by more
able counsel than respondents, then respondents may obtain a greater
boost from the assistance of an amicus brief. In effect, an amicus brief
may function in significant numbers of cases as a "stand in" for a high-
quality brief on the merits, and respondents may benefit more than
petitioners from such briefs. This explanation, if valid, would tend to
support the legal model because it suggests that amicus briefs have an
impact insofar as they provide relevant legal and background informa-
tion missing from the party's brief on the merits.
Second, there is the intriguing feature of the disparity studies that
shows that success rates exceed the benchmark with one or two briefs
filed in support of a party and no amicus briefs on the other side, but
fall back toward the benchmark with three or more briefs filed in
support of a party and no briefs on the other side. This result is
rather puzzling and, given that it is not significant under our regres-
sion models, may reflect other factors which we were not able to test.
Nonetheless, there are two possible explanations, both somewhat sup-
portive of the legal model.
191 See EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 82-83 (listing rates at which Court granted
petitions for certiorari during the 1970-1995 Supreme Court Terms).
192 This proposition, of course, is not always true. There will be instances where
cases present such square circuit conflicts or issues of such clear national importance
that any lawyer could secure review. We are speaking of the general case.193
Of course, respondent's counsel was skilled enough to prevail in the court be-
low. But Supreme Court advocacy is a specialized discipline. Often petitioners who
succeed in obtaining a grant of review will have switched to specialized Supreme Court
lawyers; the respondent who prevailed below may be less inclined to shop for new
counsel once the case moves to the Supreme Court.
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One possible explanation is that the pool of cases with only one or
two amicus briefs and the pool of cases with larger numbers of amicus
briefs reflect different sorts of controversies. The pool with small
numbers of briefs may consist largely of "low profile" controversies
that turn on questions of statutory interpretation or procedure. Legal
doctrine may play a relatively large role in the resolution of these sorts
of controversies, with the result that one or two amicus briefs filed on
one side and none on the other will have a demonstrable effect on
outcomes-especially if the Solicitor General is out of the picture. In
contrast, the pool of cases that contains three or more amicus briefs
may include a much higher percentage of "high profile" cases. In
these sorts of cases, legal doctrine may play a less significant role, and
judicial behavior may more closely approximate what the attitudinal
model depicts. If so, this would account for the puzzle that amicus
briefs evidently have much less impact on outcomes in these cases. All
this is quite speculative, obviously, and clearly additional research is
warranted in an effort to determine whether amicus briefs play a dif-
ferent role in low-profile as opposed to high-profile cases.
An alternative explanation is that it very rarely takes more than
two amicus briefs to supply whatever additional information is valued
to the Court under the legal model. The Court may view three or
more amicus briefs as repetitious or as an annoying effort to "lobby"
the Court, producing counterproductive results. We regard this ex-
planation as less plausible than the first explanation. The Court's
most likely response to repetitive amicus briefs is to ignore them, not
to punish the party they support.
Third, there is the dramatic success of the Solicitor General as an
amicus filer. As we have seen, there are a variety of explanations for
the Solicitor General's success with amicus briefs, including the possi-
bility that the Justices defer to the views of the Solicitor General for
strategic reasons and the possibility that the Justices defer because
they assume that the executive branch will tend to endorse politically
popular positions. But these explanations are weak. Often the Solici-
tor General files amicus briefs at the invitation of the Court, or on is-
sues as to which the executive branch previously has had no views or
only mild preferences. In addition, most of the cases in which the So-
licitor General files amicus briefs involve issues as to which it is un-
clear what the public's preferences might be. Both the Justices them-
selves and close observers of the Solicitor General's office attribute the
high rate of success to the Solicitor General's reputation for objectivity
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in accurately stating the law" It is reasonable to assume that this is at
least part of the explanation for the Solicitor General's remarkable
success as an amicus filer, and this too tends to support the legal
model.
Fourth, our other attempts to measure the impact of high-quality
amicus briefs, while admittedly not always supportive of the legal
model and often not producing statistically significant results, provide
modest support for the legal model. Although the ACLU and the
AFL-CIO, two other filers of high-quality briefs, do not consistently
beat benchmark rates of success, they have been successful more than
the average amicus filer. Our study of the impact of amicus briefs
filed by experienced lawyers also provides suggestive support for the
legal model.
In arguing that the legal model is best supported by our findings,
we do not suggest that the legal model provides the sole explanation
for Supreme Court decisions, or that our data do not also provide
some support for the rival models. We do believe, however, that our
study provides evidence that amicus briefs that speak to the require-
ments of the law exert some influence on the outcomes reached by
the Court. In other words, law matters, and because law matters, ami-
cus briefs that speak to the requirements of the law matter.
VI. RECONSIDERING THE RISING TIDE
OF AMICUS BRIEFS
Does our study of the impact of amicus briefs on the outcomes
reached by the Supreme Court explain the remarkable proliferation
of such briefs in the last half century? We think it provides some miss-
ing pieces of the picture. But it is doubtful that the impact of briefs
on outcomes is the sole driving force behind this phenomenon. Mul-
tiple factors must be at work, some of which are not well understood
and will require further research to comprehend fully.
As noted in Part II, the Court's adoption of an open door policy
toward the filing of amicus briefs provides one part of the explanation
for the surge in amicus filings in the last three decades. The knowl-
edge that any group can file an amicus brief without risk of rejection
increases the benefits to interested organizations of seeking to file
such a brief, whatever those benefits might be. This is especially so
relative to the previous state of affairs, marked by uncertainty as to
194 See generally sources cited supra note 161 (examining the success of the Solicitor
General before the Court).
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whether such a brief would be accepted. Thus, the Court's gradual
embrace of the open door policy, starting in the late 1950s, probably
accounts for some of the increase. Still, as we explained in Part II, the
continued proliferation of amicus briefs into the 1980s and 1990s is
difficult to attribute to the open door policy alone, which has now
been firmly in place for several decades.
An awareness that amicus briefs can influence outcomes, even if
that understanding is only intuitive among Supreme Court litigators,
may also account in part for the increase in filings. To be sure, our
study reveals no evidence that would suggest that amicus briefs in
general have had an increasing impact on outcomes over the fifty
years of our study. The various measures we have developed of suc-
cess rates over time suggest at most a constant or perhaps downward
trend in terms of success rates over the period of our study.'9 5 Never-
theless, it may be that perceptions of impact have grown as anecdotal
examples of influence have multiplied. With respect to the amicus fil-
ings of the Solicitor General, for example, our study shows that such
briefs are associated on average with a 17% increase in petitioner suc-
cess and a 26% increase in respondent success. If the Justice Depart-
ment has become aware of this remarkable record, even if only im-
pressionistically, it would stand to reason that the Department would
make increasing use of Solicitor General amicus briefs in order to in-
fluence Supreme Court decision making. In fact, we find that the So-
licitor General's office has dramatically increased its amicus filings
during the period of our study.16 Similar points could be made, albeit
with more qualifications, about the States, the ACLU, and the AFL-
CIO.
With respect to other filers, however, it is far from clear that im-
pact on outcomes provides much, if any, explanation for the popular-
ity of amicus participation. The average filer supporting petitioners,
in particular, cannot be shown to have any impact on outcomes."9 We
195 See supra Figure 7 (charting the success rate of all amici supporting petitioner);
supra Figure 8 (same for all amici supporting respondent); supra Figure 13 (Solicitor
General as amicus supporting petitioner); supra Figure 14 (Solicitor General as amicus
supporting respondent); supra Figure 15 (ACLU as amicus supporting petitioner); su-
pra Figure 16 (ACLU as amicus supporting respondent); supra Figure 17 (AFL-CIO as
amicus supporting petitioner); supra Figure 18 (AFL-CIO as amicus supporting re-
spondent); supra Figure 19 (States as amici supporting petitioner); supra Figure 20
(States as amici supporting respondent).
196 The Solicitor General filed amicus briefs in only 6.38% of cases in 1946-1955,
but in the most recent decade filed in 28.60% of cases. See supra note 25.
197 See supra Figure 7.
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need some other explanation to account for the behavior of these fil-
ers.
One possible explanation is that amicus filings have proliferated
in accordance with a kind of "arms race" phenomenon. The theory
would be that interest groups file amicus briefs out of fear that rival
groups will file for the other side. For example, the general counsel
of an organization considering whether to file an amicus brief may
harbor few illusions that such a brief will have any impact on the out-
come of the case. But other officers or the membership of the or-
ganization may not be so sophisticated. The great fear of the general
counsel may be that the Court will rule adversely to the organization's
interest, and in so ruling, may even cite an amicus brief filed in sup-
port of the other side. Should this happen, the other officers or
members of the organization may demand an explanation for why the
group did not file its own brief to protect its interest One can easily
see how, if enough general counsel engage in this kind of worrying,
amicus briefs might begin to proliferate, even without any solid evi-
dence that such briefs have much effect on outcomes.
If the arms race conception of amicus participation has any valid-
ity, then the number of amicus briefs should tend to be about the
same on both sides of a case. 98 In other words, if groups supporting
the petitioner anticipate that groups supporting the respondent will
file multiple briefs, then groups supporting the petitioner will file
multiple briefs. In contrast, if groups supporting petitioner anticipate
that groups supporting respondent will sit out the controversy, or will
file only one or two briefs, then there should be few or no briefs filed
by the groups supporting petitioner. Over a large enough number of
cases (as in our database), one would expect the dispersion of the dif-
ference between the number of briefs supporting petitioner and the
number of briefs supporting respondent in each case to be narrow,
and to spike at zero. In other words, if we subtract the amicus briefs
supporting respondent from the briefs supporting petitioner in each
case, we should find zero to be the most common number and a high
concentration of low numbers on both sides of zero.
193 Arguably, one might think that the number of organizations participating in the
filing of amicus briefs should be similar. Examining this would require counting the
number of organizations signing on to amicus briefs. But organizations differ greatly
in size and financial resources. Numbers of amicus briefs may be a better proxy for
intensity of group participation than numbers of organizations, since each amicus brief
represents a lump expenditure of roughly the same magnitude as other amicus briefs.
Thus, the number of amicus briefs is a crude proxy for the "willingness to pay" of the
collective assembly of interest groups on each side of a controversy. Cf supra note 146.
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To test this prediction, Figure 23 plots the dispersion of the dif-
ference in number of briefs supporting petitioner and respondent in
cases in which two or more amicus briefs were filed. As can be seen,
the dispersion does spike at zero, it is highly symmetrical, and the
numbers of cases showing differences greater than three fall off very
rapidly. For some reason, the drop-off is not entirely continuous, in
that differences of-2 and +2 occur with virtually the same frequency as
-1 and +1.
Figure 23: Difference Between Number of Amicus Briefs Filed
for Petitioner & Respondent: Distribution of Cases
25%
20%
15%
S10%-
5%
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Difference in number of amicus briefs between parties for cases where
total number of amicus briefs > 1 (N = 2287)
The tendency of amicus briefs to be evenly distributed on both
sides not only helps explain the proliferation of amicus briefs, but may
also account in part for why a study such as ours has difficulty detect-
ing the substantive impact of amicus briefs. Consider in this regard
the interest group theory. Even if the interest group theory of amicus
briefs were valid, the arms race phenomenon would make this difficult
to detect. This is because one side would rarely succeed in filing large
numbers of briefs signalling strong political support to the exclusion
of similar filings on the other side. Each side's enlistment of multiple
supporting briefs would in most cases cancel out the signalling effects
of the other side's efforts. It is theoretically possible, therefore, that
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the interest group model-or simply a widespread acceptance of the
validity of the interest group model among organizations interested in
Supreme Court litigation'--could explain both the rising incidence
of amicus participation and the lack of evidence of impact on out-
comes, at least as a general matter, from the filing of amicus briefs.
The phenomenon of cases with unusually high numbers of briefs,
delineated in Part I, seems consistent with this explanation. For ex-
ample, in the most extreme case, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
pro-life forces generated forty-six briefs and pro-choice forces mus-
tered thirty-two. At least on the pro-life side, it appears that there -was
a deliberate strategy among pro-life groups to try to create the impres-
sion, by filing as many briefs as possible, of widespread and intense
opposition to Roe v. Wade. 210 The pro-choice forces made greater ef-
forts to coordinate their filings so as to avoid repetitive argument.
20'
Still, it is hard to imagine that thirty-two briefs were needed in order
to lay out all the considerations relevant to a reaffirmation of Roe v.
Wade. At some level, the pro-choice forces appear also to have sought
to generate the impression of powerful interest group support for the
outcome desired.2 2 The net effect was that the two sides largely neu-
tralized each other, at least in terms of trying to demonstrate greater
public support for their respective positions.
The relatively even distribution of amicus filings between sides
may also explain why we do not see stronger evidence of any effect on
outcomes from high-quality briefs, as predicted by the legal model.
Insofar as the legal model accurately portrays the judicial process as
being concerned with deciding cases correctly-or insofar as organiza-
tions interested in Supreme Court cases believe that this is a fair char-
acterization of the judicial process-these organizations will have an
incentive to try to commission amicus briefs that provide additional
legal arguments and factual data that are of value to the Court in
reaching decisions consistent with jurisprudential norms. If both
sides share this belief, then we should see some increase in amicus fil-
ings-although presumably not as extreme an increase in numbers as
the interest group theory would predict.
199 See Morriss, supra note 80, at 829 (offering evidence that contemporary amicus
filers conceive of their role as a form of lobbying directed at the Supreme Court).
20 SeeBehuniak-Long, supra note 32, at 268.
201 See id. at 267.
202 See Epstein, supra note 42, at 658 (quoting sources from both pro-choice and
pro-life camps indicating that they sought through widespread amicus filings to show
the Court that their respective positions had the support of "mainstream America").
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Again, however, the net effect of this increase in amicus activity
might not be noticeable in terms of overall outcomes. This is because
each side's attempt to file amicus briefs with additional arguments and
information would to some extent cancel out the other side's effort to
come up with new arguments and information. Clearly, there are in-
herent limits to how many new ideas and background studies can be
submitted to the Court. Further, in many cases, by the very nature of
things, better arguments and empirical support will favor one side
over the other. So the potential for cancelling out the effect of a brief
on the other side will not be as dramatic under the legal model as un-
der the interest group model. Still, a combination of the legal model
and the arms race hypothesis can also explain how the incidence of
amicus participation might rise even though it is not evident from the
aggregate data that there are notable benefits from the filing of ami-
cus briefs.
The abortion controversy again illustrates how under the legal
model one might see an increase in amicus filings on both sides of an
issue. Suppose it is known that pro-choice forces plan to file an ami-
cus brief by a group of legal historians arguing that there was no tradi-
tion of regulating abortion at the time of the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 3 Pro-life forces are likely to regard such a brief
as supporting the case for a constitutional right to abortion, and
hence would feel compelled to sponsor amicus briefs seeking to show
the opposite. The net effect would be that the Court would receive
additional and perhaps valuable information to assist its deliberations.
It is unlikely, however, that the new information would tip the out-
come in one direction or another (although it might have such an
impact if only one side submitted such an historical brief).
In addition to the open door policy, the impact on outcomes, and
the arms race possibility, it is also important to consider the internal
benefits to groups of filing amicus briefs. Political scientists have long
been sensitive to the possibility that the real audience for amicus
briefs is not the Court but the membership of the group sponsoring
the brief.204 The Court's increasing proclivity to cite and quote from
2"s See Sylvia A. Law, Conversations Between Historians and the Constitution, 12 PUB.
HIsTORIAN 11 (1990) (describing her involvementin such an undertaking).
204 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 42, at 675-76 (discussing evidence that interest
groups file amicus briefs in part for "organizational maintenance" reasons); Puro, su-
pra note 2, at 247 (opining that filing an amicus brief may "be related more to a na-
tional group's desire to look good to its members than to a strong desire to affect ei-
ther the Court or the law").
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amicus briefs, documented in Part I, is particularly relevant here. Ci-
tation or quotation of a brief in the official Reports of the United
States Supreme Court can lend legitimacy to 'a group, and may be
used by the group in its publicity efforts to create the impression that
it has "access" to or "influence" with the Court. Interest groups can
use this impression to obtain new members and contributions. Even if
the group's briefs are never cited, the brief can be distributed to
members and others as evidence that the group's leadership is dili-
gently pursuing its members' interests in high places. No doubt emu-
lation enters into the picture here as well. If one group starts filing
amicus briefs and touting this to its members and others, other groups
may be more likely to start filing as well.
Finally, there may be structural explanations for the increase in
amicus brief activity. Andrew Koshner, in a recent study, has outlined
a number of possible structural causes. 05 Included in his list are in-
creased activism on the part of the Court, increased legislative activity
by Congress, and increased numbers of organized interest groups with
permanent offices in Washington, D.C. Specifically, Koshner argues
that the Court became more activist in the 1960s and 1970s, which in-
creased the possibility of securing legal change through litigation.20 r
This of course is when the tide of amicus filings started to rise. He
also points out that the volume of new legislation from Congress in-
creased substantially about the same time.0 7 New legislation increases
the number of unresolved legal questions that have an impact on in-
terest groups, and may stimulate more amicus filings. The growth of
interest groups in Washington also parallels the proliferation of ami-
cus briefs, plausibly suggesting that the permanent institutional
presence of these groups in the capital has brought the activity of fil-
ing amicus briefs within the reach of many more organizations than
was the case before the 1960s.
We would add two other factors to Koshner's list. The first is the
growth in the caseloads in the lower courts. The Supreme Court is ex-
tremely constrained in the number of argued cases it can hear and re-
2 SeeKOsHNER, supra note 21, at 11-18.
206 See id. at 55-66 (noting that interest group activism has closely tracked judicial
activism).
207 See id. at 68-78 (noting that the total number of pages of legislation passed by
Congress correlates well with the number of Supreme Court cases containing amicus
briefs).
M See id. at 84-87; see also Epstein, supra note 42, at 646-49 (providing data about
the growth in the number of groups using litigation from 1968 to 1988).
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solve in any given year. 2°9 At its peak, the Court heard around 150
cases; today, due to the abolition of mandatory appeals and the
2111
Court's own restrictive policies in granting certiorari, ° the total is
closer to half that. Meanwhile, the number of cases decided in the
lower courts has continued to grow. Thus, most litigants in the
lower courts and most groups interested in issues being litigated in
the lower courts will never be able to secure a direct ruling on their
issue from the Supreme Court. This situation may create great pres-
sure for litigants and groups to try to influence the way the Court
writes opinions in the cases it does decide, in order to secure broad
rulings or dicta that may influence the disposition of other matters in
the lower courts in a favorable manner. One obvious way to do this
would be to file amicus briefs in the most directly relevant cases.
The second factor we would add to Koshner's list is the growth in
the number of lawyers. One possible explanation for the surge in
amicus filings is that it is lawyer-driven, at least in part, rather than cli-
213ent-driven. For example, it could be argued that participation in
Supreme Court litigation is a highly prestigious activity for law firms,
useful in recruiting new associates, retaining talented lawyers in the
firm, and securing clients. 4 Given both the severe constraint on the
209 See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year Some Implications of the Su-
preme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1093-96 (1987).
210 See Supreme Court Case Selection Act, Pub. L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988)
(repealing 28 U.S.C. § 1252 and thereby eliminating almost all mandatory appeals);
Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Shrinking Docket: Justices Spurn New Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1989, at Al (noting Court's restrictive certiorari practices); Linda Green-
house, Lightening Scales ofJustice: High Court Trims Its Docket, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1992,
at 6 (same).
2 See supra note 71 (setting forth the number of Supreme Court cases from 1986
to 1995).
212 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 391-
93 (1996) (providing a table documenting the number of cases before federal courts
of appeals and federal district courts since 1892).
Such fragmentary evidence as exists regarding this possibility is conflicting.
O'NEILL, supra note 78, at 218, reports that four-fifths of the amicus filers in Bakke
stated in response to a survey questionnaire that they were persuaded to file by lawyers.
A more general survey of amicus filers at the certiorari stage by Caldeira & Wright, su-
pra note 81, at 1112, suggests that even groups with a large litigation budget and a
large number of staff attorneys are cautious in deciding when to file amicus briefs, bas-
ing the decision on their interest in, and the merits of, the individual case.
214 A number of the nation's largest law firms, including Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher;
Hogan & Hartson; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue; Kirkland & Ellis; Latham & Watkins;
Mayer, Brown & Platt; and Sidley & Austin, have offices in Washington, D.C. that in-
clude specialized practices focusing on Supreme Court litigation.
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number of cases argued before the Supreme Court and the increased
numbers of lawyers competing for opportunities to appear in such
cases, however, the chances of any law firm's having many cases before
the Supreme Court are small. Preparing and filing amicus briefs in
this context becomes a kind of surrogate activity for real Supreme
Court litigation. Law firms may have some control over the volume of
this surrogate litigation, insofar as they can either try to persuade their
clients that filing amicus briefs is a good idea or offer to file briefs at a
reduced rate or even on a pro bono basis.
Figure 24 shows, for purposes of comparison, the rates of change
in the number of amicus briefs, the number of cases in the federal
courts of appeals, and the number of practicing lawyers in the United
States from 1951 (the first date for which common comparative data
were readily available) through 1994.215 As can be seen, all three lines
increase substantially from 1951 to 1994. Interestingly, however, the
rate of change of cases in the courts of appeals tracks the rate of
change in amicus briefs more closely than does the rate of change in
the number of lawyers. This is a small piece of circumstantial evi-
dence suggesting that the imbalance between the number of lower
court cases and the severely constrained number of Supreme Court
docket slots has contributed to the rise in amicus briefs. Alternatively,
it may mean only that the rise in amicus activity mirrors more general
forces in society (whatever exactly they may be) that have produced
increased litigation in the federal courts in the last half century.
215 The sources for the data underlying Figure 24 are as follows: the number of
cases with amicus briefs comes from our database; the number of cases in the federal
courts of appeals is set forth in POSNER, supra note 212, at 391-93 tbl.A.2; and the
number of lawyers in the United States is taken from CARL A. AUERBACH, HISTORICAL
STATLSTICS OF LEGAL EDUCATION 63 tbl.12A (1997). The numbers in Figure 24 itself
are expressed in terms of percentage increases, using 1951 data as baselines.
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Figure 24: Percentage Growth in Numbers of Supreme Court
Amicus Briefs Per Case, Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
and awyers Since 1951 (Selected Years)
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-u-Lawyers 0 23% 57% 161% 215% 294% 333%
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As should be obvious, we are not in any position to offer any de-
finitive judgment about why the amount of amicus curiae activity has
risen so much in the Supreme Court during the last fifty years. Fur-
ther research will be needed in order to learn more about the relative
importance of the factors we have identified above, and perhaps other
factors as well, in explaining this striking development.
CONCLUSION
Amicus curiae briefs have become an increasingly important phe-
nomenon in Supreme Court litigation. Once a rarity, such briefs are
currently filed in the Supreme Court at the rate of about 500 per year.
If nothing else, these briefs consume significant amounts of legal re-
sources-and a significant portion of the shelf space devoted to the
Court's records and proceedings. As the number of amicus submis-
sions has soared, so have the citations and quotations of amicus briefs
found in the justices' opinions.
The obvious question is whether, or to what extent, these submis-
sions influence the decisions rendered by the Court. Although politi-
cal scientists and, to a lesser degree, law professors have turned in-
creasingly to empirical analysis in recent years, no one has undertaken
to try to answer this question by analyzing the patterns of amicus par-
ticipation and associated outcomes in a large number of cases decided
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over a significant span of time. One reason such a study has not been
done is that the political scientists who study the Supreme Court
overwhelmingly start from the attitudinal model, which explains out-
comes in terms of the preexisting political beliefs of theJustices. Such
a model suggests that amicus briefs should have little or no impact on
outcomes. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the database political
scientists use to study the Court (which was developed by attitudinal
scholars2 16) does not include information on the number of amicus
briefs filed in each case in support of each side or by key institutional
litigants. The lack of readily accessible data has undoubtedly discour-
aged empirical research.
In this Article, we report our efforts to fill this gap in our knowl-
edge by developing and analyzing a database consisting of over 6000
Supreme Court decisions over fifty years. Some of our results confirm
the findings of previous, more limited studies. Most prominently, our
survey shows that the Solicitor General enjoys a unique degree of suc-
cess as an amicus filer. We also show that other institutional lit-
gants-the ACLU, the AFLXIO, and the States-enjoy above-average
success, although their success rates fluctuate depending on whether
they support petitioners or respondents and never reach the same
level achieved by the Solicitor General.
In two respects, however, our study generates results wholly unan-
ticipated by the prior literature. First, we show that amicus filers sup-
porting respondents consistently enjoy more success than do amicus
filers supporting petitioners. For example, amicus filers who support
respondents are in general 7% more successful than those who sup-
port petitioners, and the Solicitor General is 9% more successful when
217supporting respondents than when supporting petitioners.
Second, we find that although small disparities of amicus support
(one or two briefs to none) may be associated with increased success
for the supported party, larger disparities (three briefs or more to
none) show little sign of increased success and may possibly even be
counterproductive." Undoubtedly one reason we find little support
for higher success rates with larger disparities of filings is that there
are very few cases that have such disparities. In most cases the amicus
briefs are symmetrically distributed between the parties; patterns like
216 See supra note 82 (discussing the Supreme Court Database developed by
Spaeth).
217 See supra Figures 7 & 8, 13 & 14.
218 See supra Figures 9 & 10.
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that encountered inJaffee v. Redmond, where fourteen briefs supported
respondent and none supported petitioner, are extremely rare.
Regarding the implications our results have in terms of identifying
the factors that motivate Supreme CourtJustices, we must speak much
more tentatively. The attitudinal model, at least in its undiluted form,
seems to find the least support in our findings. Amicus briefs clearly
do matter in many contexts, and this means that the Court is almost
certainly influenced by additional information supplementing that
provided by the parties to the case. The strategic actor variation on
the attitudinal model fares better, since the Court appears to be more
attentive to information supplied by the Solicitor General (represent-
ing the executive branch) and, to a lesser degree, to information com-
ing from the States than it is to the information supplied by amicus
filers in general. The interest group model, which predicts that the
Justices will respond to signals suggesting that organized interest
groups disproportionately favor one side over the other, finds only
equivocal support. Small disparities of support for one side may mat-
ter, although only weakly. Large disparities, however, perhaps be-
cause they occur so rarely, cannot be shown to have any impact; in-
deed, they appear often to work against the interests of the supported
party.
We think the explanatory model that fares the best overall is the
traditional legal model reflected in the rules and procedures of the
Court Amicus briefs matter insofar as they provide legally relevant
information not supplied by the parties to the case-information that
assists the Court in reaching the correct decision as defined by the
complex norms of our legal culture. This explanation can account for
the fact that respondents benefit from amicus support more than peti-
tioners, since it is likely that respondents on the whole are less likely to
be represented by experienced counsel. It can also account for the
apparent pattern that small disparities of support for one side over the
other are associated with greater success on the part of the supported
party, since the low-profile nature of these cases may make the Court
more attentive to legal arguments. Finally, of course, it is consistent
with the remarkable success of the Solicitor General and the signifi-
cant if less dramatic success of other institutional litigants that employ
skilled and experienced Supreme Court advocates. This does not
mean that the legal model explains all the Court's decisions. Never-
theless, we think our findings support the conclusion that legal doc-
trine matters in at least a significant portion of the Court's business.
APPENDIX A: GASES WirH TWEN'1Y OR MORE
AMICUS BRIEFS, 1946-1995
The following Table summarizes the issue in the thirty-four cases
that have triggered twenty or more amicus briefs during the fifty-year
period of our study, indicating also the year and the number of briefs
filed.
CASE SUBJECT MATTER BRIEFS
1 Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989)
2 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)
3 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990)
4 Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.,
463 U.S. 159 (1983)
5 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991)
6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)
Abortion (constitu-
tional aspects)
Affirmative action
(constitutionality)
Right to die (consti-
tutional aspects)
State tax power
(constitutionality)
Punitive damages
(constitutionality)
Abortion (constitu-
tional aspects)
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7 United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979)
8 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1 (1986)
9 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
10 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)
11 DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974)
12 Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476 (1993)
13 Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996)
14 City of L.A. v. Preferred Com-
munications, Inc.,
476 U.S. 488 (1986)
15 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.,
509 U.S. 443 (1993)
Affirmative action
(Title VII)
First Amendment
(speech)
Takings (constitu-
tional)
Copyright
Affirmative action
(constitutionality)
First Amendment
(speech)
Gay rights (Equal
Protection Clause)
First Amendment
(speech)
Punitive damages
(constitutionality)
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16 Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982)
17 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities,
515 U.S. 687 (1995)
18 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996)
19 Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994)
20 Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986)
21 Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519 (1992)
22 Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993)
23 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal.,
512 U.S. 298 (1994)
24 Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971)
25 Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Federalism/
Congressional
power
Environment (En-
dangered Species
Act)
Punitive damages
(constitutionality)
Takings (constitu-
tional)
Affirmative action
(constitutionality)
Takings (constitu-
tional)
Expert testimony
(Fed. R. Evid.)
State tax power
(constitutionality)
School desegrega-
tion (Equal Protec-
tion Clause)
First Amendment
(religion)
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26 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)
27 Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986)
28 Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989)
29 Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990)
30 Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991)
31 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995)
32 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990)
33 Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992)
34 Board of Educ. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687 (1994)
Abortion (constitu-
tional aspects)
Abortion (constitu-
tional aspects)
Punitive damages
(constitutionality)
Abortion (constitu-
tional aspects)
First Amendment
(speech)
Affirmative action
(constitutionality)
Affirmative action
(constitutionality)
First Amendment
(religion)
First Amendment
(religion)
APPENDIX B: DATA-GATHERING METHODOLOGY
This Appendix sets forth the basic features of the methodology we
used in gathering the data for our study of amicus briefs in the United
States Supreme Court. Our essential goal was to record information
for every argued case in which the Court took action on a judgment
(e.g., affirmed, reversed, vacated) or declined in a dispositive way to
do so (i.e., dismissed). The following also summarizes many (though
not all) of the types of data that we tracked and some of the more im-
portantjudgment calls that we made.
1. The Amicus Brief Study
Our database consists of virtually every case decided by the Court
from October Term 1946 through October Term 1995 in which the
Court heard oral argument (more specifically, every such case except
as indicated otherwise in this appendix).' We excluded non-argued
cases for several reasons. First, the Court ordinarily will not decide an
important issue without hearing oral argument and, conversely, will
act summarily (i.e., without argument) only where it regards the issues
as clearly settled by existing precedent. Second, the Court and the
public both tend to regard the argued cases as the Court's business for
a particular term. Third, the very low probability that important sub-
stantive issues will be decided at the certiorari or probable-jurisdiction
stage, combined with a lack of public attention to most cases until the
Court accepts them for argument and plenary treatment, means that
amicus briefs are relatively rare at this stage of the process.2
' All of the Court's signed opinions (i.e., those in which a particularJustice is iden-
tified as the author who is speaking for the Court), and virtually all of the Court's im-
portant decisions, are handed down in argued cases. The remaining opinions are un-
signed and are usually denominated as "per curiam" opinions. An argued case will
infrequently be decided in a per curiam opinion-for example, if the judgment below
is affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, or if the Court, after argument, dis-
misses the writ of certiorari as having been improvidently granted. The determination
that a case has been "argued" is straightforward, for the Court indicates the fact and
date of the argument at the beginning of each such case.
2 See Gregory A. Caldeira &John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in
the U.S. Supreme Cour=, 82 AM. POL. Sd. REV. 1109, 1116 (1988) (reporting that in 1982
Term amicus briefs were filed in only 7.78% of the Court's cases (148 out of 1906) at
the certiorari petition stage).
(835)
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Several observations concerning the inclusion or exclusion of par-
ticular types of argued cases are appropriate. Notwithstanding their
detailed nature, these observations concern only a small percentage of
the cases in our database. First, we excluded some small categories of
the Court's decisions in argued cases. In particular, we generally
eliminated any reported decisions, even if listed as argued, that did
not take action on ajudgment from another court (e.g., by affirming,
reversing, or vacating) or decline in a dispositive way to do so (i.e., by
dismissing). These included reports of decisions that merely contin-
ued cases on the docket pending some further action, acted on mo-
tions,4 or otherwise did not act on some judgment! These also in-
s To take one example, the Court occasionally followed a practice of certifying the
question to a state court if it was unclear whether a decision of the state court rested
on an adequate and independent state ground that would bar federal review. The Su-
preme Court would report its certification and continue the case on its docket pending
receipt of the answer from the state court, whereafter the Court would take up the case
or decline to do so (depending upon the answer). In this circumstance, although the
case would be reported twice (or more) in the United States Reports (each continuance
and then the ultimate disposition), it seemed improper to treat this as more than one
case. We therefore ordinarily included only the ultimate decision in our database. For
an example of this, compare Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 340 U.S. 622
(1951), which continued the case so that counsel could obtain rulings from state
courts on state or federal basis for decision below (and therefore was not included by
us), with Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 341 U.S. 491 (1951), which dis-
missed the case based on resulting rulings (and therefore was included by us).
4 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953) (denying motion to va-
cate stay and therefore not included); United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337
U.S. 78 (1949) (denying petition for certiorari in argued case); Ex parte Collett, 337
U.S. 55 (1949) (denying motion for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and
prohibition); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (denying motions for leave to
file petitions for writs of habeas corpus). But cf. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1
(1956) (denying motion to remand but also reversing judgment below and therefore
included).
- Compare, e.g., Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 354 U.S. 934 (1957) (restoring case to calendar
for reargument and therefore not included), with Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115
(1957) (deciding case and therefore included by us); Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 965
(1954) (merely entering order to show cause and therefore not included), with Alton
v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) (vacatingjudgment below and therefore included).
In cases such as these that were reported more than once, see also supra note 3, we
counted what we determined was the total number of amicus briefs filed by different
entities. The number of amicus briefs filed in such a case may have been indicated in
any of several different ways, including the following- (a) in the first report, compare,
e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (certifying question and listing one amicus
brief), with Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979) (deciding same case after certified
question was answered and listing no amicus briefs); or (b) more frequently, in the
second report, compare, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 366 U.S. 907 (1961) (setting case for rear-
gument and listing five amicus briefs), with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (decid-
ing case and listing seven amicus briefs, five of which were filed by the same entities as
stated in the report on the original argument, wherefore we counted seven amicus
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cluded cases within the Court's original jurisdiction. On the same
principle, we excluded three cases where the Court answered a certi-
fied question,7 but included one certified case where the Court exer
8cised its option to order the entire case sent up.
Second, in contrast to the foregoing, but under similar principles,
where a case was reported twice because the Court granted rehearing,
we included both decisions if the Court had the case reargued and is-
sued substantive decisions in each instance (e.g., if notable determina-
tions of law were made or action was taken on the judgment).9 We
briefs); Scales v. United States, 360 U.S. 924 (1959) (setting case for reargument and
listing no amicus briefs), with Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (deciding
case and listing one amicus brief); or (c) identically in both reports, compare, e.g., In-
ternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 363 U.S. 825 (1960), with International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (each listing the same two amicus briefs);
Ellis v. Dixon, 348 U.S. 881 (1954), with Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955) (each list-
ing the same amicus brief). Where the reports of such cases contained a discrepancy
with regard to the side on which an amicus brief had been filed, we used our best
judgment. For example, in Perez v. Browiell, 354 U.S. 934 (1957) (restoring case to cal-
endar for oral argument), and Perez v. Brownell 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (deciding case), the
first report listsJohn W. Willis as having filed an amicus brief for Mendoza-Martinez in
support of petitioner, second lists Willis simply as having filed an amicus brief for the
same individual but does not specify whether the brief supported petitioner or re-
spondent. From the context of the case, it was not difficult to conclude that the ami-
cus brief supported petitioner, and we so recorded it in our database. Finally, under
the principle set forth at the beginning of this paragraph, we did not double-count
when the same entity filed two amicus briefs. Compare, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 920 (1963) (restoring case to docket for reargument and listing one amicus brief
filed by the United States), with Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (deciding
case and listing another amicus brief filed by the United States).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). There were more than 100
original-jurisdiction cases from 1946 to 1995. These cases tend to be disputes between
states or between a state and the United States. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET
AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 294-347
(4th ed. 1996) (discussing original jurisdiction). We excluded them because they are
of a fundamentally different nature from the Court's appellate-jurisdiction cases. In
original-jurisdiction cases, the Court does not "affirm," "reverse," or "vacate" another
Court's judgment but acts instead as a Court of first instance and indeed as a fact-
finder. Results in original-jurisdiction cases therefore tend to be such actions as "mo-
tion for leave to file bill of complaint granted" or "exceptions to special master's rec-
ommendations overruled" and therefore cannot be correlated to appellate-jurisdiction
results.
See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Woods v. Hils, 334 U.S. 210
(1948); Shade v. Downing, 333 U.S. 586 (1948).
8 See28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1994) (giving Court the option); Alison v. United States,
344 U.S. 167 (1952).
9 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949) (re-
versing in partjudgment of the court of appeals in a patent case), with Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (on rehearing, discussing sub-
stantive aspects of patent law and adhering to prior decision); Marzani v. United States,
335 U.S. 895 (1948) (affirming, per curiam, the lower court), with Marzani v. United
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applied the same principle where a case was reported twice either be-
cause it was reargued, even though not technically reheard, 0 or be-
cause the Court certified a question to another court.11
Two major problems were presented in tabulating the data-one
regarding the classification of inputs (the amicus briefs), the other the
classification of outputs (the decisions of the Court). As described
further below, our objective in both respects was to reduce the inputs
and outputs to a dichotomous form as much as possible.
With respect to the classification of the amicus briefs, this process
involved classifying briefs as being either "for petitioner" or "for re-
spondent.",2 For each argued case in our fifty-year period we divided
the amicus briefs into the same categories used by the Reporter of De-
cisions in the United States Reports. There are several reasons why we
States, 336 U.S. 922 (1949) (reaffirming the earlier per curiam decision).
"0 Compare, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (deciding main constitu-
tional question in case), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (same), with
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (reporting decision after Brown and
Bollinghad been reargued on the question of relief); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962),
with Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (same case as Rusk). Again,
however, we did not include both reported decisions if one of them was not substan-
tive. Compare, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 349 U.S. 949 (1955) (merely appointing counsel
in case), with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (deciding case).
" Compare Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982) (certifying question but also de-
ciding substantive issues), with Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (deciding case
and thus also deciding substantive issues).
12 These are the terms for the parties in Supreme Court practice in cases in which
the Court's jurisdiction is based on a writ of certiorari. The party seeking to overturn
the judgment below is the petitioner, and the party defending the judgment below is
the respondent. We use the same terminology throughout, even though in some cases
the Court's jurisdiction is based not on a writ of certiorari, but on a right of appeal
(which is now rare but was in the earlier years of the study more common, see Supreme
Court Case Selection Act, Pub. L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988) (repealing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252 and thereby eliminating almost all mandatory appeals)). The technical terms
used in such cases are "appellant" and "appellee." Our database contains 4861 cases
on certiorari (79.16% of all argued cases in our database), 1279 cases on appeal
(20.83%), and one case on certificate (0.02%).
13 In some instances, we had to grapple with the difficult issue of how to count
amicus briefs in cases where the Court consolidated together two or more cases and a
different number of amicus briefs were filed in the different cases. Consider the ex-
ample of Plylerv. Doe 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, the lead case, three amicus briefs
were filed in support of petitioner, ten in support of respondent, and four "other"
briefs (see infra text accompanying notes 15-21 for a description of this last category).
However, Plylerwas decided by the Court "[tlogether with No. 80-1934, Texas et aL v.
Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children et aL" Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202
n.*. This second case had two amicus briefs supporting petitioner, nine supporting
respondent, and five "other" briefs; some of these were the same as the briefs in Plyler,
others were not. This phenomenon of multiple cases, with different numbers of ami-
cus briefs, brought together for decision was not a rarity (the number of such cases
well exceeded 100).
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chose to adopt the Reporter's classification of amicus briefs. First, this
information is readily accessible in any set of the United States Reports,
and so it is relatively easy (though still time-consuming) to gather in-
formation about a very large number of cases. Second, the Reporter's
office has a deserved reputation for meticulousness, and so we are
highly confident that the office faithfully follows its chosen method of
classification.14 Third, the Reporter's office classifies amicus briefs
based on unambiguous statements made by the amici themselves;
thus, we can be confident that the briefs listed by the Reporter as be-
ing "for petitioner" or "for respondent" do in fact support the parties
they are said to support.
The major drawback to adopting the Reporter's method of classi-
fication is that it quite clearly undercounts the true number of amicus
briefs supporting either one side or the other. At the end of the offi-
cial syllabus for each case prepared by the Reporter's office, the Re-
porter's staff adds a footnote that lists all the amicus briefs filed in the
case, arranged in three categories.' The first category consists of
We decided not to look upon such consolidated cases as separate cases, for they
were not so regarded by the Court or by the public, and such an approach would
therefore result in an overcount on the output side. Lacking an entirely satisfactory
approach, we decided to count only amicus briefs in the lead case in such instances,
with one exception: if the lead case was the subject of no amicus briefs, and a case
consolidated "together with" that case did have amicus briefs, we used the "together
with" case that contained the largest number of briefs. We viewed this imperfect ap-
proach as better than the alternatives, such as recording the "average" number of ami-
cus briefs for each side in the consolidated cases or strictly looking to the lead case (for
in the latter instance a decision could be recorded as having no amicus briefs even if
many were filed in a "together with" case).
"4 Our random sample of 99 cases, see infra text following note 18, confirms that
the Reporter's office quite faithfully applies its methodology in classifying amicus
briefs. But cf. infra note 17 (setting forth a few instances in which the Reporter has ap-
peared to include in the "other" category briefs that under the classification scheme
summarized here should have been in either petitioner's category or respondent's
category). We are also confident that the Reporter's office is highly reliable on the
even more basic question whether an amicus brief was filed in a case and, if so, by
whom. It is true that we discovered a few isolated cases where the Court but not the
Reporter refers to an amicus brief. See FCC v. iT World Communications, Inc., 466
U.S. 463, 473 n.12 (1984); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 735
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Individual examination of these briefs reveals, how-
ever, that in these instances the Court has cited amicus briefs filed in support of the
petition for certiorari.
" Until Volume 410 of the United States Reports (which was in the midst of October
Term 1972 and, perhaps more relevantly, contains the Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), this information was set forth in the text of the syllabus,
along with the information concerning counsel for the parties. Presumably, the in-
creasing number of amicus briefs (and hence the increasing space required to list the
lead amicus and all counsel on the brief who are members of the Supreme Court Bar)
prompted the move of the amicus information to a footnote (except in instances
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briefs identified by the Reporter of Decisions as amicus briefs "urging
reversal" of the judgment under review, i.e., supporting the petitioner
in cases before the Court on a writ of certiorari (an overwhelming ma-
jority of the cases) or the appellant in cases on appeal. The second
category consists of briefs denominated by the Reporter as "urging af-
firmance," i.e., supporting the respondent or the appellee. The third
category consists of what we termed "other" amicus briefs-i.e., briefs
that the Reporter of Decisions does not specify as supporting a par-
ticular party or urging a particular result.
This third category contained approximately one-fifth of all ami-
cus briefs. Based on our experience, this struck us as a substantially
larger percentage of amicus briefs than those in which in fact no re-
sult is urged upon the Court. 6 We learned from the current Reporter
of Decisions that this third category includes all briefs not containing
an indication of the desired result in the "conclusion" section at the
end of the brief.'7 This means that a brief that clearly urges a particu-
lar result throughout will not be categorized as having done so unless
the desired result is also made explicit, in accordance with conven-
tion, at the end of the brief. 8
In order to determine whether the briefs in this third category
(i.e., that of "other" briefs) deviated materially from the briefs urging
reversal or affirmance, in terms of the side that they were actually
supporting, we conducted a random survey of these "other" briefs.
Our overall study contained 1082 cases between 1946 and 1995 with
where an amicus orally argues, in which case the information concerning that amicus
remains in the text along with the information concerning the parties).
16 Using the Reporter's method, 17.49% of all the amicus briefs in our study fell
into the "other" column, whereas in the earlier study by Puro (who evidently examined
the briefs individually), only 3% of such briefs did not support either the petitioner or
the respondent. See Steven Puro, The Role of Amicus Curiae in the United States Su-
preme Court: 1920-1966, at 110 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
17 Telephone Interview with Frank D. Wagner, Reporter of Decisions, United States
Supreme Court (Oct. 29, 1997). It should be noted that we found a scattered handful
of cases in which the Reporter's office appears to have departed from its methodology
by lumping all or almost all of a case's amicus briefs in the "other" category even when
the desired results were set forth in some of the briefs' conclusion sections. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
"' For example, in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Internationa4 Inc., 508 U.S. 83
(1993), the Reporter of Decisions lists Atochem North America, Inc. as one of the enti-
ties that filed an amicus brief but does not set forth the result the company urged. See
id. at 85 n.*. Nonetheless, the Court had no difficulty understanding the company's
desires. See id. at 87 n.6 ("Atochem has also filed a brief amicus curiae in this Court,
urging our reversal of the Federal Circuit practice.").
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one or more "other" amicus briefs; the total number of such briefs was
2236. From these 1082 cases, we individually examined the amicus
briefs in ninety-nine randomly selected cases. This subset contained
256 "other" amicus briefs. After reviewing these 256 briefs, we placed
them into three sub-categories: (a) those actually urging reversal,
(b) those actually urging affirmance, and (c) true "other" briefs, i.e.,
those in which the amicus was actually supporting neither party but
either was advocating a "split-the-difference" rationale or had some
other concern it wanted to bring to the Court's attention. Although
the process itself was laborious, it was generally not difficult to deter-
mine into which category a brief should be placed. For example,
many of these briefs actually specified on their cover the party that
they were supporting, but were placed in the "other" category by the
Reporter of Decisions merely because of the absence of the appropri-
ate language in the concluding section of the brief as described
above.'9
The results of this random survey support the conclusion that the
ratio of support for petitioners and respondents among the amicus
briefs within the "other" category is approximately equal to the ratio
of support for petitioners and respondents among amicus briefs iden-
tified by the Reporter as supporting petitioners and respondents. Of
the 256 "other" amicus briefs we examined, 240 in fact supported ei-
ther the petitioner or the respondent 20  Of these 240, 127 (or
52.92%) supported the petitioner, and 113 (or 47.08%) supported
the respondent. Of all amicus briefs in our database, 5117 (or 50.32%
of all amicus briefs listed as supporting petitioner or respondent) are
listed by the Reporter of Decisions as supporting the petitioner, and
5052 (or 49.68%) as supporting the respondent. In other words, sup-
port was almost exactly evenly divided between petitioners and re-
spondents. Given that the breakdown of "other" briefs in the random
study actually supporting the petitioner or the respondent is also close
to even, we are reasonably confident that we can ignore the briefs in
the "other" column for most purposes without distorting our general
' To use an actual example, if an amicus states on the cover of its brief that the
brief is filed in "support of petitioner," and if the conclusion paragraph makes clear
the rule of law sought by the amicus but fails to state that the decision below should be
reversed, the brief will be put in the "other" column, even though it clearly supports
the petitioner. Compare, ag., Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 236-37 n.* (1976) with
Brief for Amicus Curiae State of California, Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976)
(No. 74-520).
20 In other words, only 16 of the briefs were true "other" briefs (i.e., subcategory
(c) briefs).
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overall findings.
With respect to the classification of outputs, we adopted the fol-
lowing procedure. Seeking to dichotomize our classification as much
as possible, we settled upon the basic output categories of "petitioner
wins" ("p-win") and "petitioner loses" ("p-loss"), with cases containing a
mixed result from the petitioner's perspective (e.g., a partial affir-
mance and partial reversal of a lower court judgment) falling into a
"mixed resule' category. We then placed each case into one of these
categories according to the Court's disposition or judgment in the
21
case.
This categorization of the individual decisions was fairly straight-
forward. A case was categorized as a p-loss if it reflected a failure by
the petitioner to obtain relief from the lower court's judgment. Ac-
cordingly, cases where the lower court judgment was reported as "af-
firmed" (comprising 31.90% of all argued cases) constituted the vast
bulk of p-losses. Other p-losses consisted of judgments reported as "af-
firmed in part,"2 "affirmed by an equally divided Court,"23 "dismissed,"
and "dismissed as improvidently granted."2 4 Conversely, we classified
cases where the lower court's judgment was reported as "reversed" or
"vacated" as p-wins, for each represents a setting aside of the lower
21 We relied upon the report of the Court's judgment as set forth in the syllabus of
the Reporter of Decisions preceding each case. This report is most often a verbatim
recitation or restatement of the Court's judgment as set forth as the last line of the ma-
jority, plurality, or other principal decision. In some instances, the Reporter's state-
ment of the judgment is a more succinct summary than that provided by the Court it-
self.
This category, which contained only 11 cases (or 0.18% of cases in our data-
base), consists of cases where the judgment below was only reported as being affirmed
in part, see, e.g., Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 92 (1979), and thus does
not include cases where that result was combined with another result, which was unfa-
vorable to the petitioner, see, e.g.,Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 138 (1977) (re-
portingjudgment below as "affirmed in part, vacated in part"); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 652 (1977) (reportingjudgment below as "affirmed in part, reversed in
part").
2This result, which occurred in 98 cases (or 1.60% of cases in our database), ob-
tains where, for reasons such as illness or recusal, the Court hears a case with less than
the usual nine-member complement and then divides evenly as to the proper disposi-
tion of the case. See, e.g., Cory v. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n, 471 U.S. 81 (1985); Gara v.
United States, 340 U.S. 857 (1950). Its effect is the same as an affirmance by a majority
vote of the Court, although the judgment is usually reflected merely in an order and is
not accompanied by an opinion or other statement of reasons. Such a judgment is
also not entitled to any precedential weight. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192
(1972).
21 These reported results ("dismissed" and "dismissed as improvidently granted,"
the latter being known as "dig" in the vernacular) collectively comprised 182 cases (or
2.96% of cases in our database).
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court'sjudgment.! Reversals constituted 50.11%, and vacaturs 8.26%,
of the cases in our database. Other p-wins included judgments re-
ported as "reversed in part," "vacated in part,"26 "reversed in part, va-
cated in part," and "set aside."2 Finally, the mixed result category con-
sisted of cases where judgments were reported as "affirmed in part,
reversed in part," "affirmed in part, vacated in part," "modified," "re-
manded," or under similar denominations, or where some miscella-
neous action was taken.
25The classification of cases where the judgment below was vacated as p-wins is not
entirely satisfactory. There are a substantial number of cases in which the Court va-
cates ajudgment even though it substantially agrees with the action of the court below
and the argument of the respondent. The result in these cases is a vacatur instead of
an affirmance for some other reason, such as a clarification by the Court of the appli-
cable legal standard accompanied by a remand to the lower court for application of
the standard, even if the same result seems likely, see, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 306 (1991) ("Out of an abundance of caution, we vacate the judgment of the
Sixth Circuit and remand the case for reconsideration under the appropriate standard
[which we have just announced]."), or a concern by the Court that a state court might
have reached a different result but for a misapprehension of federal law, see, e.g.,
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 624, 632 (1973) (deciding that federal
law does not control an issue and so "vacat[ing] the judgment and remand[ing] the
case for consideration of an issue under state law" in order "to avoid the risk of 'an af-
firmance of a decision which might have been decided differently if the court below
had felt free, under our decisions, to do so'" (quoting Perkins v. Banguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 443 (1952))).
While an argument exists for classifying this subset of vacaturs as p-losses or mixed
results, we decided not to do so for a number of reasons. First, such "reclassification"
would have required individually assessing each case vacating the judgment below-a
process that not only would have been substantially more time-consuming than even
our classification procedure, but also would have required close judgments in some
cases as to whether or not the case was "really" ap-win or "really" a p-loss. The fact that
our other classifications were mechanical (and thus that our data are reproducible and
confirmable by others) also made us disinclined to engage in such discretionary reclas-
sification. Second, our review of the data persuaded us that the cases at issue were a
minority of the vacaturs in our database (for an example of a case demonstrating the
ordinary equivalence of a vacatur and a reversal, see Killian v. United States, 368 U.S.
231, 239-44 (1961) (remanding after vacatur for new fact-finding and entry of a new
judgment)) and reminded us that, even if for only technical reasons, the result of the
Supreme Court's decision was that the judgment of the lower court was set aside, con-
traty to the urgings of the respondent
2 Where they were classified as p-wins, these cases had judgments that consisted
only of partial reversals or qnly of partial vacaturs. Cf supra note 22 and accompanying
text. These cases respectively made up 0.54% and 0.10% of our database.
2 This last classification of "set aside" is the Reporter's characterization of the
judgment in only four cases from our database (or 0.07%), see, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385
U.S. 276, 277 (1966); United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 146 (1961); NLRB v. Lo-
cal Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 464 (1953), and such ajudgment appears to be no
different in effect from a vacatur.
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2. The Citation Study
We gathered our data on citations and quotations by initially run-
ning a LEXIS search for Supreme Court cases within our time period
that referred to "amicus," "amici," or "friend(s) of the court" and then
examining each case turned up by our search. We chose this ap-
proach because any alternative would have been impractical in the ex-
treme. Specifically, we would have had to read closely each case from
the past fifty years (or at least each case that was not turned up by our
search results) to ensure that the Court did not employ other rhetori-
cal approaches possibly referring to an argument made by an amicus,
such as "It has been argued that .... " We concluded that the thou-
sands of additional hours that would have been required for this ap-
proach could not be justified by the marginal additional value yielded
in the form of a perhaps somewhat more precise count of the number
of references by the Court to amicus arguments. Our conclusion was
strengthened by our observation that the Court is generally consistent
in identifying any amicus to which it refers as, in fact, being an amicus.
There is an inherent difficulty in defining exactly what is meant by
a "citation" of an amicus brief in a Supreme Court opinion. The
Court frequently does not specifically cite the brief or briefs of amici
when it makes reference to some argument or information supplied
by the amici. Thus, we did not confine our count to instances of
formal citation of briefs. Instead, we included as a "citation" any ref-
erence by the Court to the argument or information provided by a
particular amicus, and did not distinguish between references to
briefs (or oral argument) of an amicus, on the one hand, and less tar-
geted references to an amicus, on the other.
Our approach in this respect arguably results in an overcount of
references to arguments of amici. Sometimes the Court will refer to
the amici in a case only in the most passing of ways, as, for example, by
saying "petitioner and its amid argue... ."2 This would not itself be a
problem if the Court were equally likely to use such a formulation
throughout the period of our study. Our review of the data that we
2' See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 415 (1992) (referring to argument of
an amicus but not citing its brief); In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
804 n.82 (1968) (same).
2 See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 282 n.35, 285 (1994) (refer-
ring to arguments of "petitioner and ami'); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369
n.1, 374, 377 (1989) (same for "petitioners and their amid," "petitioners and their
various amid," and "petitioners and their supporting amic'); Mallard v. United States
Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989) (same for "respondents and theiramici').
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collected made it clear, however, that these formulations, while not
unknown in the early years of the half-century that we examine, have
become increasingly popular as time has gone on. For example, while
we discovered no case in the first five years of our study that used the
formulation "petitioner and its amicus" or any variant thereof, there
were routinely several such cases a year by the 1980s.
On the other hand, our approach also results in some under-
counting. For example, our approach would not disclose any cases in
which the Court referred to an argument of an amicus but failed to
identify it as such. Our approach is especially likely to have under-
counted references by the Court to arguments made as amicus by the
Solicitor General, if the frequency of the Solicitor General's amicus
filings makes the Court feel less of a need to identify a particular ar-
gument by the Solicitor General as having been made in an amicus
brief." Our approach would also not disclose any case in which the
amicus making an argument was not even identified-for example, if
the Court merely stated "It has also been suggested that...."
Given our goal of focusing on the effect on the Court of amicus
arguments in a particular case, we excluded (i.e., did not count) ref-
erences to an amicus or amici that did not appear as such in the case
before the Court. This means, more specifically, that we exclud-
ed (a) the Court's references to the general phenomenon of amici
curiae,3' (b) its references to an amicus in another Supreme Court
case,32 (c) its references to an amicus who participated in the course of
lower court proceedings,33 and (d) its references to the absence of
amici.?
See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 431
(1963) (referring to argument of United States but not identifying United States as
amicus).
31 See, e.g., Insurance Group Comm. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.P., 329 U.S. 607,
621 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Government frequently intervenes as
amicus curiae in so-called private litigation to present the dominant public aspects of
such litigation.").
32 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1992) (referring to an ami-
cus brief filed by the United States Solicitor General in a 1987 case); Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 487 n.10 (1983) (referring to an amicus
brief filed by the American Public Health Association in several other cases in the same
Term).
3See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (refer-
ring to an amicus that participated in the state supreme court decision under review);
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 579-81 (1946) (discussing
whether amici in a lower federal court who argued in favor of setting aside a fraudu-
lentjudgment were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs).
See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 822 n.2 (1990) (not-
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The only close question among these was whether to count refer-
ences by the Court to amicus briefs filed in another Supreme Court
case. In some instances, such amicus briefs were filed in sufficient
proximity to the case in which they were actually cited that excluding
them from the database seemed unduly arbitrary.3 5 In most instances,
however, the briefs thus excluded were not so contemporaneous. m In
all events, we determined to exclude such briefs from our database for
a variety of reasons: such briefs were not designed to influence the
Court in the case in which they were cited; they were not presented to
the Court in that case; and such a non-discretionary approach to clas-
sification is consistent with the nature of our study. By contrast, we
included the handful of references by the Court to amici who partici-
pated at the certiorari stage, reasoning that all such briefs both were
designed to have an influence in that particular case and apparently
did
37
ing the absence of an amicus brief of the United States).
For example, in Roaden v. Kentucky, the amicus brief to which the court refers
was filed in a case decided the same day as Roaden. See 413 U.S. 496, 505 n.6 (1973)
(citing amicus brief filed in Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)); see also Planned
Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 487 n.10 (1983) (referring to an ami-
cus brief filed in three other cases that Term).
36 In Cantorv. Detroit Edison Co., for example, the amicus brief to which variousJus-
tices refer had been filed more than four decades previously in Parker v. Broun, 317
U.S. 341 (1943). See 428 U.S. 579, 587-90 (1976) (discussing amicus brief filed by the
Solicitor General in Parker); id. at 618-22 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
plurality's interpretation of the amicus brief filed in Parker).
37 See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 697 (1984) (emphasiz-
ing that an amicus brief filed by the FCC while the petition for certiorari was pending
raised additional questions about the legality of the Oklahoma statute at issue); Na-
tional R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 467
(1974) (DouglasJ., dissenting) (referring to a position taken by the Solicitor General
in an amicus brief in support of the petition for certiorari); Callen v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 332 U.S. 625, 630 & n.* (1948) (quoting an amicus brief in support of the peti-
tion for certiorari). This approach also took support from the fact that in some in-
stances the Court cited amicus briefs filed at the petition for certiorari stage without
indicating that it was not referring to briefs filed at the merits stage. Seesupra note 14.
APPENDIX C: STAISTICAL ANALYSIS
We have not included standard tests of statistical significance in
connection with the data reported in the twenty-four figures through-
out the paper. Standard tests of significance are used to determine
the extent to which traits found in a sample of a population are repre-
sentative of the population as a whole. No sampling was used in our
study. As set forth in Appendix B, our data were obtained from an
analysis of every argued case decided by the United States Supreme
Court between 1946 and 1995. Our figures present comparisons of
means for certain defined subsets of this entire population of cases.
Thus, all of the results we report, be they the mean number of amicus
briefs filed per case per decade or the change in p-win rates under
specific parameters of institutional-litigant involvement, are statisti-
cally significant because they represent the true figures for an entire
population of cases. Including the significance of the data for each
figure would be unnecessary and redundant.
The nature of amicus participation has changed greatly over the
course of the past fifty years. Many of the figures in the Article attest
not just to the increase in the number of briefs filed, but also to in-
creases in citations, quotations, level of involvement by institutional
litigants, and other changes. Because of the changing nature of ami-
cus participation across the decades covered in the database, many of
the results compare rates and means across markedly different-sized
population subsets. Thus an important caveat with regard to the data
presented in the figures is that statistical significance alone does not
necessarily equate with substantive significance-the relative impact of
each of the categories of inquiry on Supreme Court outcomes. It is
entirely reasonable to be skeptical of p-win rates produced by a subset
of the data that contains only fifteen cases versus one that contains
100 or more; the larger the size of the population, the smaller the
variance of the variable will be. Smaller N sizes are much more likely
to produce means affected by the presence of outliers; larger popula-
tion sizes tend to mitigate the likelihood of random chance outcomes
driving the data. For this reason, we have in each figure included the
number of cases falling within each category to allow the reader to
makejudgments about the robustness of the reported results.
Ultimately, our project seeks to determine whether amicus briefs
(847)
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have any influence on who wins and loses in cases brought before the
Court. Thus, it was important to move beyond a comparison of p-win
rates and develop a model that could inform this core question. Logit
regression allows us to accomplish this by measuring the effects of dif-
ferent variables on the probability of producing an outcome favorable
to petitioner.' Logit uses a dependent variable coded either 1 or 0:
either the dependent variable occurs or it does not. In this case, the
dependent variable was a p-win: either the case resulted in a win for
petitioner or it did not. The dependent variable "PWINONLY" was a
filter variable, recoding each case in the database (A=6141) into 1 or
0; 1 if the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, 0 if the Court ruled in
favor of the respondent or if a mixed result was reached.
2
The question driving our research is what impact specific ar-
rangements of participants and levels of amicus filing activity would
have on Court outcomes: e.g., what would be the outcome if a specific
party filed as amicus? In order to address this question, each of the
independent variables was coded as a dummy variable, where the
category of interest was either present in a specific case or not (1 or
0). This allowed us to assess the influence of specific case parameters
on the dependent variable; we did not include independent variables
that would be coded in a continuous ordinal manner such as total
number of briefs filed.
Table I sets forth the results for the regression used in conjunc-
tion with Figures 11 and 12 in Part V.B.
I For general explanations of logit regression, see ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA
FnLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCiENcES 482-92 (2d ed. 1986);JOHN
H. ALDRIcH & FOREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LoGon, AND PROBIT MODELS
48-66 (1984); MICHAEL 0. FINKELST & BRUCE LEVIN, STATITICS FOR LAWYERS 447-
52 (1990).
2 We omitted the mixed results in this model since a mixed result does not lend itself
to probability analysis in any substantive manner. Absent data on the issues on which
the party wins, the issues on which the party loses, and the issues that each amicus brief
had addressed, no meaningful correlation can be made between the amicus brief and
the mixed outcome. When we ran the model combining mixed results with p-wins (from
"PWINONLY' into "PWINM1X"), it did not significantly alter the results.
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Table I
Dependent variable = Case outcome is p-win*
CASE VARIABLE PARAMETER STANDARD SIGNIFI- ESTIMATE R ODDS RATIO:
ESTIMATE ERROR OF CANCE ExP(B), AT
THE A 95%
ESTiMATE CONF. INT.
SG as petitioner .7284 .0725 .0000 .1092 2.0718
(1.7973--
2.3883)
SG as respon- -.6370 .0712 .0000 -.0970 .5289
dent (.4600-
.0681)
SG as amicus .8418 .1067 .0000 .0852 2.3205
supporting peti- (1.8827-
tioner 2.8601)
SG as amicus -.9828 .1297 .0000 -.0817 .3743
supporting re- (.2903-
spondent .4826)
1-0-0 cases; SG .2405 .1104 .0294 .0182 1.2719
filtered out as (1.0244-
amicus 1.5793)
2-0-0 cases; SG .4029 .2024 .0465 .0154 1.4962
filtered out as (1.0062-
anics 2.2249)
>2-0-0 cases; -.1871 .2333 .4225 .0000 .8294
SG filtered out (.5250-
as amicus 1.3101)
0-1-0 cases; SG -.2330 .1158 .0441 -.0157 .7921
filtered out as (.6313-
amicus .9939)
0-2-0 cases; SG -.6028 .1852 .0011 -.0322 .5473
filtered out as (.3807-
amicus .7868)
0->2-0 cases; -.3257 .2118 .1241 -.0066 .7220
SG filtered out (.4767-
as amicus 1.0936)
Constant .3339 .0420 .0000
*significant variables at p < .05 level in italics
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The "Parameter Estimate" in Table I indicates how the dependent
variable changes, and in what direction, when an independent vari-
able changes from 0 to 1, holding all other variables constant. For in-
stance, the Parameter Estimate for the variable "SG as petitioner" tells
us that when the variable increases from 0 to 1-that is, when the So-
licitor General represents the petitioner in the case-the log odds of a
p-win increase by .7284.
The "Standard Error of the Estimate" describes the spread of the
distribution of the estimate; it refers to the variability of the value.
Generally, the larger the subset of cases that falls within each variable,
the smaller the Standard Error of the Estimate will be. The "Signifi-
cance" column shows the level at which the estimate for each variable
is statistically significant within the model. Independent variables that
are significant at the p < .05 level, the standard cut-off, are shown in
italics.
It is particularly important for the purposes of this study to assess
the robustness of the statistically significant variables. The "Estimate
R" measures the strength of the relationship between the independ-
ent variable and a p-win. Essentially, it is an interpretation of the
strength of the association provided by the Parameter Estimate. The
variables that are not statistically significant have R's at zero or close to
zero, implying that the coefficients may be the result of chance or
spurious behavior. The range of R is from -1 to 1: a score of 1 is a
perfect positive association, while a score of-1 is a perfect negative as-
sociation. The sign (+/-) of R indicates the direction of association:
positive and negative numbers are equally strong in measuring the
strength of association.
As evidenced by Table I, none of the variables have particularly
large R's, and we can surmise that even the statistically significant vari-
ables are not particularly robust in explaining individual case out-
comes, controlling for other factors.s We are not distressed by this,
however. We have made no attempt to develop a model that would
robustly predict Supreme Court outcomes by taking into account the
wide variety of factors that influence the Court. Rather, our limited
objective is to use logit regression models to corroborate what we find
through a comparison-of-means analysis about one slice of the uni-
verse of factors that arguably influence the Court-amicus briefs.
The far right column, "Odds Ratio: Exp(B)" (Exponent of B),
Indeed, the Nagelkerke R! for the models reflected in Tables I and II is .090 and
.096, respectively, telling us that less than 10% of the variation in the p-win outcomes is
explained by our models.
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tells us how the presence of each independent variable increases or
decreases the odds of a p-win. This gives us the ratio of the probability
of a p-win when a variable is 1 (present in a case) compared to the
probability of a p-win when the variable is 0 (not present). The associ-
ated confidence interval tells us the range of values that are plausible
for 95% of the population of cases; if we repeated the procedure, we
would expect 95% of the intervals to contain the estimate Exp(B).
Thus, when the odds ratio equals 2, as reflected in the case of the So-
licitor General as petitioner or the Solicitor General filing as amicus
on behalf of the petitioner, a p-win is twice as likely as it would be if
the Solicitor General had not filed as petitioner or as amicus. When
the odds ratio equals 0.5, as reflected in the case of the Solicitor Gen-
eral as respondent, a p-win is half as likely as it would be if the Solicitor
General had not been involved as a party. If the 95% confidence in-
terval includes the value 1-no change in odds, the status quo
benchmark-then we cannot conclude that the presence of a particu-
lar variable is associated with either a decrease or increase in the odds
of a win for petitioner. The >2-0-0 and the 0->2-0 disparity variables,
for instance, include values both greater than and less than 1. Thus,
across 95% of cases, we cannot predict whether these variables would
increase or decrease the odds of a p-win; there are too many cases on
both sides for the variable to be effective as a predictor.
All variables are significant in this model except >2-0 cases (SG
filtered out as amicus) and 0->2-0 cases (SG filtered out as amicus).
Among the statistically significant outcomes in the model, clearly the
Solicitor General is the most robust in influencing Court rulings. The
impact of the Solicitor General filing on behalf of petitioner is very
large. A case where the Solicitor General files as amicus on behalf of
petitioner, holding other influences constant, effectively more than
doubles the odds of a win for petitioner. At the same time, the Solici-
tor General filing as amicus on behalf of the respondent decreases the
odds of a p-win by more than 60%-the most robust impact of any of
the variables in this model.
The disparity cases follow the pattern we would intuitively expect,
given the information reflected in Figures 11 and 12. For each vari-
able, the Solicitor General was filtered out as amicus. With respect to
briefs supporting petitioner, the odds of a p-win are increased by a
disparity of two briefs to none, relative to one brief to none. Likewise,
the disparities on the respondent's side tend to favor respondent in
decreasing the odds of a p-win.
It is worth noting that the variables that are not statistically signifi-
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cant should not be interpreted as being wholly irrelevant. These vari-
ables may simply be so scattered as to be ineffective predictors of out-
comes. The >2-0-0 cases, for instance, may have another factor not
measured by our study influencing the outcomes so as to render this
variable a disadvantage for petitioner (as evidenced by the negative pa-
rameter estimate for these cases). As the confidence intervals demon-
strate, the influence of this particular variable alone cannot predict
whether the odds of a p-win are increased or decreased.
Table II sets forth the results of the regression used in conjunc-
tion with Figures 13-22 in Part V.C.
Table II
Dependent variable = Case outcome is p-win*
CASE PARAMETER STANDARD SIGNIFI- ESTIMATE ODDS RATIO:
VARIABLE ESTIMATE ERROR OF CANCE R ExP(B), ATA
THE 95% CONF.
ESIMATE INT.
SG as petitioner .7229 .0729 .0000 .1080 2.0605
(1.7865-
2.3765)
SG as respondent -.6324 .0718 .0000 -.0955 .5313
(.4616-
.6116)
SG as amicus .9165 .1132 .0000 .0876 2.5006
supporting peti- (2.0029-
tioner 3.1220)
SG as amicus -1.0060 .1367 .0000 -.0793 .3657
supporting re- (.2797-
spondent .4780)
Other amici .0509 .1305 .6968 .0000 1.0522
besides four (.8147-
institutional 1.3589)
litigants (SG,
States, ACLU,
AFL-CIO) in 1-
0-0 cases
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CASE PARAMETER STANDARD SIGNIFI- ESTIMATE ODDS RATIO:
VARIABLE ESTIMATE ERROR OF CANCE R EXP(B), ATA
THE 95% CoNF.
EsFnATE INT.
Other amid .2918 .2604 .2624 .0000 1.3388
besides four (.8037-
institutional 2.2303)
litigants in 2-0-0
cases
Other amid -.3647 .3442 .2894 .0000 .6944
besides four (.3537-
institutional 1.3634)
litigants in
>2-0-0 cases
Other amid -.1676 .1365 .2192 .0000 .8457
besides four (.6472-
institutional 1.1050)
litigants in 0-1-0
cases
Other amici -.3838 .2445 .1165 -.0075 .6813
besides four (.4218-
institutional 1.1002)
litigants in 0-2-0
cases
Other amid -.3736 .3180 .2401 .0000 .6883
besides four (.3690-
institutional 1.2837)
litigants in
0->2-0 cases
ACLU as amicus .5346 .1425 .0002 .0382 1.7068
supportingpeti- (1.2910-
tioner 2.2565)
ACLU as amicus -.1975 .1394 .1564 -.0010 .8208
supporting re- (.6246-
spondent 1.0786)
AFL-CIO as -.0477 .2020 .8134 .0000 .9534
amicus support- (.6417-
ing petitioner 1.4165)
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CASE PARAMETER STANDARD SIGNIFI- ESTIMATE ODDS RATIO:
VARIABLE ESTIMATE ERROR OF CANCE R ExP(B), ATA
THE 95% CONF.
ESTIMATE INT.
AFL-CIO asami- -.4814 .1955 .0138 -.0221 .6179
cus supporting (.4212-
respondent .9064)
State as amicus .2285 .1277 .0736 .0120 1.2567
supporting peti- (.9784-
tioner 1.6141)
State as amicus -.4341 .1166 .0002 -.0378 .6479
supporting re- (.5155-
spondent .8143)
Court cited .1155 .1538 .4526 .0000 1.1225
amicus support- (.8303-
ing petitioner 1.5174)
Court cited -.1681 .1611 .2966 .0000 .8453
amicus support- (.6165-
ing respondent 1.1590)
In 1-1-0 cases, .3569 .2996 .2336 .0000 1.4289
petitioner's law- (.7943-
yer more expe- 2.5705)
rienced before
Court
In 1-1-0 cases, -.2445 .2622 .3511 .0000 .7831
respondent's (.4684-
lawyer more 1.3092)
experienced
before Court __F____
Constant .3401 .0442 .0000
*significant variables at p <.05 level in italics
The Parameter Estimate, Standard Error of the Estimate, Signifi-
cance, Estimate R, and Odds Ratio in Table II all express the same
values as they do in Table I. Significant variables at the p < .05 level
are again shown in italics.
In this model, none of the disparity-of-amicus-support variables at-
tains significance. Because each of the institutional litigants in the
study (Solicitor General, ACLU, AFL-CIO, the States) has been given a
dummy variable, they have all been filtered out of the analysis of dis-
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parities of amicus support to avoid duplication of effects. Either be-
cause this reduced the number of cases presenting disparities, or be-
cause the other institutional litigants (besides the Solicitor General)
are responsible for much of the effect of disparities in Table 1, we find
no significant relationship between disparities of amicus support and
court outcomes.
In contrast, the significance and influence of the Solicitor General
in the more complete model remain roughly as robust as in the first
model. The impact of other institutional litigants is highly varied.
The ACLU is the only one of the three that has a statistically signifi-
cant impact when it files on behalf of petitioner, increasing the odds
of a p-win; the AFL-CIO and States each have an impact toward de-
creasing the odds of a p-win when filing on behalf of respondent, but
show no consistent pattern of influence when supporting petitioner.
It is also likely that the spread of case outcomes in the subset popula-
tion, particularly in the AFL-CIO amicus filings on behalf of peti-
tioner, was simply too wide and random to produce an effective pre-
dictor variable.
Noticeably, neither the "citation" variables nor "experience" vari-
ables achieved a measure of statistical significance. Judging from the
varied spread of possible increases or decreases in odds of a p-win
when any of these four variables is present, it is likely that these factors
by themselves do not hold much influence. Whether or not cases in
these categories are p-wins or p-losses is more dependent on a host of
other variables.
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